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I.

Losses Flowing from Impecuniosity

INTRODUCTION

A court determining the quantum of recovery in an action for damages
is influenced by considerations of policy to the same extent as a court determining the existence of liability. Such considerations are presented in their
starkest form when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages traceable in part to
his own impecuniosity.
The extent of a plaintiff's financial resources1 may affect the quantum
of both his pecuniary2 and his nonpecuniary3 losses. This article, however,
will be concerned with only one question: what is the court to do when a
plaintiff, suing in tort or in contract, and admittedly entitled to some damages, seeks to recover damages in respect of losses that a person of greater
means would have suffered to a lesser extent, if at all?
The undivided voice of the House of Lords purported to answer this
question in 1933. Yet so ambiguous was the answer that it gave, so unworkable the distinctions that it drew, that today the jurisprudence on this
point is in a state of hopeless confusion. As a result of high inflation rates,
the question is coming before the courts with increasing frequency, and
agreement on some basic issues is needed to bring some measure of certainty to the area.
This article will examine the decisions of the Commonwealth courts
and mention American decisions for comparative purposes. Various options
open to the courts will be set out and analysed. The cases will be examined
© Copyright, 1982, Gordon Phillips.
Mr. Phillips is currently articling with the firm of McAlpine, Roberts and Hordo,
Vancouver, British Columbia. The author would like to express his appreciation to
Professor (now Madam Justice) McLachlin for the valuable assistance she provided
through her comments and suggestions. The opinions expressed, however, are those of
the author alone.
1The extent of a defendant's resources will not affect the quantum of a plaintiff's
compensatory damages (Andrews v. Grand & Toy, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 243, 83
D.L.R. (3d) 452 at 463, [1978] 1 W.W.R. 577 at 587-88; Lim Poh Choo v. Camden
and Islington Area Health Authority, [1980] A.C. 174 at 187, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 44 at 52,
[1979] 2 All E.R. 910 at 917-18), though it might affect the quantum of punitive or
exemplary damages (Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 at 1228, [1964] 2 W.L.R. 269
at 331, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 at 412).
This is the most common American position too, with most states agreeing that
the defendant's financial status can affect the quantum of the punitive damages assessed
against him, and disagreeing only over the stage of the trial at which evidence of that
status can be introduced: Devane, The Use of Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive
Damages in New York: "Rupert v. Sellers" (1980), 44 Alb. L. Rev. 422.
2 One instance of this is found in the principle that an injured party can recover
the full extent of his lost wages, even though he may have been engaged in an extraordinarily lucrative occupation: The Arpad, [1934] All E.R. 326, 152 L.T. 521, 50
T.L.R. 505; Smith v. London & S.W. Ry. Co. (1870), L.R. 6 C.P. 14, [1861-73] All
E.R. 167, 23 L.T. 678, aff'g (1870) 5 C.P. 98.
3 For the thesis that pain and suffering will be experienced in different degrees by
persons of different social levels, compare Phillips v. London & S.W. Ry. Co., [1874-80]
All E.R. 1176, 42 L.T. 6, 49 LJ.Q.B. 233, with Radebe v. Hough, [1949] 1 S.A.R. 380
and Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters, Ltd., [1968] 2 Q.B. 322 at 340-41, [1968] 2
W.L.R. 743 at 752-53, [1968] 1 All E.R. 726 at 736-37 (C.A.).
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background: Lord Wright's decision in the classic case of
against a common
4
The Liesbosch.

II. THE CASES BEFORE 1933
Before 1933 the problem of the impecunious plaintiff had arisen in
various contexts. In each context, rules had been developed to determine the
extent of his recovery. But the common thread of his impecuniosity had not
been perceived, and no attempt had been made to develop general principles
on which the decisions could rest.
Some of the early cases involving questions of impecuniosity will be
considered under a few general headings in the following sections. Although
they have seldom been considered, these early cases may prove useful in
interpreting The Liesbosch, a case whose interpretation is long overdue.
A.

Impecunious Plaintiffs Recover: Cases Involving the Sale of Goods or
the Loan of Stock

In suits for a borrower's failure to return stock, and in suits for a
vendor's failure to deliver goods paid for in advance, the courts had established not only that the plaintiff's impecuniosity would be presumed, but
that it would excuse his failure to purchase substitute goods. This meant
that he could recover damages assessed as of the trial date rather than the
date of breach.
In actions for the non-return of stock, the plaintiff recovered the value
of the stock as of the date of the trial.5 It was argued that he should have
mitigated his damages by purchasing other stock on the day on which his
own stock should have been returned to him, and that the defendant should
not be held responsible for the amount by which the stock's value rose
between that date and the trial date. To this the courts replied that a plaintiff would not be penalized for his failure to purchase substitute stock be-

4 Owners of Dredger Liesbosch v. Owners of Steamship Edison, [1933] A.C. 449,
49 T.L.R. 289, 102 L.J. P. & A. 73 (H.L.); varying sub nom The Edison, [1932] P. 52,
48 T.L.R. 224, 101 L.J. P. & A. 12 (C.A.).
5
Shepherd v. Johnson (1802), 2 East. 211, 102 E.R. 349; M'Arthur v. Lord Seaforth (1810), 2 Taunt. 257, 127 E.R. 1076; Downes v. Back (1816), 1 Stark. 318, 171
E.R. 485; Owen v. Routh (1854), 14 C.B. 327, 139 E.R. 134, 23 LJ.C.P. 105. See also
Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co. (1956), 20 W.W.R. 359 at 366-67.

The selection of judgment date rather than breach-date as the appropriate date as
of which to assess damages could in those days have been justified without reference to
the plaintiff's presumed impecuniosity if the actions had been brought in detinue or in

conversion: McGregor on Damages (14th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980) para.

1051 [hereinafter McGregor]. But the actions were in fact all brought in contract.
The principle upon which those cases were based was doubted by Sidney Smith

J.A. in Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co. (No. 3) (1957), 22 W.W.R. 207 at 21314, 8 D.L.R. (2d) 97 at 103-104, and was finally rejected by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Asamera Oil v. Sea Oil and Gen. Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633 at 651, 89

D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 13, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 301 at 315, where Estey J. described them as
raising "no responsibility in the plaintiff to mitigate his loss." As will be seen, the cases
ostensibly raised that responsibility, but permitted the plaintiff to evade it.
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cause "the borrower holds in his hands the money of the lender, and thereby
prevents him from using it." 6
In short, the plaintiff could not have purchased substitute stock because he did not have access to the stock in the hands of the defendant. The
premise compels the conclusion if, and only if, the plaintiff had no source
of funds 7 other than the stock held by the defendant. These cases could

thus be cited as authority for two propositions: first, impecuniosity would
be assumed," and second, impecuniosity would excuse a failure to purchase

goods in substitution for those wrongfully withheld by another. 9

The first of these propositions did not escape comment. In Robertson v.

Dumaresq'0 Lord Chelmsford
sumption of impecuniosity. In
date, rather than the value as
had wrongfully failed to grant

recognized the unrealistic nature of an asallowing the respondent the value as of trial
of breach-date, of land which the appellant
him, he stated:

mhe right of the respondent to the highest value of the lands which he has not
received in performance of the promise made to him seems to be even stronger
than that of the lender of stock upon the borrower's omission to replace it. The
owner of the stock might have the means of purchasing other stock at the
day....
11

But whatever doubt this cast upon the first of the two propositions, Lord
Chelmsford did not suggest that the trial-date rule was inappropriate in the
case of a plaintiff who was indeed too impecunious to replace the stock.
The "stock loan" cases could thus have been cited in support of the following proposition: an impecunious plaintiff will not be penalized for his failure
to replace a chattel to which he was entitled and of which he was deprived,
if his impecuniosity made it impossible for him to do so.
The same principle could have been supported by cases concerning the
non-delivery of goods whose purchase price was paid in advance. These

6Gainsford v. Carroll (1824), 2 B. & C. 624 at 625, 107 E.R. 516 at 516, 2
L.J.K.B. (O.S.) 112 at 113. In Dunn v. Callahan (1908), 1 Alta. L.R. 179 at 184, 8
W.W.R. 169 at 173, Beck J. indicated that the assessment of damages as of the trial
date in actions for not replacing stock was due to the fluctuating or speculative character of stock. While the rule could have been based on such grounds it seems in fact
to have been based on considerations involving the plaintiff's assumed impecuniosity.
7 In this article the word "funds" will, unless the contrary is stated, refer to the
combination of funds in hand and funds available, including credit. Both Commonwealth and American courts usually treat a plaintiff with credit as if he had the cash
itself: see, e.g., CarriageBags, Ltd. v. Aerolinas Argentinas, 521 F. Supp. 1363 at 1367

(1981).
8 In fact the ratio of those cases is only that non-impecuniosity will not be presumed; but their tenor is that impecuniosity will be presumed.
0 The effect of this combination would be that the plaintiff would never have to
mitigate his damages by purchasing substitute stock. It would seem that impecuniosity
was irrebutably presumed.
10 (1864), 10 L.T. 110, 15 E.R. 827 (P.C., N.S.W.).
111d. at 113 (L.T.), 837 (E.R.). In Horsnail v. Shute, [1921] 3 W.W.R. 270, 62
D.L.R. 199, 30 B.C.R. 189 (C.A.), Macdonald J.A. treated Robertson as a case in
which the plaintiff had pre-paid the purchase price.
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cases can best be understood if the rationale of the rule establishing the
prima facie measure of damages for non-delivery is kept in mind. The rule
is that the measure of damage will prima facie be the difference between the
contract price and the market value of the goods where the latter is evaluated as of the date on which the goods should have been delivered. 12 Delivery date is the appropriate date because "the plaintiff had his money in
his own possession, and might have gone into the market, and bought other
[goods] as soon as the contract was broken."'1 3 In other words, from the
mere fact that a plaintiff had obligated himself to have one sum, the contract price, on hand on a certain day, the court inferred that he must have
had a greater sum, the market price, on hand on that day. This prima facie
rule conceals a presumption of unlimited assets.
In fact, there are several possibilities:
(1) The plaintiff may indeed have had sufficient disposable funds to
purchase substitute goods in the market on the delivery day. In that case
the prima facie measure is the correct one.
(2) The plaintiff may have had more than the contract price, but less
than the market price, in disposable funds on the delivery day. In that case
he could be described as having been "too impecunious to mitigate." The
problem has never arisen, and it is unclear what effect the courts would give
to such impecuniosity.' 4
(3) The plaintiff may have had less than the contract price in disposable funds on the delivery day. In that case, ordinarily, he suffered no damages; for even if the defendant had tendered the goods on the appointed
day, the plaintiff would have been unable to pay for them, and the defendant
would have been justified in refusing to deliver; 15 in this case the defendant's
non-delivery would not attract damages. This also holds true wherever the
defendant has committed an (accepted) anticipatory breach if it can be
shown that the plaintiff's inability to pay the price on delivery was already
inevitable. 16
This will not always be true, however, for sometimes a vendor will not
of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s. 54(3).
13 Shaw v. Holland (1846), 15 M. & W. 136 at 146, 153 E.R. 794 at 798 per
Parke B. See also Barrow v. Arnaud (1846), 8 Q.B. 605, 115 E.R. 1004, 10 Jur. 319,
and Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 647 (S.C.R.), 10 (D.L.R.), 311 (W.W.R.).
1In 1938 Lord Wright, citing no cases, said that "if a seller defaults in delivering
the goods sold, the buyer, if there is a market, can recover only the difference between
the contract and the market price if the market has risen, and only nominal damages if
the market has fallen, even though he can show that want of money or credit would
have prevented him from availing himself of the market and covering the default."
Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1939) at 114
[hereinafter Wright].
15Sale of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s. 32; Rawson v. Johnson (1801), 1
East 203, 102 E.R. 79; Wexelman v. Dale, [1917] 3 W.W.R. 235, 35 D.L.R. 557, 10
Sask. L.R. 289 (C.A.).
16 The Mihalis Angelos, [1970] 3 All E.R. 125, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 601, [1971] 1 Q.B.
164. The requirement of inevitability may require reappraisal: see Jobling v. Associated
DairiesLtd., [1981] 3 W.L.R. 155, [1981] 2 All E.R. 752 (H.L.).
12Sale
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be able to excuse his failure to deliver by showing that the purchaser would
not have been able to pay the purchase price on delivery. This will be the
case if the vendor's obligation to deliver is not predicated upon the plaintiff's
payment upon receipt. This can only mean one of two things.
First, the vendor might have agreed to accept payment later, that is, to
extend credit to the plaintiff. It would be possible in such a case for a plaintiff to have had insufficient funds to buy replacement goods on the delivery
date, and yet to have suffered damages. Should his lack of funds excuse his
failure to purchase replacement goods, and enable him to recover the difference between the contract price and the market price as of trial date, which
may be higher than the difference as of delivery date? This question was
finally answered affirmatively in 1952, when the Court of Appeal decided
Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co.17
Second, the vendor might already have been paid. It is here that a
second line of cases involving impecunious purchasers of goods appeared.
In Elliott v. Hughes,'8 a purchaser who had paid in advance recovered the
difference between the contract price and the market price as of the date of
trial plus the monies he had already paid. Although the report does not
indicate the judge's reasoning, the decision must have been based on the
same grounds as the cases concerning the non-return of stock, which were
cited in argument in Elliott. It was on precisely those grounds, that impecuniosity will be assumed and will excuse a failure to purchase substitute
goods at the time of the breach, that the Illinois Supreme Court decided
Illinois CentralRailway Co. v. Cobb, Christy & Co.19 In that case the plaintiff had sold corn to the army, and had commissioned the defendant to ship
the corn to Cairo, Illinois, where the army was to take delivery. The defendant delayed the shipment, in breach of its contract with the plaintiff, and
as a consequence the plaintiff lost the profits that it might have made under
its contract with the army. The Court noted that the lost profits could be
recovered under the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale0 because the defendant
was aware of the existence of the sale to the army. The Court then disposed
of the argument that "the plaintiffs should have gone into the market at
Cairo and have [sic] bought corn to fill their contract, and that, not having
done so, they can only recover the market price," 2' 1 by stating:
17 [1952] 2 Q.B. 297, [1952] 1 All E.R. 970, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1066 (C.A.). There
were, however, American decisions bearing on this point. In actions for non-delivery
by a purchaser to whom the vendor was to extend credit, it had in some states been
held that the purchaser had to mitigate his damages by buying the goods for cash if
the defaulting vendor offered to sell them providing he was paid on the spot [cf. Payzu
Ltd. v. Saunders, [1919] 2 K.B. 581, affd 89 LJ.K.B. 17, [1918-19] All E.R. 219
(C.A.)], but that he would not be penalized for his failure to do so if he did not have
the funds: Plesofsky v. Kaufman & Flonacker, 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S.W. 204, 1 A.LR.
433 (1919); Weber Implement Co. v. Acme Harvesting Machine Co., 268 Mo. 363,
187 S.W. 874 (1916).
18 (1863), 3 F. & F. 387, 176 E.R. 173.
19 64 Ill.
Rep. 128 (1872). Although the case did not involve breach of a contract
of sale, the same principle should apply.
20 (1854), 9 Exch. 341, 156 E.R. 145, 18 Jur. 358.
2
1Supra note 19, at 142.
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However this might be, if they had not already invested their money in the corn
in controversy, we can not so hold in the present case. It would be very unreasonable to require one, who has bought and paid for an article, to have the money
22
in his pocket with which to buy a second, in case of non-delivery of the first.

These cases, then, support the same two propositions as the cases concerning the failure to return stock. But just as those cases were doubted in
Dumaresq,
so these cases were rejected (this time in ratio) in Startup v.
23
Cortazzi.

In Startup, the plaintiffs had paid one-half of the purchase price in
advance. The old cases concerning loans of stock were cited to the Court.
But the Court found that special damages (by which the rise in the market
price from delivery date to trial date was meant) could not be awarded, as
they had not been established. Lord Abinger C.B. said in reference to the

purchase monies that had been paid in advance: "[ilt was not proved that
the plaintiffs could have made more than 5 per cent on that money, or that
they had not credit at their bankers to that extent, and thereby had sus-

tained any peculiar inconvenience." 2 4 It would seem that special damages
could have been recovered if the plaintiffs had been able to show that they
had insufficient credit to purchase replacement goods.2 5 As the burden was

cast upon the plaintiffs to show that they could not have mitigated their
damages in this way, a prima facie case must have been made out that they
could have done so.

6

This could only have been done with the aid of a

presumption of non-impecuniosity.
Startup can be taken to stand for the proposition that a party will be
assumed to be in funds. It reinforces, however, the principle deduced from
the above-mentioned cases concerning non-delivery of goods paid for in advance, that impecuniosity (if it can be established) will excuse the plaintiff's
failure to replace a chattel to which he was entitled but which was not delivered to him, if his impecuniosity made such replacement impossible.
22

1d.
(1835), 2 Cr. M. & R. 165, 150 E.R. 71, 4 L.J. Ex. 218. The question of the
measure of damages if the purchase price was paid in advance and the market was
falling at the date of the breach was treated as open by Atkin L.J. in Aronson v.
Mologa Holzindustrie AIG Leningrad (1927), 32 Com. Cas. 176 at 289-290, 138 L.T.
470 at 475 (C.A.). This is taken as leaving open the question of whether Startup or
Elliott is to dominate where the two decisions conflict: Benjamin, Benjamin's Sale of
Goods (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974) at para. 1267; McGregor, supra note 5, at
paras. 225, 591; Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 657-58 (S.C.R.), 18 (D.L.R.), 320
(W.W.R.) per Estey J. For a modem case analogous to Startup, see Cain v. Bird
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile (1977), 12 O.R. (2d) 532, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 484 (H.C.).
24 Id. at 168 (Cr. M. & R.), 72 (E.R.), 219 (L.J. Ex.).
25Lord Abinger assumed that such damages could not have been suffered if the
plaintiff had a line of credit sufficient to enable him to bring his monies up to the contract price of the goods. He did not contemplate the case of a plaintiff with a line of
credit sufficient to enable him to bring his monies up to that level, but insufficient to
enable him to bring his monies up to the market price on the delivery day.
26The onus of showing that the plaintiff should have mitigated lies on the defendant: Roper v. Johnson (1873), 8 C.P. 167 at 181, 42 L.J.C.P. 65 at 69; Red Deer
College v. Michaels and Finn, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 324, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 386, [1975] 5
W.W.R. 575.
23
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In 1933, then, there was some support for the principle that the impecuniosity of a plaintiff would, in some circumstances, affect the quantum
of damages which he could recover.
Impecunious Plaintiffs Recover: Cases Involving the Duty to Mitigate
The cases discussed in the preceding section may be seen as exemplifying the general principle that a party may recover damages which, but for
his impecuniosity, it would have been reasonable for him to have taken
steps to avoid. Apparently the only pre-1933 Commonwealth decision in
which this point was explicitly made was Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh &
27
District Water Trustees.
B.

The defendants in that case obtained an interim injunction preventing
the plaintiff from working various mineral seams near the defendant's water
pipes. The injunction was too broad, and should only have prohibited the
plaintiff from depriving one of those pipes of vertical support; the plaintiff,
effectively prohibited by the broad injunction from carrying on its business,
was ruined.
The measure of damages alone concerned the House of Lords. Matters
were complicated by the fact that the lower courts had assessed damages

without indicating the manner in which the assessment was made. Lord
Collins interpreted a passage in the judgment of the Court of Sessions2 8 as
meaning only that lost profits could not all be recovered by a plaintiff whose
financial position had been so precarious as to make it doubtful that it would
have made those profits even had all gone well.29 He then added:
It was contended that this passage implied that the defenders were entitled to
measure the damage on the footing that it was the duty of the company to do all
that was reasonably possible to mitigate the loss, and that if, through lack of
funds, they were unable to incur the necessary expense of such remedial measures
the defenders ought not to suffer for it.... In my opinion, the wrong-doer must
take his victim talem qualem, and if the position of the latter is aggravated because he is without the means of mitigating it, so much the worse for the wrongdoer, who has got to be answerable for the consequences flowing from his tortious
acts.30

This principle was evidently taken for granted in numerous cases decided over the next three decades. Thus, in Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders,' Mc27 [1907] A.C. 291, 76 L.J.P.C. 79. In Frost v. Knight (1872), 7 L.R. Exch. 111
at 115, [1861-73] All E.R. 221 at 225, 41 L.J. Ex. 78 at 80, Cockburn C.J. had said
that a jury should take into account only what the plaintiff "has done or has had the
means of doing," but no court has ever taken this up. See also the similar words of
Lord Wrenbury in Jamal v. Moola Dawood, Sons & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 175 at 179, 114
L.T. I at 3, 85 L.J.P.C. 29 at 30-31 (India), and of Tindal C.J. in Barrow, supra note
13, at 610 (Q.B.), 1006 (E.R.), 322 (Jur.).
28 Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh & District Water Trustees (1905-1906), 8 Scot.
Sess. Cas. (5th) 731, at 752 per Lord Dunedin.
29 Supra note 27, at 303-304 (A.C.), 83-84 (L.J.). None of the other Law Lords
mentioned this point. Compare B.C. Lightweight Aggregate Ltd. v. Canada Cement
LaFarge Ltd. (1980), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 587, at 632 (S.C.), afd (1981), 123 D.L.R.
(3d) 66, 26 B.C.L.R. 292 (C.A.), and see note 238, infra.
30 Clippens Oil, id.
31 Supra note 17, at 586.
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Cardie J. noted in passing that whether or not the plaintiff should have taken
certain steps to mitigate her damages was to be determined by considering,
inter alia, her financial position; the point was evidently too clear to require
comment.
It seemed equally clear to McPhillips J.A. of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal. In Cain v. Schultz,32 it was argued that the plaintiff should
have mitigated its losses by paying a particular licence fee. This was rejected by the learned judge who noted that "it might be a very inconvenient
rule of law, and might work great injustice if it were the rule of law, because there might be the inability to advance the licence fee." 33 He then
indicated that the likelihood of a plaintiff being too impecunious to mitigate
his losses justified the rule 3 4that a plaintiff need not expend money in an
effort to mitigate his losses
Many American cases could also, in 1933, have been cited to illustrate
this point.3 5 Numerous courts had held that the plaintiff in a personal-injury
suit could excuse his failure to seek the medical assistance that a reasonable
man would ordinarily have sought by showing that he had insufficient funds
to procure such assistance. :0 Since a plaintiff in an action for wrongful attachment of his automobile could have posted security and had the vehicle
released, his damages were ordinarily limited to the cost of posting such
security plus damages for the temporary deprivation of his vehicle but this
limitation
would not apply if he had been too impecunious to furnish se7
curity 3
One court, in an action for wrongfully ejecting a train passenger who
32 (1926), 38 B.C.L.R. 332, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 600
33Id. at 335 (B.C.L.R.), 602-603 (W.W.R.).
34 1d. The case usually cited to support the "rule"
1 K.B. 510, [1944] 1 All E.R. 483, 171 L.T. 234. The
e.g., Asamera Oil, supra note 5.
35
In addition to the cases described in the text,

(C.A.).
is lewelowski v. Propp, [1944]
rule has long been discredited;
see Pratt Consol. Coal Co. v.

Vintson, 85 So. 502, 204 Ala. 185 (1920); American Smelting & Refining Co. v.

Riverside Dairy & Stock Farm, 236 F. 510 (1916). Lord Collins' words are echoed in
American Law Institute, 4 Restatement of the Law, Second: Torts (Washington: A.L.I.
Pub., 1977), § 918, para. e.
36
Feather v. City of Reading, 155 Pa. 187, 26 A. 212 (1893); Glasgow v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 191 Mo. 347, 89 S.W. 915 (1905); Biggie v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. Co., 159 Mo. App. 350, 140 S.W. 602 (1911); McCauley v. Detroit United

Ry., 167 Mich. 297, 133 N.W. 11 (1911); Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So.
378 (1932); Texas Utilities Co. v. Dear, 64 S.W. 2d 807 (1933). The same principle has
since been applied many times: see, e.g., North American Acc. Ins. Ca.v. Henderson,
180 Miss. 395, 177 So. 528 (1937); Mengel Co. v. Parker, 192 Miss. 634, 7 So. 2d
521 (1942); for a more severe attitude, see Owens v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co.,
1 L.R.A. 75, 35 F. 715 (1888), and Rusoff v. O'Brien, 99 R.I. 153, 206 A. 2d 209
(1965).
37 W.B. Moses & Sons v. Lockwood, 33 A.L.R. 1467, 295 F. 936 (1924), followed
in Davis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 255 F. 2d 534 (1958); Lake Village Implement Co. v.
Cox, 252 Ark. 224, 478 S.W. 2d 36 (1972); Gray v. American Surety Co. of N.Y., 129

Ca. 2d 471, 277 P. 2d 436 (1954). Moses was approved on this point in Rohlick v.
Parhowsky (1980), 4 Man. R. (2d) 181 (Q.B.) in dictum.
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had paid his full fare,38 had held that, "the rule requiring the passenger to
pay a second time, if he has the money, in compliance with his duty to
minimize defendant's loss"8 9 did not apply to a plaintiff with insufficient
funds to meet the conductor's demand for an additional fifty-one cents, nor
did it require him to attempt to borrow that sum from his friends or acquaintances on the train. In another such action, the plaintiff was refused a
transfer to a connecting streetcar, and had to walk six blocks to her destination, suffering a serious relapse as a result. 4 ° It was argued that she should
have purchased a ticket on the streetcar to which she needed to transfer.
The court held that her lack of funds for this purpose excused her failure
to do so:
But plaintiff owed defendant no duty to be prepared for an emergency forced
upon her by defendant's wrong, nor can defendant be relieved of responsibility
for the full measure of her suffering by reason of the fact that [sic] her unpreparedness for a wrong she need not have anticipated.... Her lack of money was
thus an important factor in the production of the injury suffered, and for it, as
for all the proximate results of the wrong done, defendant was responsible... 41

In an action for breach of an agreement to sharecrop, 42 which the court
treated as "of the nature of a contract for personal services,

' 43

it was held

that the plaintiff was under a duty to mitigate his damages by accepting
employment of the same general nature, but that:
If the crop season at the time of the breach of the contract had not advanced too
far to permit the plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable effort, and at a reasonable
expense, to rent similar lands at the same place and to replace the stock and tools
that the defendants agreed to furnish, evidence of the financial condition of the
plaintiff at the time the contract was breached would be relevant on the question
or not the plaintiff, by reasonable efforts, could have minimized
as to whether
44
the damages.

Each of these decisions applied a principle without making any attempt
to show that it followed logically from other well-accepted principles. This
38

Light v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co., 165 Mich. 433, 130 N.W. 1124 (1911).
It is not clear if this is indeed a case of a plaintiff failing to mitigate. It is arguably a
case of a plaintiff suffering damage of an unforeseeable nature. See also Sloane v. S.
Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Ca. 668 at 684, 44 P. 320 at 324 (1896), where a passenger who was
wrongfully put off her train had no money, walked towards a nearby town in which a
relative lived, and was given a ride after walking for a while. The Court held that the
jury should not have been directed "not to allow compensation for any injury sustained
[sic] the walk, upon the ground that, if she had waited a few hours, she could have
gone on the [next] cars."
In such cases the plaintiff's lack of funds on her person caused her losses. Impecunious persons often have no funds on their person, but the same is often true of
non-impecunious persons as well, and the cases can be seen as cases in which the
plaintiff's impecuniosity, if indeed it existed, was irrelevant.
39 Light, id. at 436 (Mich.), 1126 (N.W.). This rule is not part of Canadian law:
Toronto Ry. Co. v. Grinsted (1895), 24 S.C.R. 570.
4
OBirmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Hatton, 187 Ala. 573, 65 So. 934 (1914).
She was recovering from childbirth. See the penetrating words of Griffith J. in Tri-State
Transit Co. v. Martin, 179 So. 349 at 350 (1938).
41 Hatton, id. at 577 (Ala.), 936 (So.).
42 T.L. Farrow Mercantile Co. v. Riggins, 14 Al. A. 529, 71 So. 963 (1916).
43
Id. at 535 (Al. A.), 965 (So.).
44
Id. at 536 (Al. A.), 966 (So.).
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was inevitable, for the principle that a plaintiff is not to be penalized for his
failure to expend monies which he did not possess is truly a first principle,
to be rejected or accepted on policy grounds alone. 45 The principle expounded by Lord Collins in Clippens Oil had, however, been accepted wherever it had been considered: impecuniosity will excuse a failure to mitigate. 40
Closely connected to this issue is the issue of whether impecuniosity
will excuse a failure to crystallize one's losses. Once it was accepted that a
person whose chattel had been tortiously injured could recover damages in
respect of being deprived of its use, the question arose, could he recover
such damages even if he had not rented a replacement and thus crystallized
his losses? Clearly, the damages would be difficult to assess unless a replacement had been rented, in which case the damages would simply be the
rental charges, but American courts had held that they could be recovered
even if no replacement had been rented. 4 7 To hold otherwise would be to
place a condition of financial ability to rent another chattel upon the plaintiff's right to recover, and "the [l]aw cannot condone such a condition." 4 8
C.

Impecunious Plaintiffs Do Not Recover: Cases Involving
Forced Bankruptcy

Two nineteenth-century English cases established that a plaintiff could
not recover damages for having been driven into bankruptcy after the defendant deprived him of his money or assets. That rule may have been an
application of a general rule that a plaintiff may not recover damages which
he would not have suffered if he had had unlimited funds.
In Hodgson v. Sidney49 the plaintiff claimed to have been induced by a
false representation to pay £2,000 to the defendant, as a result of which
he had lost the E2,000 and had ultimately become bankrupt. He sought to
recover the £2,000, as well as damages flowing from his having been adjudicated bankrupt. It was held that the plaintiff had no standing to bring the
action because the damages claimed were, with the exception of those flowing from the plaintiff's having been declared bankrupt, recoverable only by
the assignee in bankruptcy.
45 Cf. Wright, supra note 14, at 113: "It is not possible to give any logical reason
why the law disregards this ... financial incapacity."
40
Much of the confusion in this area stems from the unthinking use of the term
"mitigate" (see text accompanying notes 328-31, infra. In what follows, the rule that
impecuniosity excuses a failure to mitigate will at times be called "the rule in Clippens
Oil."
47
Naughton Mulgrew Motor Car Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 173 N.Y.S. 437 at
439 (1918); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Boren, 202 Ky. 348 at 355, 259 S.W. 711 at
715 (1924).
48 Subsequent cases indicating that the refusal to penalize a plaintiff who has not
crystallized his losses is based on a reluctance to penalize the poor include Hohnes v.
Raffo, 60 Wash. 421 at 431, 374 P. 2d 536 at 542 (1962); N.Y. Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Churchill, 140 Ind. A. 426, 218 N.E. 2d 372 (1966); Meakin v. Dreler, 209 So. 2d
252 at 254 (Fla. C.A. 1968), and-arguably-Robertson v. Wright (1958), 16 D.L.R.
(2d) 364 at 371, 26 W.W.R. 337 at 345 (Sask. C.A.). But contra Daly v. Gen. Steam
Nay. Co., "1980] 3 All E.R. 696 at 701 (C.A.).
49 (1866), L.R. 1 Exch. 313, 14 L.T. 624.
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The exception was "of no effect" 50 because, as Bramwell B. commented

in argument, the damages from the adjudication were "clearly too remote." 5'
Hodgson could thus have been cited for the proposition that losses flowing
from the plaintiff's bankruptcy were too remote to be recovered, where the
bankruptcy was attributable to the defendants' tortiously depriving him of
his assets.
Hodgson was not, however, seen in Morgan v. Steblem1 as involving any
question of remoteness. The defendants, attorneys acting for the plaintiff,
were alleged to have breached their duty to obtain the highest possible price
for his property. As a result, the plaintiff did not have the funds to stave off
bankruptcy. It was alleged that the defendants knew that the plaintiff's bankruptcy would be the inevitable consequence of their breach of duty, and the
plaintiff argued that this special knowledge on the defendants' part took the
case out of the ambit of Hodgson.
The Court did not decide that the damages claimed were too remote.
Hannen J. explicitly stated that they were not. 53 The Court interpreted
Hodgson as saying only that such damages could not be recovered by a
bankrupt, since that would result in an undesirable splitting of one cause of
action, with the assignee bringing an action for some of the damages and
the bankrupt bringing an action for the remainder. 54
Following Morgan, it could have been argued that losses flowing from

an adjudication of bankruptcy were recoverable where the adjudication
results from the defendant wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of his assets;

but that bankruptcy might in some circumstances deprive the bankrupt of
standing to recover them. The rule might be seen as involving standing
5OId. at 315 (L.R.) per Martin B. The L.T. report uses the phrase "null and void."
In M'Gregor v. Campbell (1909), 11 W.L.R. 153 at 159, 19 Man. R. 38 at 49 (C.A.),
Richards J.A. stated that the L.R. version was misleading, because it did not reveal that
the judges disregarded the exception.
51
Id. at 314 (L.R.). The L.T. report quotes him as saying "it is questionable to
my mind whether you could recover anything on this declaration but the pecuniary
damage" (at 625), rather than the words quoted in the text.
0 (1872), L.R. 7 Q.B. 611.
53 Id. at 614-15. The judgment is difficult to understand, and might be interpreted
as saying that Hodgson determined the issue, not because it determined that a cause of
action could not be split between a bankrupt and his assignee in bankruptcy, but because it determined that damages flowing from an adjudication of bankruptcy are
always too remote in an. action of this type. In that case Morgan could be seen as
determining that such damages are too remote even if the defendant knew that they
would result from his actions. But that interpretation seems untenable in light of two
observations: (a) Hannen J. who held that the damages were not too remote, evidently
felt that his reluctantly-rendered judgment was not inconsistent with that of the majority;
and (b) the majority was willing to proceed under the assumption that "this special
damage... would not pass to the assignee" (at 614). Of course "damage" cannot pass:
only a chose in action can pass. So the majority was referring to a right of action,
which they would not have done had they not at least kept an open mind as to its
existence, i.e., as to the recoverability of damages.
54 Not only was the point obiter, the judgment of the Court (Pollock C.B., Martin,
Bramwell, Channell BB.) made no mention of it. Only the assignee had standing to
recover the £2,000.
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rather than remoteness, and as being in no way based upon the fact that the
plaintiff's bankruptcy and resulting damages were attributable in part to his
own impecuniosity.
That was the argument made in Clark v. HassamalMoolchand & Co. 5
The plaintiff claimed to have been forced into bankruptcy as a result of the
defendant's breach of his contractual obligation to pay a debt of £4,000
owed by the plaintiff to a third party. He sought damages flowing from having been adjudicated bankrupt, arguing that his bankruptcy had not deprived
him of standing to bring the suit,5e and that Hodgson and Morgan did not
decide that the damages he sought were too remote. But the Court held
that those two cases did indeed decide that such damages were too remote."
Hodgson and Morgan, as understood by the Court in Hassamal Moolchand, could be seen as standing for the following narrow proposition: if
one person tortiously or in breach of contract deprives another of his assets,
and as a consequence the victim is adjudicated bankrupt, then the bankruptcy is too remote to sound in damages at least if the wrongdoer did not
know that it was likely to follow from his acts. Since the bankruptcy can
be seen as following from the combination of the defendant's breach on the
one hand, and the plaintiff's impecuniosity on the other hand, this could be
seen as merely a narrow formulation of a broader principle: damages flowing
from the combination of the defendant's wrongful act and the plaintiff's
impecuniosity will be too remote, at least if the defendant was unaware 'of
that impecuniosity. 58
In no other reported case does it appear that the defendant's wrongful
act combined with the plaintiff's impecuniosity to bring about the latter's
bankruptcy.5 9 It is, as a result, impossible to say what knowledge on the
defendant's part might suffice to make damages flowing from the bankruptcy
recoverable. But the cases do support a proposition complementary to that
supported by the cases concerning the sale of goods or the loan of stock:
55 (1900), 2 W.A.R. 30.
56 On the ground that no pecuniary damages, for which only the assignee in bankruptcy could sue, were claimed, and so there was no possibility of the cause of action
being split. The argument seems rather tenuous.
57 This interpretation was adopted by the reporter, but it must be admitted that
the case is ambiguous. At 34, the Chief Justice stated that Hodgson and Morgan "decide
conclusively that bankruptcy proceedings are not the necessary consequence of the
alleged breach," whereas at 35, Stone J. quoted Bramwell B. as saying in Hodgson that
"the bankruptcy... naturally resulted from the fraudulent representation." The quotation
attributed to Bramwell B. is not found in either of the reports.
58 Impecuniosity represents a combination of three or four factors, all of which
must be known before the plaintiff's impecuniosity will be revealed. If all of them
require explicit knowledge, and none of them can be presumed, then a man's impecuniosity will generally only be known to, or foreseeable by, his intimates or those
having significant financial dealings with him.
59
In Wilson v. United Counties Bank, [1920] A.C. 102, [1918-19] All E.R. 1035,
122 L.T. 76, the plaintiff recovered damages in respect of his having been forced into
bankruptcy, but the decision is distinguishable because the defendant had contracted to
protect him against that very event.

1982]

Losses Flowing from Impecuniosity

impecuniosity may excuse a failure to mitigate but it cannot, in the absence
knowledge on the defendant's part, generate a new head of damof special
0
ages.
D.

Impecunious Plaintiffs Might Recover: Cases Involving Lost Profits

In a few cases decided before 1933, the plaintiff failed to recover damages for profits lost as a consequence of the combination of his own impecuniosity and the defendant's wrongful act. The refusal to award damages in
such cases is equivocal. It might reflect an unwillingness to award damages
for losses consequent upon the plaintiff's own impecuniosity. On the other
hand, it might simply reflect the principles concerning damages for lost profits, for example, the principle that damages are recoverable in respect of
lost profits only if those profits were reasonably likely to have been earned
if the wrong had not been committed. 61
In Greenbirt v. Smee,2 the defendant wrongfully seized the plaintiff's
mail cart and the two horses required to work it. The plaintiff brought an
action in trespass. He had hired other horses, not having the funds to purchase replacements, and had as a consequence lost his contract with the post
office. He was allowed only the value of the property taken. Bramwell B.
stated:
This is a tort, and a man who commits a tort commits it at his peril. But in the
present case the damages do not follow solely from the tort committed, but from
from the plaintiff not having money enough in his pocket
the tort committed and
03
to buy a fresh horse.

Although the decision could, perhaps, be explained on the ground that the
requisite special knowledge was not possessed by the defendant,6 4 it seems
that Bramwell B. was reiterating the view that he had ten years earlier expressed in Hodgson: impecunious plaintiffs cannot recover damages attributable to their impecuniosity. But this time he phrased his reasoning in terms
of causation, rather than remoteness, suggesting that even knowledge of the
60 The cases considered later in this article will demonstrate the difficulties in applying this seemingly simple proposition.
61 Carsten v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 545, 47 N.W. 49 (1890); O'Neill v.
Johnson, 53 Minn. 443, 55 N.W. 601 (1893); Hail v. Dahlgren, 157 Minn. 100, 195
N.W. 765 (1922), are cases in which an injured party was denied compensation for
losses flowing from his impecuniosity, but which were decided on the ground of uncertainty.
62 (1876), 35 L.T. 168 (Exch.). This has been described as the first case to acknowledge the proposition that damage caused by impecuniosity is too remote: Lawson,
The Status of 'The Edison' (1974), 124 New. L.J. 240. Cf. Duckworth v. Ewart (1863),
2 H. & C. 129, 159 E.R. 54, 9 L.T. 297 (Exch.).
63 Greenbirt, id. at 170. Amphlett B. concurred. The judgment is somewhat weakened in that the third member of the Court, Huddleston B. felt that the case was in all
relevant respects indistinguishable from Hughes v. Quentin (1838), 8 C. & P. 703, 173
E.R. 681 (Exch.), a case which did not involve impecuniosity.
64 The principle was that the plaintiff could only recover special damages if he
could show that the defendant knew that he would suffer inconvenience beyond the mere
loss of his property: Bodley v. Reynolds (1846), 8 Q.B. 779, 115 E.R. 1066, 15 L.J.Q.B.
219; France v. Gaudet (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 199, 40 L.J.Q.B. 121. Both cases were
cited by counsel in Greenbirt.
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plaintiff's impecuniosity would not suffice to render the defendant liable for
damages flowing from it.
A rather different approach had, however, been suggested three years
earlier by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Larios v. Bonany y
Gurety,6 a decision not cited in Greenbirt. In that case the defendant, a
banker, lent money to the plaintiff, an exporter, not by transferring cash to
him, but rather by crediting the amount of the loan to his account. While
that account still contained several thousand dollars, the defendant refused
to honour a bill for $1,000 drawn on it. The plaintiff sought damages of
$1,340 in respect of a "[1]oss at the rate of $2 per quintal on the sale of
670 quintals of cork ...which cork Plaintiff was forced to sell at a reduced
price to raise money in consequence of the Defendant's breach of contract."0 0
The case was not treated as one in which the defendant had breached a
contract to loan money, but rather as one in which the defendant had
breached a special contract, 67 and in which damages might be assessed in
the usual way, following the principles of Hadley v. Baxendale. The Judicial
Committee refused to allow the damages in question, but Sir James Colville
said:
[We] entirely concur with the learned Chief Justice, who in his charge to the
assessors ruled that the full market value of the cork... on the day of the sale
must on the evidence be taken to have been realised, and that any extra price
which the plaintiff might possibly have obtained for it in a foreign market, had
he had the funds to export it, was uncertain, speculative, and remote. In fact,
he failed to prove on this item that he had actually sustained a loss, so that the
question whether the Defendants could be reasonably taken to have contemplated
such damages when they made the contract never arose.08

It seems clear from this passage that the damages claimed by the plaintiff
could have been recovered if it had been established that he actually suffered
them and that the defendant was aware at the time of contracting that they
might result from a breach on its part; that is, the damages would have to
meet the requirements of one of the two branches of Hadley v. Baxendale's
remoteness test.
But the damages in question flowed from the plaintiff's impecuniosity,
for a plaintiff with sufficient disposable cash would not have been forced to
65 (1873), L.R. 5 P.C. 346 (Gibralter). Sedgwick on Damages, (11th ed., 1920)
para. 126c describes the case thus: "In an action for failure to accept drafts, a loss on
pork [sic] which the plaintiff was obliged to sell in order to raise money was held too
remote for compensation." Sed quaere.
66 Id.at 347.
67 Numerous cases had been characterized as involving "special" contracts, but had
not indicated what made the contracts special. The better view is probably that they
were special only in that the borrower's losses met the requirements of the second
branch of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale (McGregor, supra note 5, para. 848), but
it was arguable that they involved, not breach of an obligation to loan money, but
rather breach of an obligation to disburse money already lent [Mennie v. Leitch (1885),
8 O.R. 397 at 404 (Q.B.)]. Note that most of the cases were concerned with losses
flowing from the wrongful dishonour of a cheque, losses unrelated to any impecuniosity
on the plaintiff's part (supra note 38).
681d. at 358.
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sell the cork. A plaintiff with sufficient credit would simply have borrowed
the necessary sum from some other source.69 It is possible to view the issue
as one of a plaintiff endeavouring to recover the cost of an attempt to mitigate his damages which involved steps which a non-impecunious plaintiff
would not have been compelled to take. 70 In that case Larios can be seen as
illustrating the principle expressed in Clippens Oil.71 The Judicial Committee,
however, clearly treated the issue as one of heads of damage, not as one of
mitigation; it would have allowed the plaintiff to recover his loss, notwithstanding that it flowed from his impecuniosity, if only he had been able to
establish that he had suffered it.
The same attitude had been displayed two decades earlier in Hyde v.
Gooderham,72 a decision from Upper Canada. The plaintiff alleged that, as
a result of the defendants' failure to advance him Z20,000, he was "unable
to do so extensive a business as he might have done, and has lost the profits
he might have made thereby. 7 3 Draper C.J. held that such losses might be
recoverable:
If having required and failed in obtaining from defendants any specific advance,
the plaintiff was able to shew that he was unable to complete any particular
purchase of wheat, and so lost it and consequent profits, I think such ground of
damage might have been proper, and that it may not be going too far to say he
might74recover the profits of that particular transaction, though this may not be
clear.

The validity of this approach seems to have been taken for granted elsewhere in Canada. In Walton v. Ferguson,75 an action in contract for failure
to furnish a tractor, the plaintiff sought to recover losses suffered when her

69 Although the figures are not displayed explicitly in the report, it seems that at
the time of the breach the defendant still held $3,500 or less in the plaintiff's account,
that the plaintiff was under no obligation to repay the loan until a further 4 years 11
months had passed, and that monies were available at 6% per annum. On this basis
the plaintiff could have obtained the requisite funds by taking out a loan with a different
firm, borrowing $3,500 at 6% per annum for 4 years 11 months. This would have cost
$1,161 in interest, $179 less than the amount actually claimed. It is possible that the
plaintiff's inability to arrange such financing was due to some cause other than his own
impecuniosity.
70The cases discussed infra will illustrate the difficulties involved in categorizing
an issue as one of mitigation or as one of heads of damage. See especially Compania
Financiera"Soleada" S.A. v. Hamoor Tanker Corp., The 'Borag', [1981] 1 W.L.R. 274
(C.A.), :ev'g [19801 1 Lloyd's Rep. 111, leave to appeal refused, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 992
(H.L.).
71 There is a difference between the question answered in Clippens Oil and the
question posed here. Clippens Oil stated that a plaintiff's impecuniosity will excuse his
failure to take steps to mitigate his losses: he may remain supine and still recover
consequent damages. But the question here is whether that impecuniosity will excuse
inefficient attempts to mitigate. If the plaintiff chooses to take the limited steps that are
within his power rather than to remain supine, can he recover the cost of so doing?
See text accompanying notes 337-38, infra.
72 (1856), 6 U.C.C.P. 21, subsequent proceedings at 539.
73 Id. at 22.
74
Id.at 36.
75 (1914), 19 D.L.R. 816, 7 W.W.R. 611 (Alta. S.C.).
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land remained unplowed after her efforts to purchase horses to replace the
tractor failed "as she had no money with which to pay for them and no one
seemed willing to sell on credit." 76 The Alberta Supreme Court denied her
claim because the defendant was unaware of her impecuniosity, but noted
that it was obvious that her losses would have been recoverable under the
second branch of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale if the defendant had
known of the special circumstances3 7 Before 1933, Greenbirt supported the
proposition that damages flowing from the combination of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the defendant's tortious act were not recoverable as a matter
of law. Larios, Gooderham and Ferguson supported the proposition that
damages flowing from the combination of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and
the defendant's breach of contract were recoverable if they met the remoteness test applicable to other heads of damage, and if no rule of law applicable only to impecuniosity prevented their recovery. It is difficult to see
why there should have been such a difference between tort and contract if
the first proposition was based on concepts of causation or policy; it must
have been based on the rules of remoteness in tort, just as the second proposition was based on the rules of remoteness in contract.
Impecunious Plaintiffs Might Recover: Cases Involving
Contracts to Loan Money
When a lender breaches a contract to loan money, the damages suffered
by the borrower will usually depend in part on his financial status and the
extent of his assets. Decisions in which the borrower had recovered such
damages could, therefore, have been cited in 1933 to make some points concerning impecuniosity.
In order to understand these decisions, and the relationship between
the borrower's impecuniosity and the measure of his damages, it is necessary
to remember the nature of a loan of money. Although not a sale of goods
within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, 78 a loan of money is economically indistinguishable from such a sale. 70 One party, in need of an item,
proceeds into the marketplace to obtain it. Another party, possessing such
an item, transfers the property in it to him. The first party, in return, generally gives some security, and either promises to pay the second party a
lump sum on some future date or, more commonly, promises to pay certain
sums at various stipulated future dates. If the item sought were a load of
bricks, the transaction would be characterized as a sale of bricks on credit;
if the item sought is instead a sum of money, the transaction can accurately
be characterized as a sale of money on credit.
Cases in which a borrower sues a lender for breach of a contract to
loan money can thus be assimilated to cases in which a purchaser sues a
E.

761d.

at 817 (D.L.R.), 611 (W.W.R.).

77Id. at 818 (D.L.R.), 612 (W.W.R.).
78

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s. 1.

79 A loan of money is really a sale, for it differs in many ways from a loan in the

sense of a bailment of a chattel. Not only does the borrower obtain the property in
the money lent to him, but the money he must return need not be the same as the
money lent to him.
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vendor for breach of a contract to deliver goods. In the former, as in the
latter, the plaintiff's impecuniosity may make it impossible for him to utilize
alternate sources of supply; other potential lenders might consider his limited
assets insufficient to constitute adequate security. More commonly, however,
alternate financing is available at a price which depends in part on the
borrower's credit-worthiness.
If the interest rate of the repudiated loan was equal to the market rate
at the time the contract was made, the borrower might find alternate financing either unobtainable or more costly. The market may have changed,
making money generally more difficult to obtain, or his financial situation
may have changed making him less credit-worthy. It was held in Bahamas
(Inagua) Sisal Plantation(Ltd.) v. Griffin 80 that damages attributable to the

second of these two factors are. not recoverable. In that case the defendant
refused, in breach of contract, to subscribe for debentures in the plaintiff
company. At the time of contracting the company was able to find subscribers for its debentures, but by the time of the defendant's breach it had
fallen out of favour with investors and was unable to find alternate subscribers. Bigham J.refused to award damages. He is paraphrased as saying:
But, in measuring the damages, it must be assumed that when the company
applied elsewhere for an advance it still remained a company with ordinary credit.
If, by reason of circumstances, the company had fallen into disrepute and bad
financial odour, the defendant was not responsible for that.... [T]he company's
difficulty in getting the money at the rate which the defendant had undertaken to
pay (sic-accept] was not due to the defendant but was the fault of the company
for falling into that position. 81

Suppose, then, that the borrower is able to obtain alternate financing,
but that the cost of money has increased since he first negotiated the loan
which has now been repudiated by the lender. In such a case it has been held
that he may recover the excess of the cost of the alternate loan over the
cost of the loan that the defendant lender should have granted him.8 2 This
principle, which seems at first glance to accord with common sense, could
have been seen as permitting the recovery of compensation for losses which
only an impecunious person would have suffered. The point had not been
taken in 1933, and seems to have been taken only once since then, in
Jacobson Ford-Mercury Sales Ltd. v. Sivertz.83 The defendant had drafted

an unenforceable option to borrow money at 7% to buy land. The plaintiff
was forced to borrow at 12%, and brought suit in negligence. The defendant
argued that those losses flowed from "the plaintiff's alleged impecuniosity in
not being able to pay cash for the property," 84 and that they were, accordingly, not recoverable.
The argument, although rejected by the judge in a terse and somewhat
80 (1897), 14 T.L.R. 139 (Q.B.).
81 id. at 140.
82 South African Territories Ltd. v. Wallington, [1897] 1 Q.B. 692, 13 T.L.R. 361

(C.A.), aff'd [1898] A.C. 309, 67 L.J.Q.B. 470, 78 L.T. 426, (H.L.).
83 [1980] 1 W.W.R. 141, 103 D.L.R.(3d) 480, 10 C.C.L.T. 274 (B.C.S.C.).
84 Id. at 147 (W.W.R.), 485 (D.L.R.), 280 (C.C.L.T.).
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ambiguous passage, 85 is worthy of analysis, for it can be met in either of two
ways, each of which involves the application of principles to which reference will frequently be made in the remainder of this paper.
The first argument is both the simplest and the most controversial. "Impecuniosity" is the combination of a lack of assets, and a lack of credit, and
the plaintiff, though he lacked assets, certainly did not lack credit. None of
his losses can, therefore, be attributed to his non-existent impecuniosity.
The second argument is more subtle. The plaintiff's lack of assets, even
if it constituted impecuniosity, was not the cause of his losses, for he would
have suffered the same losses even if his assets were unlimited. In order to
see this, consider a simple example: a lender promises to pay $1000 to a
borrower on January 1, and the borrower in return promises to repay it in
one year at 17% interest, that is, to pay $1170 exactly one year later. Suppose that the lender resiles, and that interest rates have risen to 20% by
January 1. What are the borrower's pecuniary losses?
The losses are determined by comparing the borrower's financial position on that day with the position in which he would have found himself if
the lender had not resiled. His gross losses are easily quantified: he has
$1000 less than he would have had if the lender had not resiled. But he
has gained something from the breach, the value of which must be set off
against his gross losses: he has gained a release from the obligation to pay
$1170 one year later. The value of such a release-or, equivalently,
the value of the obligation to pay $1170 one year later-is found by
applying the simple interest formula: a loan of $P at a rate of i% for
a term of one year is a contract whereby the lender pays $P for the
borrower's promise to pay $P (1+i/100) one year later. Thus the
market value of a promise to pay $A one year later is $P, where A =
P(1+i/100). On the day in question, i = 20 and A = 1170, so P = 975;
the market value of the obligation to pay $1170 one year later was thus
$975 on January 1, and so $975 is the value of the release which the borrower gained. After his gross losses are offset by that amount his net recoverable losses are $25.86
The important thing about this analysis is that is has nothing to do with
the extent of the borrower's assets. He is simply saying, "You promised to
sell me some money, you breached your promise, so I am entitled to the
difference between the market price of that money as of the breach-date and
the contract price." He need not reveal that he needed the loan to finance
some project for which his assets were otherwise inadequate, since damages
such as this do not depend on the use to which the buyer planned to put
his purchase.
There are thus two reasons why a borrower can, on the lender's default, recover the excess cost of a substitute loan: decisions to the contrary
85 Id.

86Other damages, not considered here, may also be recoverable: McGregor, supra
note 5, at para. 862.
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notwithstanding, 87 impecuniosity is found only in the lack of both assets and
credit, 8 and, at any rate, even a person with unlimited assets would have
suffered the same losses.

But neither of these reasons applies if the borrower's credit rating is so
bad that he cannot obtain alternate financing. In that case he will lose his
chance to make profits from opportunities which his embarassed circumstances do not allow him to seize. He might be unable to meet his obligations and thus be forced into bankruptcy. He might be unable to complete
a contract with some third party, and consequently be forced to pay a sum
to placate that person. Can he recover such damages?
Prior to 1933 there was no satisfactory Commonwealth authority on
this point,89 but there were numerous American cases. Most American jurisdictions had held that the principles of Hadley v. Baxendale applied to such
cases. The plaintiff could recover damages provided they were of a type
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. 90 For
example, a borower deprived of his ability to enter into an advantageous
purchase by the lender's breach could recover lost profits, provided they
were sufficiently certain, if he could show that the lender had known that
the monies were to be used for that purchase and that the plaintiff had no
other source of funds. 91
Some jurisdictions, however, had held that to allow the plaintiff to recover such damages would be to allow an impecunious person to recover
damages flowing from his own impecuniosity, and that this should not be
allowed. In Lowe v. Turpie92 this attitude was made explicit:
[If the owner of real estate who has a contract with another to loan him money
to pay liens of incumbrances on his land, who refuses to do so, has knowledge
87
Infra notes
88

307-3 09.
,Supranote 7, infra note 310.
89The cases of Wallis Chlorine Syndicate v. American Alkali Co. (1901), 17
T.L.R. 656, 45 Sol. J. 654 (K.B.) and Manchester and Oldham Bank, Ltd. v. W.A.
Cook and Co. (1883), 49 L.T. 674 (Q.B.), are sometimes cited as bearing on this point.
The former, however, was treated as an action for breach of duty to disburse monies
that had already been lent to the plaintiff, rather than as an action for breach of the
contract to lend them; the judge felt constrained to follow cases involving the first type
of action, and may have felt that there was a difference between the principles applicable to the two types of actions. As for the latter, it is reported in too summary a
fashion to be useful. It would seem that the plaintiffs poor credit rating, if indeed he
had such, was not behind the failure of the project for which he needed the loan. The
defendant bank had been leading him on with assurances that the loan would soon be
disbursed, and the plaintiff discovered that the bank would not honour the contract when
it may have been too late for him to finance the project even if he had the funds in
his pocket. This was the view of the case adopted in Lowe v. Turpie, 147 Ind. 652 at
673, 44 N.E. 25 at 31 (1896), afld 147 Ind. 690, 47 N.E. 150.
9oSee the cases cited in Corbin, 5 Corbin on Contracts (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Pub. Co., 1964) at §1078; in the annotation to National Bank v. M.M. Pittman Roller
Mill, 36 A.L.R. 1405, 265 S.W. 1024 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924), and in McCormick, The
Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract (1934-35),
19 Minn. L. Rev. 497 at 505 n.24 and 507 n.28.
91 Id.
92 Supra note 89.
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of such refusal in time to give him an opportunity to seek for it elsewhere, the
fact that he cannot procure the money on account of being in embarrassed circumstances will not entitle him to recover more than nominal damages; for the
reason that no party's condition in respect to the measure of damages is any worse
for having failed in his engagement to a person whose affairs are embarrassed
than if 93the same result had occurred with one in prosperous or affluent circumstances.

The weight of American authority, however, supported the view that
the- plaintiff's impecuniosity was only another factor which had to be within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. It it were, then
damages were not to be denied simply because they flowed from that impecuniosity. In order for damages flowing from the plaintiff's impecuniosity to
be recoverable that impecuniosity had to be explictly brought home to the
other party; it was not the sort of common circumstance that fell within the
first branch of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale and which was deemed to
have been within the contemplation of all contracting parties.
F.

Summary
In general, two propositions emerge from the cases decided before 1933
in which an impecunious plaintiff sought damages in some sense attributable
to his own impecuniosity. First, impecuniosity would excuse a failure to
mitigate one's damages. More generally, damages of a type which a nonimpecunious plaintiff would have suffered could be recovered even if their
quantum was increased as a result of the plaintiff's impecuniosity. Second,
damages of a type which only an impecunious person would suffer would
not be recoverable unless the defendant knew, at the relevant time, of the
plaintiff's impecuniosity and perhaps, at least according to Bramwell B., not
even then. If the anomalous rules in cases involving the failure to return
stock or to deliver goods paid for in advance are set aside, the cases also
established that impecuniosity is not, in the absence of special knowledge,
within the contemplation of contracting parties. It is in the light of these
principles that the decision in the case of The Liesbosch4 must be considered.
III. THE DECISION IN THE LIESBOSCH
The "Liesbosch" was a dredger engaged in work on the harbour of
Patras, Greece. Her moorings were fouled by the steamship "Edison," and
she was towed into the open sea where she sank. The owners of the Edison
admitted liability in negligence, and only the quantum of damages was in
issue.
The Liesbosch sank on November 26, 1928. Substitute dredgers were
available in Holland at that time, but the owners of the Liesbosch had invested all their funds in its purchase. So they remained inactive, unable to
purchase a replacement. In January, 1929, the harbour authorities threatened to cancel the contract under which the Liesbosch had been working,
and to forfeit a deposit put up by its owners, unless a substitute were found
within a certain time. The owners, still without the funds to purchase a
93 Id. at 677-78 (Ind.), 33 (N.E.).
94
Supra note 4.
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replacement, resolved to rent one. On May 11, 1929, they rented the "Adria"
from Italy. The rental payments were very high, and the Adria was more
costly to operate than the Liesbosch had been.
On June 17, 1929, the Adria arrived at Patras and commenced operations. But even though the owners of the Liesbosch were once again earning
money, the Adria's high rental payments presented problems. As a result,
the harbour board purchased the Adria, and re-sold it on June 30, 1930, to
the owners of the Liesbosch, who paid for it in forty-eight instalments.
The plaintiffs sought damages for:
(1) the price of the Adria;
(2) overhead wasted and other money needlessly expended during the
period from November 26, 1928, to June 17, 1929, during which period the
plaintiffs were unable to work on the harbour;
(3) profits lost during the same period;
(4) the extra cost of operating the Adria over the cost of operating the
Liesbosch; and
(5) the cost of renting the Adria from May 11, 1929, to June 30, 1930.
The House of Lords allowed, in place of the damages claimed under
the third and fourth heads, profits lost and monies wasted from November
26, 1928, until the time when the plaintiffs could have put a replacement
dredger into operation, had they had the money to buy that replacement
immediately upon the loss of the Liesbosch. In place of the damages claimed
under the other three heads, the House of Lords allowed the cost of a replacement dredger (including such items as its transportation to Patras, and
its conversion to meet the plaintiffs' exact needs) such as could have been
purchased in the market by a person with sufficient funds.
The decision of Lord Wright, with whom the other members of the
House concurred, 0s contains many useful points concerning the measure of
damages for destruction of profit-earning chattels. This paper, however, will
be concerned exclusively with his comments concerning the effect of the
plaintiffs' impecuniosity on the measure of their damages:
But the appellants' actual loss in so far as it was due to their impecuniosity arose
from that impecuniosity as a separate and concurrent cause, extraneous to and
distinct in character from the tort: the impecuniosity was not traceable to the respondents' acts, and in my opinion was outside the legal purview of the consequences of these acts. The law cannot take account of everything that follows a
wrongful act; it regards some subsequent matters as outside the scope of its selection, because 'it were infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes' or consequences of consequences. Thus the loss of a ship by collision due to the other
vessel's sole fault, may force the shipowner into bankruptcy and that again may
involve his family in suffering, loss of education or opportunities in life, but no
such loss could be recovered from the wrongdoer. In the varied web of affairs,
the law must abstract some consequences as relevant, not perhaps on grounds
of pure logic but simply for practical reasons. In the present case if the appellants'
financial embarrassment is to be regarded as a consequence of the respondents'
95
Lord Warrington of Clyffe, Lord Buckmaster, Lord Tomlin, and Lord Russell
of Killowen.
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tort, I think it is too remote, but I prefer to regard it as an independent cause,
though its operative effect was conditioned by the loss of the dredger.90

Then, after quoting the passage from Lord Collins' speech in Clippens
Oil which dealt with impecuniosity, 97 Lord Wright distinguished it as irrelevant: "[b]ut, as I think it is clear that Lord Collins is here dealing not
with measure of damage, but with the victim's duty to minimize damage,
which is quite a different matter, the dictum is not in point." 8
Several comments should be made before the cases that have considered
The Liesbosch can be properly understood.
First, Lord Wright did not define "impecuniosity." In The Liesbosch,
the plaintiffs seem to have been almost penniless. But subsequent cases have
shown that a plaintiff will be described as impecunious whenever he is compelled, in justifying his actions or explaining how it happened that he suffered certain damage, to point out that his funds were limited. 99 Impecuniosity will be found in insufficient funds, not merely in utter poverty, so a
person may be impecunious for some purposes but not for others. Furthermore, a plaintiff will be regarded as impecunious whenever he is forced to
point out that business or other considerations made it inadvisable for him
to follow some course of action; this is not only because limited disposable
funds imply limited funds in general, but also because a person who finds
expenditures inexpedient cannot expect better treatment than one who finds
them impossible. 100 There would seem to be little or no important difference
between one who was "'impecunious' (meaning poverty-stricken or unable
to raise the necessary money),"101 and one for whom "the provision of...
money ...would have involved ... a measure of 'financial stringency'."1 02
96Supra note 4, at 460 (A.C.), 292 (T.L.R.), 76 (L.J. P. & A.). The decision is
entirely one of policy, and the reference to causation is misleading, for by no theory of
causation could it be said that the plaintiff's loss was not caused by the defendants' act:
Hart and Honor6, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) at 163.
97
Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
98
Supra note 4, at 461 (A.C.), 292 (T.L.R.), 76 (L.J. P. & A.).
9aSee, e.g., Bunclark v. HertfordshireCity Council, [1977] E.G. Dig. 659 at 685.
100 If the issue is labelled as one of "mitigation," then poverty-stricken persons can
justify their failure to mitigate on the basis of their poverty: Clippens Oil, supra note 30.
And so too can those for whom mitigation would merely produce a financial strain; this
follows from the principle that a party need not take steps in mitigation of damages
if those steps might adversely affect his commercial interests: Finlay v. Kwick Hoo
Tong, [1929] 1 K.B. 400, 98 LJ.K.B. 251, 140 L.T. 389.
If the issue is labelled as one of heads of damage, then the law might adopt one
of two approaches, under either of which the principle still holds good. One approach
is to apply a rule of law that one who cannot raise funds cannot recover subsequent
damages. In that case, one who merely finds it inexpedient to raise funds must also be
denied consequent damages: he has no right to be treated better than the other, and
he cannot possibly be treated worse. The other approach is to allow recovery of damages
flowing from the inability to raise funds if, and only if, they were foreseeable. In such
a case there could be no reason to refrain from applying the same rule to the recovery
of damages flowing from the inexpediency of raising or disbursing funds.
101 Dodd Properties(Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council, [1980] 1 All E.R. 928
at 934, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433 at 451 per Megaw L.J. (C.A.).
302 Id.
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Second, Lord Wright did not cast any doubt upon the soundness of
Lord Collins' dictum in Clippens Oil,103 nor did he approve it. 104 It remained
for later courts to accept or reject it.
Third, Lord Wright did not reveal what he meant by "the victim's duty
to minimize damage,"'' 1 5 which he contrasted with the "measure of damage."10 If the characterization of an issue as one of mitigation or as one of
measure of damage will determine the effect to be given to a plaintiff's impecuniosity, some guidelines must be established to separate the two concepts. Yet an attempt to formulate such guidelines, encounters several obstacles.
One obstacle lies in the fact, noted by Scrutton L.J. in Payzu Ltd. v.
Saunders,0 7 that problems of mitigation can in all cases be phrased as problems of a different sort. For example, instead of saying that a plaintiff is
denied damages because he should have acted to mitigate them, a court could
say that he is denied damages because they flow from his own unreasonable
refusal to take steps to protect himself, and not from the wrongdoer's acts;
the issue is thus presented as one of causation, not mitigation. Yet if Lord
Wright's distinction is to be meaningful, there must be some problems which
are to be characterized as problems of mitigation. It is suggested that only
one solution is logically defensible: every problem which can be characterized
as one of mitigation must be so characterized, even though it might also be
possible to characterize it in another way.
In this way the difficulties inherent in separating the concepts of mitigation and causation can be overcome. But the general inseparability of
these basic concepts of the law continues to cause problems, and raises this
further obstacle to a logical analysis of Lord Wright's speech: every question
of mitigation is necessarily a question of the measure of damages.
This stems from the inclusion of the concept of mitigation in the general rule determining the measure of damages recoverable by a plaintiff. The
rule is that a plaintiff may, in respect of each type of damage that is not too
remote, recover a portion of the damage that he actually suffered: that por03
1
The headnote to the A.C. report is wrong in this regard. See also Reiter and
Sharpe, Wroth v. Tyler: Must Equity Remedy Contract Damages? (1978-79), 3 Can.
Bus. L.J. 146 at 152: "there is authority to the effect that impecuniosity is not an excuse
for failure to mitigate," citing inter alia The Liesbosch. Whatever authority there may
be for such a proposition is not to be found in The Liesbosch.
104 Despite observations to the contrary in Dodd Properties,supra note 101, at 935
(All E.R.), 453 (W.L.R.) per Megaw L.J.: "Lord Wright... accepted Lord Collins's
[sic] dictum." Indeed, in an address delivered five years later, Lord Wright, after referring to "certain not very clear observations of Lord Collins in Clippens Oil," would say
no more than that "it may be that Lord Collins' view may be justified on some such
ground," referring to the principle that a plaintiff need only do what is reasonable in
trying to mitigate his losses. Wright, supra note 14, at 115-16.

105 Supranote 98.

10(

Id.

Supra note 17, at 589. See also the observations of the Earl of Halsbury L.C. in
The Mediana, [1900] A.C. 113 at 117 (H.L.).
1o7
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tion being the amount that he would have suffered if he had acted as a reasonable person in trying to mitigate his damages.
As Laskin, C.J.C. said in
08
Red Deer College v. Michaels and Finn:
The primary rule in breach of contract cases, that a wronged plaintiff is entitled
to be put in as good a position as he would have been in had there been proper
performance by the defendant, is subject to the qualification that the defendant
cannot be called upon to pay for avoidable losses which would result in an increase in the quantum of damages payable to the plaintiff....
In short, a wronged plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the losses he
has suffered, but the extent of those losses may depend on whether he has taken
reasonable steps to avoid their unreasonable accumulation.10D

If Lord Wright's speech is to be understood, a way must be found to
characterize some questions as questions of mitigation, and others as questions of measure of damages. It might be possible to subdivide narrowly the
questions involved in measuring damages, and to categorize some as falling
under the rubric of mitigation, with the remainder falling under the rubric
of "pure" measure of damages. But the problem cannot be solved in this
manner, for the distinction drawn between mitigation and measure of damages by Lord Wright cannot survive this final observation: any definition of
mitigation that conforms to accepted academic and judicial usage must include two particular questions as questions of mitigation, the first of which is
the question Lord Wright was answering in The Liesbosch when he purported
to distinguish Clippens Oil as dealing only with questions of mitigation.
These two questions are usually formulated as one question, as in the
leading case of British Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Underground Electric
Rys.,110 where Viscount Haldane, L.C. said:
The fundamental basis is thus compensation for pecuniary loss naturally flowing
from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second, which imposes
on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach, and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which
is due to his neglect to take such steps."'

But to say that it is a question only of determining which steps are reasonable is to combine two questions into one. The first question to ask is which
of his idiosyncracies will the plaintiff be allowed to retain, and which must
be deleted and replaced by other, more "reasonable," characteristics? Having
created a hypothetical plaintiff with only some characteristics in common
with the actual plaintiff, the second question to ask is what steps would it be
reasonable for such a person to take? These are the steps that the actual
plaintiff will be penalized for failing to take.
In answering the first question, the court could alter none of the actual
plaintiff's idiosyncracies, thus creating the "subjective reasonable person;"
108 Supra note 26.
109 Id. at 330-31 (S.C.R.), 390 (D.L.R.), 579 (W.W.R.). Though directed to contract, the passage is equally applicable to tort.

110 [1912] A.C. 673, [1911-13] All E.R. 63, 107 L.T. 325 (H.L.).
111 Id. at 689 (A.C.), 69 (All E.R.), 329 (L.T.).
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or it could alter all of them, thus creating the "objective reasonable person."
The courts, however, generally adopt a middle course. 11 2 Thus the characteristic of being psychologically unable to undergo an operation is one that
a reasonable person may not be allowed to possess. 113 On the other hand,
the more impersonal characteristic of lacking good business connections in
India is one that a reasonable person will be allowed to possess. 114
In The Liesbosch, Lord Wright awarded the plaintiffs the profits they
missed from the date of the loss of their dredger until the date when a person
with sufficient funds would have got a replacement operational. In short, he
awarded the plaintiffs the damages that a different reasonable person in their
position would have suffered, where that person differed from them in only
one attribute: he had sufficient funds to purchase a dredger.
In deciding that impecuniosity was an attribute of the plaintiffs that
would be altered in creating the reasonable person, Lord Wright was answering a question of mitigation or, as he put it, "dealing with the victim's duty
to minimize damage.""l5 The distinction which he drew between the problem
facing him and the problem considered by Lord Collins in Clippens Oil is
illusory; Lord Wright's decision is incompatible with Lord Collins' dictum.
As consideration of subsequent cases will show, this enables a court to
award damages in situations where Lord Wright clearly would not have done
so, by following Clippens Oil and distinguishing The Liesbosch.
Fourth, Lord Wright excepted impecuniosity "traceable to the respondents' acts""16 from the ambit of his principle. He did not elaborate on this
exception. In a very real sense, however, a plaintiff's impecuniosity is frequently traceable to the defendant's wrongful act. In most actions, whether
in tort or contract, the defendant's wrongful act deprives the plaintiff of the
profits that he might have otherwise obtained. In personal injury actions, the
plaintiff is often deprived of earnings from the date of the tort; in actions for
non-delivery of goods purchased, the plaintiff is often deprived of profits
from a sub-sale. Suppose that at some later date the plaintiff's house is sold
at a forced sale, and accordingly for a very low price, because he had been
2
1 1In Glavonjic v. Foster, [1979] V.R. 536 at 537 (S.C.), Gobbo J. asked: "is the
feasonableness to be judged upon an objective basis or is it to be judged subjectively?"
and adopted "an intervening position wherein one is to ask what would a reasonable
man have done, assuming he had been in the circumstances facing the plaintiff."
113Marcroft v. Scruttpns, Ltd., [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 395 (C.A.), but see contra,

Lorca v. Holts' Corrosion Control Pty. Ltd., [1981] Qd. R. 261 (Full Ct.); Karabotsos

v. Plastex Ind. Pty. Ltd., [1981] V.R. 675 (S.C.).
114 Lesters Leather and Skin Co. v. Home and Overseas Brokers Ltd., [1948] W.N.

437, 64 T.L.R. 569, 92 Sol. J. 646 (C.A.). It seems to be generally accepted that a
plaintiff will not be penalized for his failure to take steps in mitigation of damage if his
circumstances, commercial Lid.] or physical [Savage v. T. Wallis Ltd., [1966] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 357; Murphy v. MacAdam (1965), 51 M.P.R. 267 at 283, 5 N.S.R. 575 at 596-97
(S.C.)], were such that the steps in question either could not have been carried out, or
would probably not have been effective to diminish his loss. The principle in The
Liesbosch may form an anomolous exception to this rule.
115 Supranote 98.

116 Supra note 96.
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relying on his profits or earnings to enable him to keep up his monthly
payments. Can the plaintiff recover damages flowing from the forced sale
resulting from his own impecuniosity, which in turn would not have existed
but for the defendant's wrongful act?
The illustrations of non-recoverable loss given by Lord Wright in his
judgment in The Liesbosch show that he would not have allowed such recovery. 117 Probably what his Lordship had in mind was wrongful appropriation of the plaintiff's funds, depriving him of present monies, as opposed to
wrongful acts merely depriving him of his ability to obtain funds in the future. The line between the two is not, however, always easy to draw, for
an expectation of future gains is a present asset, which may in some circumstances be1 8turned into money as readily as a cheque or a bag of foreign
currency.
Seldom has any court considered this exception to the principle that
losses stemming in part from the plaintiff's impecuniosity are not recoverable. Its extent and significance remain uncertain. Indeed, as the cases to be
discussed will demonstrate, courts wishing to distinguish The Liesbosch can
easily find other grounds upon which to do so, and it seems unlikely that
this exception will ever be of much practical significance.
Fifth, Lord Wright's judgment came twelve years after the decision in
Re Polemis."19 The relationship between his principle that losses stemming
from impecuniosity are not recoverable, and the principle of that decision
that losses are recoverable only if they are the direct consequences of the
defendant's negligent acts, has seldom been considered. There are at least
two possibilities, however, one of which renders the principle of The Liesbosch irrelevant in the 1980's.
The first possibility is that Lord Wright's judgment was based on considerations of policy; as a matter of basic policy, losses flowing from the
plaintiff's impecuniosity are not recoverable. So when Lord Wright said,
"[i]n the varied web of affairs, the law must abstract some consequences
as relevant, not perhaps on grounds of pure logic but simply for practical
reasons,"' 2 0 he was laying down a rule that damages flowing from impecuniosity are not to be regarded as relevant. The rule in Re Poleinis had
nothing to do with this.
But there is another possibility: Lord Wright's judgment was based on
117 Especially the illustration of the shipowner forced into bankruptcy upon the
destruction of his sole means of livelihood. See note 96, supra and accompanying text.
118 Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1 (1936), 46
Yale L.J. 52 at 59.
119 [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 90 L.J.K.B. 1353, 125 L.T. 154. Lord Wright, as counsel
for the unsuccessful defendants, argued that damages in the tort of negligence are the
same as those in breach of contract, in that losses are recoverable if, and only if, they
were such as could reasonably have been anticipated as resulting from the negligent acts;
but his Lordship later declared the decision to be correct as a matter of principle as
well as precedent: Wright, Re Polemis (1951), 14 Mod. L. Rev. 393.
12o Supra note 96.
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considerations of causation (which, admittedly, are always connected with
considerations of policy).121 So when he referred to the abstraction of some
consequences as relevant for practical reasons, he was not laying down any
new rule. He was merely referring to the pre-existing rule that only the direct consequences of the defendant's negligent acts could sound in damages.
In short, he was referring to the rule in Re Polemis.
If this is so then it must be admitted that Lord Wright's decision was
not a necessary consequence of that rule. Some further link in the chain of
reasoning must be found. That link must be found in the assumption that
damages flowing from the plaintiff's impecuniosity are not direct consequences of the defendant's acts.
According to this analysis, Lord Wright said two things:
(1) damages that are not direct consequences of the defendant's negligent acts are not recoverable; and
(2) damages flowing from the plaintiff's impecuniosity are not direct
consequences of the defendant's negligent acts.
From these propositions, his conclusion followed inexorably.
If this is correct, then Lord Wright's principle is no longer relevant.
The first portion of his ratio, embodying the rule in Re Polemis, is no longer
good law. 2 The second part might be good law, but is no longer relevant:
the categorization of consequences as "direct" or "indirect" remains as valid
as ever, but since the demise of the rule in Re Polemis it has no legal significance. The rejection of Re Polemis constituted a rejection of The Liesbosch
also.
This interpretation of Lord Wright's speech is supported by the exception discussed earlier. Why should Lord Wright's principle not extend to
losses flowing from impecuniosity "traceable to the respondents' acts?"
Surely it should only because such damages will be direct consequences of
the defendant's acts. If the exception to the principle is based on the distinction between direct and indirect consequences, then the principle itself must
be based on the same distinction.
Further supporting the thesis that Lord Wright was only establishing
one rule-namely, that damages flowing from impecuniosity are indirect
damages-and then combining that rule with an accepted principle, is his
speech in Hay (or Bourhill) v. Young,123 where he cited The Liesbosch as
demonstrating the principle that the direct consequences rule "must be under121 At the very least the question of what concept of causation will be applied in
a particular case is entirely a question of policy.
122 Ever since The Wagon Mound (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock
& Engineering Co.), [1961] A.C. 388, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126, [1961] 1 All E.R. 404 (P.C.,
N.S.W.). The provincial courts of appeal in Canada have accepted the principle that
damage caused by a negligent act is recoverable if, and only if, it is of a type that was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the negligent act.
123 [1943] A.C. 92 at 110, [1942] 2 All E.R. 396 at 405, 167 L.T. 261 at 267
(H.L.).
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stood to be limited... to 'direct'
consequences to the particular interest of
' ' =4
the plaintiff which is affected.
Re Polemis was mentioned in Lord Wright's speech in The Liesbosch,
where it was dismissed as immaterial. But it had only been cited by counsel
to support the argument that damages flowing from the plaintiff's impecuniosity should be categorized as "direct" consequences of the defendants' act,
so its dismissal represents only a decision that it was immaterial to the second part of Lord Wright's ratio, that is, to the categorization of such losses
as indirect. Its dismissal does not establish the immateriality, to Lord
Wright's judgment, of the "direct consequences" rule which is traditionally
named after Re Polemis.
In summary a court that does not wish to follow The Liesbosch may
adopt one of several approaches. First, it may decide that the plaintiff's
impecuniosity was in fact irrelevant, because the same losses would have
been suffered by a non-impecunious person. Second, it may characterize the
problem as one of mitigation, and follow Clippens Oil. Third, a court may
find that the plaintiff's impecuniosity was traceable to the defendant's wrongful acts. Fourth, it may apply the foreseeability test, and hold that the rule
in The Liesbosch only applies to actions in tort decided before 1960. Finally,
a court may eschew all these approaches and search out a path hitherto untrodden: there are, for example, recent indications that a plaintiff will not
be stopped from pointing to his impecuniosity to justify his behavior or to
explain his losses if the defendant has already gained some benefit by reason of that impecuniosity.
An analysis of the cases decided since 1933 will show the reception
which The Liesbosch has received in the Commonwealth, the situations in
which it has been declared irrelevant and the situations in which it has,
though seldom with any explanation, been declared determinative of the
issues. In particular, this analysis will show the ease with which The Liesbosch may be evaded if the appropriate decisions are invoked.
IV. THE CASES SINCE 1933
A. Cases Allowing Recovery for Losses Attributable to the
Plaintiff's Impecuniosity
1. Cases Distinguishing The Liesbosch: Impecuniosity may be Irrelevant
In several reported cases, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was
attempting to recover damages which flowed from his own impecuniosity, and
that such attempts should not meet with success, but the court held that
even a non-impecunious person in the plaintiff's position might well have
suffered the same losses. In each case the plaintiff's impecuniosity had rendered him unable to take certain steps which would have restricted his
losses, but the court refused to reduce his damages, holding that in the circumstances even a person able to take those steps might reasonably have
failed to do so. The same results could have been reached by categorizing
124

Id. at 110 (A.C.), 405 (All E.R.), 267 (L.T.).
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the issues as issues of mitigation, and then applying the principle of Clippens
Oil. The status of that principle is, however, unclear, at least in Canada. 25
In General Securities Ltd. v. Don Ingram Ltd.,126 the defendant had

agreed to finance the plaintiff's purchase of Studebaker automobiles, but
refused to supply the funds that the plaintiff needed to pay for a shipment
of automobiles. The plaintiff tried to arrange alternate financing, but to no
avail. One finance company was willing to advance the necessary funds if a
further $5,000 capital was put into the plaintiff's business, but that sum
could not be raised in a manner satisfactory to the finance company. Finally
the Studebaker company cancelled the plaintiff's franchise as a result of its
failure to pay for the shipment.
The trial judge, making no reference to the significance of the plaintiff's
impecuniosity, held that the defendant's knowledge of the likely consequences of its refusal to loan the money sufficed to render it liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiff. 127 These included damages in respect of
the destruction of the plaintiff's business and the resulting sale of its assets
at bargain-basement prices as well as damages in respect of the loss of the
profits anticipated upon the sale of the cars.
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the defendant argued that "a
deficiency in the amount of capital employed in respondent's business was
the cause of the respondent being unable to secure the necessary funds elsewhere and that the damages flowed from that lack.' 128 Of the five members
of the court, only Kerwin J., with whom Taschereau J.concurred, made
reference to this argument. His Lordship stated:
Assuming it to be proved that in a business sense the respondent required further
capital in its undertaking, one of the main objects of the bargain between the
parties was the supplying of that capital and, in any event, the short time at the
disposal of the respondent to make other arrangements shows that that circumstance was the compelling factor in respondent's inability to secure funds from
other sources.'2 9 [Emphasis added.]

Davis J. had already noted that funds could have been obtained from
the finance company if the plaintiff had been able to increase its capital by
$5,000.130 Thus Kerwin J. can only have meant that a reasonable person
with sufficient funds might still have refused the finance company's offer, and
sought financing elsewhere, but that his search would have been too brief to
be fruitful. The plaintiff's impecuniosity, although at first sight critical, was
actually irrelevant.
The same stance was adopted by Somervell L.J. in Trans Trust S.P.R.L.
v. Danubian Trading Co.'3' The S.A. company had sold steel to Trans Trust,
-5See text accompanying notes 274 et seq., infra.
12 [1940] S.C.R. 670, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 641.
127 [1939] 2 W.W.R. 34, 54 B.C.R. 123 (S.C.).
128 Supra note 126, at 678 (S.C.R.), 647 (D.L.R.) per Kerwin J.
129

Id.
at 675-76 (S.C.R.), 645 (D.L.R.).
Supra note 17.

.13O1d.
131
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which in turn sold it to Danubian, which in turn sold it to the L company.
There were only three problems. The S.A. company did not have the funds
to purchase any steel from the wholesaler. Trans Trust did not have the
funds to purchase any steel from the S.A. company. And Danubian did not
have the funds to purchase any steel from Trans Trust. Only the L company
had funds.
So Danubian agreed, as part of its contract with Trans Trust, to cause
the L company to open a confirmed credit in favor of the S.A. company.
This would have eliminated all problems caused by the three firms' impecuniosity, but Danubian repudiated its agreement.
Trans Trust sued for the profits that it failed to earn and for a declaration that it was entitled to be indemnified against any damages that might
be recoverable against it by the S.A. company. It was successful at trial.1' 2
On appeal it was argued for the defendant that, since the market was
rising, a non-impecunious plaintiff would have used its own funds to purchase steel from the S.A. company, resold it in the market and thus gained
even more profits than it would have gained if Danubian had honoured its
obligations. All three members of the Court of Appeal decided the question
as a problem of foreseeability. 133 But Somervell L.J. went on to reject the
defendant's argument on alternate grounds:
Even if the plaintiffs had been very rich, it might still have been "contemplated"
that if the defendants did not procure the obtaining of the credit the plaintiffs
could not and would not3 4themselves have used their resources for the opening
of a credit for this steel.

However difficult this might be to reconcile with the usual requirement to
mitigate one's losses, it exemplifies the principle that a plaintiff unable to
take certain steps to minimize his losses will not be penalized if a plaintiff
with more funds might well have been equally unwilling to take those steps.
Later cases illustrate this pointY35 In Martindale v. Duncan,130 the de-

fendant negligently damaged the plaintiff's taxi. It could have been repaired
within four weeks of the accident, but the plaintiff did not get it back into
operation for ten weeks. He gave two reasons for this. First, he did not have
the funds to pay for the repairs. Second, he was reluctant to commence repairs without the authorization of either his own or the defendant's insurers,
and he did not receive such authorization until eight weeks after the accident. Defence counsel referred to The Liesbosch which, said Davies L.J.,
was "authority for the proposition that impecuniosity is no excuse for not
mitigating damage.' 1 37 But the learned judge indicated that the plaintiff's
failure to expedite the repairs was not unreasonable in light of the insurers'
132 [1952] 1 K.B. 285.
133 See text accompanying notes 214-26, infra.

note 17, at 302 (Q.B.), 975 (All E.R.), 1071 (T.L.R.).
1S5 See also Dodd Properties,supra note 101.
136 [1973] 1 W.L.R. 574, [1973] 2 All E.R. 355, [1973] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 558 (C.A.).
3
1 7 Id. at 577 (W.L.R.), 358 (All E.R.), 560 (Lloyd's). A baffling assertion.
134Supra
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silence. 138 His impecuniosity may have made him unable to repair the taxi,
but he might reasonably have been unwilling to repair it, even if he had the
necessary funds.
In Bunclark v. Hertfordshire County Council,13 roots from the defendant's trees caused cracking of the walls of the plaintiffs' houses. Proceedings were begun in 1969, when the structures could have been repaired
at a cost of £7,300. But repairs were not carried out, because most of the
plaintiffs had insufficient funds. By the date of the trial, seven years later,
the cost of repairs had risen to £58,625. The defendant cited The Liesbosch, and argued that damages should be assessed at £7,300, but the
judge assessed damages at £58,625. One of the grounds on which he rejected the defendant's argument 140 was that even non-impecunious plaintiffs
would have been justified in refusing to undertake the repairs.
The county council ... by obdurate silence, refused to remove the trees, and both
Mr. Cooper and the plaintiffs' other advisors thought that to do the work before
the defendant's trees were felled would be a waste of money. Mr. Cooper admitted
that even underpinning to a depth of 9 feet would not safeguard absolutely
against root action. In my judgment, therefore, that 4 would also be a good reason
for the plaintiffs' failure to mitigate their damages.' '

These cases establish the general proposition that an impecunious plaintiff will not be denied damages if he would have suffered the same losses
even if he had not been impecunious. That proposition might seem trivial.
But it deserves notice for two reasons. The first is that this is an area in

which logic does not always carry the day, and in which case law support
should be sought for even the most elementary propositions. The second is
that this proposition lies at the heart of the principle established in Wroth v.
Tyler, 42 discussed in the following section.
2.

Cases Ignoring The Liesbosch: Bringing Suit for Specific
Performance Makes Impecuniosity Irrelevant
Two propositions which find their origin in the case of Wroth v. Tyler

could be cited by an impecunious plaintiff seeking damages attributable in
part to his own impecuniosity, and searching for ways to evade the principle
of The Liesbosch. The first proposition, relatively narrow but extremely useful, will be developed at some length in view of the frequency with which it
has been invoked of late.
138 Id. Note that these very grounds were held not to excuse a failure to mitigate in
Smith v. McConnell Bros. and Elkin (1954), 11 W.W.R. 600 at 607, 62 Man. R. 72 at
80 (Q.B.). In Rivere v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 75 (La. C.A. 1980), recovery
for extended downtime was denied where the plaintiff's car could have been repaired
quite quickly but he lacked the funds to pay for repairs. The decision is not only outside the mainstream of American decisions (infra note 194), but also in sharp contrast
to Louisiana's benign attitude to impecunious wrongdoers: numerous cases since Daly
v. Kiel, 106 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (1901), have held that even compensatory damages
can be reduced if the defendant is impoverished.
131 Supranote 99.
140The other ground is mentioned in the text accompanying notes 179-87, infra.
141 Supra note 99, at 687.
149 [1974] Ch. 30, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 405, [1973] 1 All E.R. 897.
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The first of these propositions, which has already attracted much attention, 143 can be phrased quite narrowly: a plaintiff who unsuccessfully
seeks specific performance of a contract for the sale of land is entitled to
damages assessed as of the date on which he should have realized that specific performance would not be ordered. Phrased so narrowly, the proposition
might seem to be founded on the words of Lord Cairns' Act 144 which details the circumstances under which a court of equity may award damages.
Thus in Wroth v. Tyler itself the plaintiff sought specific performance of a
contract to sell land, but Megarry J. would not order it;14 instead he awarded damages under Lord Cairns' Act and assessed them as of the date of the
trial. 140 This approach has met with approval in Canada. 147 Wroth v. Tyler
has even been distinguished on the ground that it dealt only with damages in
equity, and could have no relevance to the measure of damages at law. 148
But the rule that damages need not be assessed as of the breach-date is not
restricted to damages in equity; a conceptual basis for the rule, independent
of Lord Cairns' Act, can be found which applies equally to equity and to
law. It is now clear that the rule applies to damages at law. 149 In order to
understand the rule, and to understand both its exact extent and the manner
in which it may on occasion be invoked by an impecunious plaintiff, a

143 See, among others, Oakley, Pecuniary Compensation for Failure to Complete a
Contract for the Sale of Land, [1980] C.L.J. 58; Comment (1980), 58 Can. B. Rev.
394; Reiter and Sharpe, supra note 103; Lawson, Damages-an Appraisal of Wroth v.
Tyler (1975), Part 1, 125 New L.J. 300; Woodman, When an Order for Specific Performance Fails (1979), 42 Mod. L. Rev. 696; Note (1973), 89 L.Q. Rev. 326.
144 The Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27.
145 Among other factors, any order would have had the effect of splitting up tho
vendor's family.
146 At 58 (Ch.), 428 (W.L.R.), 920 (All E.R.), Megarry J. said:
On the wording of the section, the power "to award damages to the party injured,
... in substitution for such... specific performance," at least envisages that the
damages awarded will in fact constitute a true substitute for specific performance.
Furthermore, the section is speaking of the time when the court is making its
decision to award damages in substitution for specific performance, so that it is
at that moment that the damages must be a substitute.
147E.G.H. Holdings Ltd. v. Fougie (1977), 7 A.R. 213, 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244
(Dist. Ct.).
148 Woodford Estates Ltd. v. Pollack (1979), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 350, 22 O.R. (2d)
340 (H.C.). It would seem that Wroth had no application to the facts of this case. The
purchaser of land was in breach, and in a falling market the vendor retained the land.
He alleged that he had been unable to find any buyers for his property, which he had
contracted to sell to the defendant for $426,000, and that its value had now dropped
to $178,000. The Court, however, found that the property could have brought $355,000
if exposed for sale on the open market at the time of the defendant's breach. The
plaintiff had never sought specific performance, and so could not excuse his failure to
seek purchasers on the open market, as could the plaintiffs in Wroth.
149 Johnson v. Agnew, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 487, [1979] 1 All E.R. 883 (H.L.); 306793
Ontario Ltd. in Trust v. Rimes (1980), 25 O.R. (2d) 79, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 350, 10
R.P.R. 25 (C.A.). In several cases the damages were assessed as of the trial date without any indication of whether they were being assessed in equity or at law. See, e.g.,
Dynamic Transport Ltd. v. O.K. Detailing Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1072, 85 D.L.R. (3d)
19, 4 R.P.R. 208.
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framework will be developed within which both the classic breach-date rule
and the new rule derived from Wroth v. Tyler can be supported.
In actions for breach of contract, one party has failed to carry out his
agreed tasks. The plaintiff, as a result, suffers losses; in most instances in
which the choice of the date as of which to assess damages is important,
those losses will continue to increase until someone is found to carry out
the defaulting party's tasks. If an employer breaches a contract of employment, the employee's losses in the form of lost wages will increase indefinitely until someone else employs him. Similarly, if a vendor breaches a
contract to deliver a profit-earning chattel, the purchaser's losses in the form
of lost profits will increase indefinitely until someone else supplies a substitute. Since an injured party must take all reasonable steps to minimize his
losses, he must ensure that the defaulter's tasks are carried out as soon as
possible.
The most common way of ensuring this is to engage a third party. So
in an action for a vendor's failure to deliver, the purchaser's damages, inasmuch as they represent the excess of the market price of substitute goods
over the contract price, will be assessed as of the earliest date on which
substitute goods should reasonably be obtained. They will usually, though
not always, 150 be found by comparing the contract price to the market price
as of the breach-date. This, of course, is the basis of the breach-date rule.
The injured party might, however, decide not to engage a third party
to carry out the defaulter's tasks. Even if he decides not to carry out those
tasks himself, he has a further alternative: he may seek an order for specific
performance, and try to compel the defaulter to perform his duties under the
contract.' 5 1
Like any injured party seeking to minimize his losses, one who seeks
specific performance must act reasonably. In particular, as soon as he learns
of circumstances which make it unreasonable for him to expect to obtain an
order for specific performance, he must seek out a third party to perform the
defaulter's tasks. He need not do so earlier, for a plaintiff seeking an order
for specific performance need not engage another to carry out the very tasks
that he reasonably anticipates compelling the defaulter himself to carry out.
This reasoning leads to three sub-rules, each a particular application
of the more general rule that an injured party must act reasonably to minimize his losses. First, if an injured party does not seek specific performance,15 2 or seeks specific performance in circumstances where he should
150 The plaintiff is given a reasonable time after the breach to take steps to minimize his losses: Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 666 (S.C.R.), 24-25 (D.L.R.), 327

(W.W.R.).

151 In appropriate circumstances it may be reasonable for the injured party to spend
some time trying to persuade the defaulter to repent: Costello v. Cormier Ent. Ltd.
(1980), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 472 at 479, 63 A.P.R. 398 at 407, 28 N.B.R. (2d) 398 at 407
(C.A.). This may afford a theoretical basis for the rule that a refusal to accept an
anticipatory breach does not constitute an unreasonable failure to mitigate.
152
In 100 Main St. Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Const. Ltd. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 401
at 419, Morden J.A. distinguished Wroth on the ground that "from the statement of
claim stage forward there has been no claim for specific performance."

52
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know from the start that it will not be ordered, 53 then the breach-date rule
applies. Second, if an injured party reasonably seeks specific performance,
but learns before the trial of circumstances making it clear that specific
performance will not be ordered, then his damages will be assessed as of
the date on which he learns of those circumstances.15 Finally, if an injured
party reasonably seeks specific performance, and learns only when judgment
comes down that it will not be ordered, then his damages will be assessed as
of the date when he should have learned that specific performance would
not be ordered. This will be the date on which judgment should have come
down, that is, the date on which it would have come down had he prosecuted the action expeditiously. 5 5 As a matter of convenience, and because
such dates cannot in any event be calculated with precision, it is customary
to speak of the trial date rather than the date on which judgment should
have come down. 156

These three rules 57 have developed slowly, and decisions not entirely
consistent with them have come down in recent years.' 5 8 The House of Lords

in Johnson v. Agnew 5 9 has, however, now made it clear that damages are

153 Two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada exemplify this. In A.V.G.
Management Sciences Ltd. v. Barwell Developments Ltd., [1976] 6 W.W.R. 289, 69
D.L.R. (3d) 741 (B.C.S.C.), the vendor of an apartment building sold it to both A.V.G.
and Jordan Development Corp. Jordan obtained an order for specific performance
[Jordan Development Corp. v. Barwell Developments Ltd., unreported, Aug. 18, 1975
(B.C.S.C.)] and A.V.G. sued for damages. McKenzie J. found its damages to be
$35,000, if evaluated as of the breach-date, and $100,000, if evaluated as of the date
on which Jordan obtained its order. The plaintiff sought the higher figure, arguing that
Wroth v. Tyler applied, but McKenzie J., with whom both the B.C.C.A. ([1978] 1
W.W.R. 730, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 702, 3 R.P.R. 90) and the S.C.C. ([1979] 2 S.CR. 43,
[1979] 1 W.W.R. 330, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 289) ultimately agreed, distinguished that case:
here the property in question was an apartment building with no special characteristics,
and it was unreasonable for A.V.G. to have sought specific performance at all, even
while the property was still in the vendor's hands. (The same point would have defeated
Jordan's action for specific performance, but was not raised in that action).
In Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 668 (S.C.R.), 26 (D.L.R.), 328 (W.W.R.), Estey
J. said for the Court:
Before a plaintiff can rely on a claim to specific performance to insulate himself
from the consequences of failing to procure alternate property in mitigation of his
losses, some fair, real, and substantial justification for his claim to performance
must be found.
154 Johnson v. Agnew, supra note 149; Horsnail v. Shute, supra note 11; Schweikhardt v. Thorne, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 249 (B.C.S.C.); Victoria Queen Inv. Ltd. v. Savarin
Ltd. (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 489, 101 D.L.R. (3d) 353, 10 R.P.R. 32 (H.C.); Boultbee
v. Shore (1883), 1 Man. R. 22.
155 Hickey v. Bruhns, [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 71 at 79-80 (S.C.); Radford v. De
Froberville, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262 at 1287, [1978] 1 All E.R. 33 at 57-58, 121 Sol. J.
319 at 319.
1 6
5 Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 653 (S.C.R.), 14-15 (D.L.R.), 316 (W.W.R.).
157 The same rules should apply not only when a purchaser is seeking specific
performance of an executory sale, but also when the vendor is seeking rescission of an
executed sale: Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A. 2d 497 (Dal. S.C. 1981).
158 See, e.g., Billie v. Mic Mac Realty (Ottawa) Ltd. (1977), 3 R.P.R. 48 (Ont.
H.C.); Malhotra v. Choudhury, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 825, [1979] 1 All E.R. 186 (C.A.).
159 Supra note 149.
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indeed to be assessed as of the date on which the plaintiff should have miti-

gated his losses. The only significance of an action for specific performance
is that it postpones, if reasonably brought, the date on which third-party
performance of the defaulter's tasks should have been sought.
The general principle for the assessment of damages is compensatory, i.e. that
the innocent party is to be placed, so far as money can do so, in the same position
as if the contract had been performed. Where the contract is one of sale, this
principle normally leads to assessment of damages as at the date of the breach,
.... But this is not an absolute rule; if to follow it would give rise to injustice,
the court has power to fix such other date as may be appropriate in the circumstances.
In cases where a breach of a contract for sale has occurred, and the innocent
party reasonably continues to try to have the contract completed, it would appear
to me more logical and just rather than tie him to the date of the original breach,
to assess damages as at the date when (otherwise than by his default) the contract
is lost....
In the present case if it is accepted, as I would accept, that the vendors acted
reasonably in pursuing the remedy of specific performance, the date on which
that remedy became aborted (not by the vendors' fault) should logically be fixed
as the date on which damages should be assessed. Choice of this date would be in
accordance ... with common law principle....16 0

In an action for breach of contract, a plaintiff may recover only those
losses which he could not have avoided by appropriate counter-measures. If
the doctrine of Clippens Oil is not good law in Canada, then the plaintiffs
impecuniosity will not excuse his failure to take such counter-measures. In
particular, his impecuniosity will not excuse his failure to engage a third
party to fulfil the defaulter's tasks if his losses are increasing while those
tasks remain unfulfilled.
On the other hand, bringing an action for specific performance, if

reasonable, will excuse such a failure. The plaintiff's damages will be assessed as of the date on which it becomes unreasonable for him to continue
such an action. This postponement of the assessment date will result in an
increased award in many circumstances. In an action for failure to deliver
goods or to convey land, it enables a plaintiff to recover higher damages in
a rising market; in an action for lost profits, it enables him to recover all
the profits lost between breach-date and assessment date.
So it is to an impecunious party's advantage to bring an action for
specific performance. If the action succeeds, he might also recover the losses
he sustained between breach-date and trial date;'"' if the action fails, he
160

Id. at 499 (W.L.R.), 896 (All E.R.) per Lord Wilberforce.

101 In assessing such damages, it is important to distinguish between two equitable

jurisdictions.
1. Since 1858 equity has had jurisdiction to award damages in addition to, or
in lieu of, specific performance. The damages will be what the purchaser lost
as a result of his being refused possession and title, offset by what he gained
as a result of his retaining possession of the purchase money. If damages are
awarded in lieu of, rather than in addition to, specific performance, the purchaser will also have lost the increase in the property's value from completion
date to the date on which he should have purchased substitute property (if the
second of these three exceeds the first, then the damages recoverable by the pur-

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, NO. I

has postponed the date of assessment, and will thus recover more monies
than otherwise. The fact that his impecuniosity made it impossible for him
chaser should be the third figure, diminished by the excess of the second over
the first; but see 306793 Ont. Ltd. in Trust, supra note 149).
If specific performance is ordered, then the purchaser's damages can often
be written as "P's profits - P's interest." The first term, "P's profits," is the profit
which the purchaser would have made if he had obtained possession, not the
profits which the vendor actually made while retaining possession [see, e.g.,
Hartwell v. Glavin, unreported, July 6, 1977 (B.C.S.C.)]. Similarly, the second
term, "P's interest," is the interest which the purchaser made on the retained
purchase money. This may be the interest that he avoided paying on a mortgage
which he no longer had to give; it is not the interest that the vendor could
have made if he had obtained the purchase money (see, e.g., Schweikhardt,
supra note 154, at 262: the relevant rate is that at which the purchaser would
have borrowed the purchase money).
2. Equity has always had jurisdiction to require a purchaser who obtained
possession of the property before payment of the purchase money to pay interest on that money to the vendor: Int. Ry. Co. v. Niagara Parks Comm., [1941]
A.C. 328 at 344-45, [1941] 2 All E.R. 456 at 462-63, 57 T.L.R. 462 at 466-67
(P.C., Ont.). This is distinct from its jurisdiction to award damages (Hayes v.
Elmsley (1893), 23 S.C.R. 623 at 627); but because the two jurisdictions have
a great deal in common, they are easily confused.
The jurisdiction extends to allow equity to "settle accounts" even if the purchaser was denied possession subsequent to the completion date: Moscovitch's
Estate v. South End Dev. Co. (1968), 4 N.S.R. 182 (S.C., App. Div.); Fry,
Specific Performance of Contracts (6th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1921) at 640
et seq. [hereinafter Fry]. Since the vendor has been wrongfully in possession, the
purchaser may receive (i.e., reduce the purchase price by) the excess of the
rents and profits of the property over the interest on the purchase money. (If
this is negative, i.e., the interest exceeds the fruits of the land, then the defaulting vendor might himself seek an accounting to recover the excess, but equity
will deny its assistance lest the wrongdoer benefit from his evil acts: Esdaile
v. Stephenson (1822), 1 Sim. & St. 122, 57 E.R. 49; Cowpe v. Bakewell (1851),
13 Beav. 421, 51 E.R. 162.) '
a) The "interest on the purchase money" is not the interest that the purchaser made on the money that he retained, and can be either more [City of
Toronto v. Toronto Ry. Co., [1926] 1 D.L.R. 1029, 58 O.L.R. 283 (S.C.),
aff'd [1926] 3 D.L.R. 629, 59 O.L.R. 73 (C.A.)] or less [Roberts v. Massey
(1807), 13 Ves. Jun. 561, 33 E.R. 404 (Ch.)] than the purchaser made. It
seems customary to adopt an "official rate" independent of the particular facts
of the case (Fry, §1424), but the view that the appropriate rate should be that
at which the vendor could have invested the money, if he had been given it, has
much to recommend it [Burnell v. Brown (1820), 1 Jac. & W. 168 at 175, 37
E.R. 339 at 342 (Ch.)], and has been followed in recent years [First Gastown
Land Corp. v. Wicklow Hotel Ltd., [1976] W.W.R. 172 (B.C.S.C.)].
b) The "rents and profits of the property" include occupation rent if the
vendor used the property as his residence (Fry, §1440), and seem to be the
rents which the vendor actually received (Fry, §1427) and not the rents that
he or the purchaser could have received [e.g., Roy v. Roy, unreported, Jan. 30,
1978 (Sask. Q.B.)]. There are problems in reconciling this with the approach
taken in First Gastown, supra, however.
Probably the purchaser can seek either damages or an accounting, sinceo
he has such a choice if breach of trust, rather than breach of contract, is at
issue: Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) at 849-53.
Although the principles applicable to an accounting do not appear to be definitively settled, it may often be preferable to damages, especially if the purchaser
was going to borrow the purchase money at a high rate of interest.
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to engage a third party is irrelevant, for his reasonably bringing an action
for specific performance made it unnecessary for him to do so.
Everything hinges on the answer to this question: when is it reasonable
to bring an action for specific performance? It would serve no useful purpose here to examine the numerous and well-known factors which determine
the availability of specific performance. One example will serve as an illustration. Contracts for the sale of a dwelling house are almost routinely
ordered to be specifically performed. 14 Thus the purchaser of a house, too
impecunious to purchase an alternate house upon the vendor's default, may
reasonably commence an action for specific performance. By so doing he
renders his impecuniosity, and the doctrine in The Liesbosch, largely irrelevant.
The doctrine in Wroth v. Tyler may be even more important than
would appear at first glance, for it may be reasonable for an impecunious
plaintiff to hope for specific performance in circumstances in which it would
be unreasonable for a non-impecunious plaintiff to do so. Consider, for example, a contract for the sale of a commonplace item. If the vendor refuses
to deliver, equity will not order specific performance, and it would be unreasonable for the purchaser to seek it, because damages at law are regarded
as adequate:
So a court of equity will not, generally, decree performance of a contract for the
sale of stock or goods, not because of their personal nature, but because damages
at law, calculated upon the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete
a remedy to the purchaser as the delivery of the stock or goods contracted for;
inasmuch as, with the damages, he may purchase the same quantity of the like
stock or goods.' 63

This reasoning fails if the breach-date rule is applied to an impecunious

plaintiff, for the law's refusal to consider his impecuniosity means that his
damages at law will be inadequate. Should not equity's general rule be inapplicable in such circumstances? Equity has denied specific performance
where the defendant's impecuniosity would cause him to experience great
hardship were it ordered; 6 4 it should order specific performance where the
102 Equity always considered land to be unique, and ordered specific performance
as a matter of course: Kloepfer Wholesale Hardwareand Automotive Co. v. Roy, [1952]
2 S.C.R. 465 at 472, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 705 at 708. This principle no longer applies to
structures destined for commercial usage: A.V.G. Management, supra note 153; Chaulk
v. Fairview Const. Ltd. (1978), 14 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 13 at 21, 3 R.P.R. 116 at 123, 33
A.P.R. 13 at 21 (Nfld. S.C., App. Div.); McNabb v. Smith (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d)
547 (B.C.S.C.); Heron Bay Inv. Ltd. v. Peel-Elder Dev. Ltd. (1976), 2 C.P.C. 338 (Ont.
H.C.). The principle of Wroth v. Tyler applies to contracts for the sale of unique
chattels: The Millstream Pty. Ltd. v. Schultz, [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 547 (S.C.).
163 Adderley v. Dixon (1824), 1 Sim. & St. 607 at 610, 57 E.R. 239 at 240 per
Sir John Leach.
164 Dowsett v. Reid (1912), 15 C.L.R. 695 (High Ct. of Aust.) where the defendant was the vendor; Major v. Shephard (1909), 10 W.L.R. 293, 18 Man. R. 504
(K.B.) and Campion v. Jacobson, [1919] N.Z.L.R. 209 (S.C.), where the defendant was
the purchaser. In McIntosh v. Daiwood (No. 3) (1930), 30 N.S.W. 332 at 335,
(No. 4) 415 at 418 (C.A.), specific performance of a contract to indemnity was given
on the ground that the plaintiff might be ruined if he were forced to pay the debt first
and then to seek damages. In Bennison Lane Ent. v. W. Krause Logging Ltd., [1977]
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plaintiff's impecuniosity would cause him to experience great hardship were
it denied.
This argument seems never to have been raised in the Commonwealth.
No cases run counter to it. The Liesbosch may have established that a plaintiff's impecuniosity cannot affect the measure of his legal remedy of damages, but it did not decide whether or not his impecuniosity can affect the
existence of his equitable remedy of specific performance.
Some support for this argument can be found in a decision of the California District Court of Appeal, Gerwin v. Southeastern California Association of Seventh-Day Adventists. 165 Specific performance of a contract to sell
bar equipment was ordered in that case because the purchaser lacked the
funds to purchase similar equipment in the market, the contract being for a
price far below market price.
Whether or not this decision would be followed in Canada remains
questionable. At this stage it is possible to state only one thing with assurance: in some circumstances, whose limits have not yet been marked out,
an impecunious party to a broken contract might circumvent The Liesbosch
by bringing an action for specific performance.
This is not the only proposition for which Wroth v. Tyler might be
cited. The plaintiffs in that case were too impecunious to purchase alternate
property. Megarry J. mentioned the point without seeming to base his decision on it,' 66 but it could be argued that his choice of the trial date as the
date as of which damages were to be assessed was due to the plaintiffs' inability to mitigate their losses at any earlier date. This was the interpretation
10 7
given to Wroth v. Tyler in Tominski v. Headway Builders (Sault) Ltd.,
in which the plaintiffs sought damages for breach of a builder's warranty.
Gould D.C.J. held that the damages were the difference between the market
value of the house and the value which it would have had if it had answered
the warranty. The plaintiffs claimed that this difference should be assessed
as of the trial date, and cited Wroth v. Tyler. Mr. Justice Gould distinguished
that case on two grounds. First, the Tominskis, unlike the Wroths, had
never requested specific performance.
Secondly, the judgment in Wroth v. Tyler was expressly based on a finding that
(1) the plaintiff was financially unable to raise additional money; and (2) the
defendant was at all times aware of that fact. In the present case [the plaintiff]
gave evidence that he did not have enough money to make such a purchase but
6 W.W.R. 92 (B.C.S.C.), the fact that the defendant's breach would cause the plaintiff
to suffer losses which The Liesbosch would prevent him from recovering was held to
justify the granting of an injunction. For equity's tender treatment of impecunious
parties, see Roberts v. Tunstall (1845), 4 Hare 247, 67 E.R. 645, 14 L.J. Ch. 184.

Although equity will not require a person to do that which he lacks the funds to
do, the law has adopted a more severe approach: see McLeod v. The Board of School
Trustees of School District No. 20, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 562 (B.C.C.A.) citing the authorities on the availability of mandamus to compel the performance of a financially impossible task.
165 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 92 Cal. Rep. 111 (1971).
166Supra note 142, at 56-57 (Ch.), 426-27 (W.L.R.), 918-19 (All E.R.).
107 (1979), 12 R.P.R. 290 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
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there is no evidence that the defendant knew this.... Accordingly I am not pre168
pared to assess the damages as at the date of trial or judgment.
Wroth v. Tyler as interpreted by Mr. Justice Gould, could thus be cited for

the following proposition: a plaintiff's impecuniosity will excuse his failure
to take steps in mitigation of damages if, and only if, the defendant knew of
that impecuniosity at the relevant time.
This proposition is much narrower than that stated by Lord Collins in

Clippens Oil. Many plaintiffs will find that they can circumvent The Liesbosch only if they can successfully invoke Lord Collins' doctrine that impecuniosity excuses a failure to mitigate. This doctrine will be considered in

the following section.
3.

Cases Following Clippens Oil: Impecuniosity Excuses

a Failure to Mitigate
McGregor's eighth rule concerning mitigation is that "a plaintiff will
not be prejudiced by his financial inability to take steps in mitigation.' 0 9
This has been approved by various courts which have not elaborated on its

meaning. 170 Merely stating the rule is insufficient, however, for it leaves unanswered the question whose answer will determine the significance of the
rule: when is a fact pattern said to involve a question of mitigation?
In General Securities Ltd. v. Don Ingram Ltd.,171 the British Columbia

Court of Appeal responded to the argument that a borrower whose lender
breached the contract to loan money could, if he had sufficient capital or

credit, have procured the money elsewhere. Macdonald J.A. stated that "[t]he
right to recover damages... in such a case as this does not depend upon
the financial standing of the injured party. Respondent was obliged to

mitigate the damages by securing funds elsewhere, if possible; its manager
made reasonable efforts to do so and failed.'

flowing from the plaintiff's lack of funds.
In Robbins of Putney Ltd. v. Meek,

172

73

The Court allowed damages

the plaintiff had purchased a

168 Id. at 304. In Vancouver Key Business Machines Ltd. v. Teja, [1975] 5 W.W.R.
104 at 114-15, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 464 at 475 (B.C.S.C.), Verchere J. stated in dictum
that Wroth v. Tyler was distinguishable in that "the plaintiffs had contemplated a rise
in house prices," and "the plaintiffs' inability to mitigate their loss was known to the
defendants."
'69 Supranote 5, para. 241.
1
70 See Coffey v. Dickson, [1960] N.Z.L.R. 1135 (S.C.); Kolan v. Solicitor, [1970]
1 O.R. 41 at 52, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 492 (H.C.), aff'd [1970] 2 O.R. 686, 11 D.L.R.
(3d) 672 (C.A.); Wallace Const. Specialties Ltd. v. Mihalcheon Holdings Ltd., [1979]
3 W.W.R. 145 at 146 (Sask. Dist. Ct.); Canso Chemicals Ltd. v. Canadian Westinghouse Co. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 517, 10 N.S.R. (2d) 306 at 335 (C.A.); Clearlite
Holdings Ltd. v. Auckland City Corp., [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 729 at 743 (S.C.); Hoad v.
Scone Motors Pty. Ltd., [1977] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 88 at 100 (C.A.).
171 [1940] 1 D.L.R. 220, [1940] 2 W.W.R. 350.
172 Id. at 221 (D.L.R.), 351 (W.W.R.), citing no cases. O'Halloran J.A. concurred in the judgment; Sloan J.A. concurred in the result only.
173 [1971] R.T.R. 345 (Q.B.). The same result was reached in Hickey v. Paletta
(1972), 14 N.R. 4 at 11-12 (Ont. S.C.), aff'd (1973), 14 N.R. 3 (C.A.) and (1974),
14 N.R. I (S.C.C.), but no one seemed to realize that such a holding represented
approval of Clippens Oil.
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Bentley for resale to the defendant. The plaintiff had cash-flow problems,
and the purchase of the car had tied up a significant portion of its resources.
Upon the defendant's refusal to take delivery, the plaintiff sold the car hurriedly. It was argued that a better price could have been obtained if the
plaintiff had not been in such a hurry, and that the defendant should only
be responsible for the difference between the contract price and that better
price. Stephenson J., as he then was, characterized this as a question of mitigation, and held that the only question was whether the plaintiff had acted
reasonably in light of its financial position. He held that it had done so, and
allowed it to recover the difference between the contract price and the price
actually obtained for the car.
In Bede DistributorsLtd. v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corp.,174 a decision
of the Land Tribunal, compensation was assessed in respect of the corporation's expropriation of land upon which Bede carried on its business. When
the land was expropriated, Bede went into liquidation. This resulted in a
loss of about £-40,000, which Bede sought from the corporation. The corporation established that Bede would only have lost about £23,000 if it had
moved to another location and continued its operations, and argued that only
£23,000 should be awarded. 175 But Bede's cash-flow did not permit it to
move to the other location, which would have involved an immediate expenditure of some £27,000. The arbitrator awarded it £40,000, stating that
"[t]he present case seems to me analogous with Liesbosch Dredger v. Edison
in which it was held that where the financial state of the victim prevents him
from doing something
to mitigate the damage, the defendant must suffer
accordingly."' 176
In Smith v. Richardson,177 waste oil from the defendant's service station
polluted the plaintiff's well, and the defendant was found liable in negligence,
nuisance, and the tort in Rylands v. Fletcher.178 The plaintiff recovered
$2,800 in respect of the cost of drilling a new well. She also sought general
damages in respect of inconvenience and hardship. The extent of that inconvenience and hardship was directly proportional to the length of time between the pollution of the old well and the drilling of the new one, and so
the plaintiff could have minimized her losses by having a new well drilled as
early as possible. But the judge refused to penalize her, noting that "[s]he
was not in a position financially to provide new facilities," 179 and that "a
plaintiff will not be prejudiced by her financial inability to mitigate."' 180
In Bunclark v. Hertfordshire County Council,'81 the plaintiffs' impe-

'74

(1973), 26 P. & C.R. 298.

175 Id. at 311.
1761d. at 314. Support for this assertion is hard to find in The Liesbosch.
177 (1977), 23 N.S.R. (2d) 407, 32 A.P.R. 407 (S.C.). The decision is incompatible
with Chiasson v. Tremblay (1976), 12 N.B.R. (2d) 590 (S.C., App. Div.).
178 (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

179 Supra note 177, at 423 (N.S.R.), 423 (A.P.R.).
180 Id., referring only to McGregor, supra note 5.
181 Supranote 99.

1982]

Losses Flowing from Impecuniosity

cuniosity excused their failure to repair their houses, for this was "a matter
of mitigation of damages."'8
88
the
In Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council,

defendants negligently damaged the plaintiff's building. Repairs could have
been carried out in 1970 at a cost of £11,000. But for various reasons, of
which its impecuniosity was not the least important, the plaintiff did not
commence repairs. By the time of the trial eight years later the cost of the
repairs had risen to £30,000. At trial. 8 4 damages were assessed at £ 11,000,
following The Liesbosch; the Court of Appeal, however, did not display
fondness towards that decision.' 8 5 Megaw, L.J. held that even a plaintiff with

sufficient funds would have refrained from repairing the building until the
defendants admitted liabilty and it became clear that whatever funds were

expended would ultimately be recovered. 86 Donaldson L.J. distinguished
The Liesbosch on the ground that the plaintiff's impecuniosity did not prevent it from repairing the building, but only prevented it from repairing the

building without experiencing cash-flow problems. His Lordship held that
fear of cash-flow problems would have caused even a reasonable person to

refrain from repairing the building. 8 7 It is difficult to see why impecuniosity
rendering repairs impossible cannot be considered by the Court, while impecuniosity rendering repairs inconvenient but not impossible can be considered. 188 But all three members of the Court agreed that this was a question
of mitigation, and that the plaintiff's impecuniosity excused its failure to
8
institute repairs at an earlier date. 9 The plaintiff was awarded the cost of
0
repairs as of the trial date, but was denied interest.'9

Id. at 686 per Gibbens Q.C., citing Clippens Oil and Robbins of Putney Ltd.
124 Sol. J.
793 (Ch.).
184 [1979] 2 All E.R. 118, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 437 (Q.B.).
185 Donaldson L.J. indicated that "it is not at once apparent why a tortfeasor
must take his victim as he fiinds him in terms of exceptionally high or low profitearning capacity, but not in terms of pecuniosity [sic] or impecuniosity which may be
their manifestations;" supra note 101, at 940 (All E.R.), 458 (W.L.R.).
180 Id.at 934 (All E.R.), 451 (W.L.R.). See also Bevan Inv. Ltd. v. Blackhall and
Struthers (No. 2), [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 97 at 115 (C.A.) (reasonable to postpone the work
"until such time as the disputed issues of liability and damages were settled"); Cormier
Ent. Ltd. v. Costello, supra note 151, at 478 (D.L.R.), 405-406 (A.P.R.), 405-406
(N.B.R.); Mediuk and Budovitch Ltd. v. A.D.I. Ltd. (1980), 33 N.B.R. (2d) 271 at
341-44; Cann v. Carl B. Potter Ltd. (1980), 42 N.S.R. (2d) 682 at 687 and 697 (S.C.,
Tr. Div.), aff'd id.681 (C.A.); Cory & Son v. Wingate Inv. (1981), 17 Bldg. L.R. 104
at 119 and 123 (C.A.). In Camrosa Ent. Ltd. v. Southwest Welding & Mfg. Co., 123
Cal. Rep. 93 (1975), the Court adopted essentially the same view. The principle was
rejected in Birauda v. Anderson (1979), 16 A.R. 330 at 335 (Dist. Ct.) and Norta
Wallpapers v. John Sisk Ltd., [1978] I.R. 114 at 121.
187 Dodd Properties, id. at 941 (All E.R.), 459 (W.L.R.).
188 Supranote 100.
189 Supra note 101, at 935, 938, 941 (All E.R.), 453, 456, 459 (W.L.R.). Browne
L.J. was the third member.
190 The parties agreed that interest was inappropriate in the circumstances. When
repair or replacement costs are assessed as of trial date, the plaintiff would be over182

183 Supra note 101, followed in Jarvis v. T. Richards & Co. (1980),
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The most recent case applying Clippens Oil is Popular Homes Ltd. v.

Circuit Developments Ltd.' 91 The defendant breached its contractual obliga-

tion to lend money to the plaintiff builder. The plaintiff, unable to obtain
alternate financing, could not complete several homes which were in the
middle of construction. The uncompleted homes were protected from the
elements to a minor extent, but vandals and bad weather caused damage of
$8,613. It was argued that the plaintiff should have taken more elaborate
steps to protect the structures, but Barker J. held that its financial inability
excused its failure to do so.' 92
These cases support the dictum of Lord Collins in Clippens Oil. Several
points should, however, be noted here. First, the dictum finds most of its
support in decisions of New Zealand and English courts; it finds little support in Canada. Second, as discussed below there are many cases which
apply The Liesbosch to circumstances that smack of mitigation; this stems
from the fact that The Liesbosch was itself a case involving an impecunious
person's inability to mitigate his losses. 193 Third, these cases only give examples. They do not suggest any tests to distinguish questions of mitigation
from questions of remoteness: American decisions tend to categorize most
questions as questions of mitigation rather than remoteness,19 4 but these
cases are never cited in Commonwealth decisions. Fourth, even if Clippens
Oil is accepted as good law, there will be many cases, such as "foreclosure

cases," that cannot be categorized as mitigation cases. Impecunious plaintiffs
involved in such cases must rely on the next line of cases.

compensated if he were awarded interest: The Queen v. Ogopogo Inv. Ltd. (1981), 113
D.L.R. (3d) 445, 23 B.C.L.R. 43; Uchiage v. Young, unreported, March 1, 1978
(B.C.S.C.); C.R.F. Holdings Ltd. v. Chem. Int. Ltd. (1980), 21 B.C.L.R. 345 at 363,
14 C.C.L.T. 87 at 108, new trial ordered, unreported, Dec. 29, 1981 (B.C.C.A.), Craig
J.A. seemingly rejecting this view. Even though interest should not be awarded, lost
profits stemming from the plaintiff's inability to exploit the unrepaired item until judgment date should be awarded.
The plaintiff has no choice: he cannot opt for damages assessed as of breach-date,
plus interest, rather than damages assessed as of trial date: Reynolds v. Phoenix Ass'n
Co., [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 440.
'91 [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 642 (S.C.).
192
93

Id. at 654.

1 See text accompanying notes 106 et seq., supra.
194 See R.E.B. Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F. 2d 749 (10 Cir. 1975); Stahl v.
Farmers Union Oil Co. of Richmond, 145 Mont. 116, 399 P. 2d 763 (1965); Dennis
v. Southworth, 2 Wash. App. 115, 467 P. 2d 330 (1970); Steinman v. City of Seattle,
16 Wash. App. 853, 560 P. 2d 357 (1977); State v. Stanley, 506 P. 2d 1284 (Ala. S.C.
1973); Shellhammer v. Caruthers, 99 S.W. 2d 1054 (Tex. Cir. Ct. App. 1936); Coyle
v. Serafina Const. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 807, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 680 (S.C. 1957); Home v.
Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rep. 714 (1979); Valencia v. Shell Oil Co.,
23 Cal. 2d 840, 147 P. 2d 558 (1944); Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 250
S.W. 2d 785 (Tenn. C.A. 1952); Jordanv. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P. 2d 20 (1961);
Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha County Sheriff, 504 F. Supp. 1 (Wis. 1980). Some courts have
adopted the extreme view that only trifling expenditures can be demanded of a plaintiff: Schneidt v. Absey Motors Inc., 248 N.W. 2d 792 (N. Dak. S.C. 1976). Against
the general American trend are Cuddy v. U.S., 490 F. Supp. 390 (U.S. Dist. Ct. 1980)
and Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A. 2d 621 (D.C.C.A. 1950).
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4.

Cases Explaining The Liesbosch: It's All a Question of
Reasonable Foresight
It might seem that the principle laid down in The Liesbosch could have
no application in actions for breach of contract, where for over a century
the rule has been that damages are recoverable if, and only if, they are of
a type that was (or should have been) within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contracting. This is the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. 95
Since the rise of the "reasonable foresight" test to determine the recoverability of damages in tort, 19 6 the rule in The Liesbosch is, arguably, inapplicable even to actions in tort.197 This argument gains support from recent
suggestions that the rules regarding remoteness are the same in tort as in
contract, save that in contract the foreseeability of damage is to be assessed
as of the time of contracting, whereas in tort it is to be assessed as of the
time of committing the tort.198 The argument that the rule in The Liesbosch
has been superseded by the reasonable foresight test has received nods of
approval from high authority. 199 But it has seldom been accepted in tort.
The reasonable foresight test has generally been applied to evade The
Liesbosch only in actions for breach of contract.
The earliest case which has been viewed as applying the reasonable
foresight test was General Securities Ltd. v. Don Ingram Ltd.200 In the
Supreme Court of Canada, Duff C.J.C. clearly espoused that test,201 but the
20 2
views of the other members of the Court were not set forth with clarity.
The decision does not unequivocally support the thesis that damages flowing
from the combination of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the defendant's

195 Supra note 20.
190 Supra note 122.
197 See text accompanying notes 119-22, supra.
198 The test in negligence is whether the type of damage is one that was reasonably
foreseeable at the relevant time. The test in contract is whether the type of damaee is
one that was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the relevant time.
In this paper the expression "reasonably foreseeable" is used to refer to both tests;
quaere, if any difference between the two can survive Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at
646-47 (S.C.R.), 9-10 (D.L.R.), 310-11 (W.W.R.), approving H. Parsons (Livestock)
Ltd. v. Uttley Ingram & Co., [1978] Q.B. 791 at 807, [1978] 1 All E.R. 525 at 536-37,
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 990 at 1001-1002 per Scarman L.J. See Tabata v. McWilliams (1981),
123 D.L.R. (3d) 141 at 159 (Ont. H.C.).
199 See 12 Halsbury, Laws (4th), para. 1144; Bevan Ind., supra note 186, at 119.
200
Supra note 126.
201 Id. at 673 (S.C.R.), 643 (D.L.R.).
202 Davis J. indicated that the plaintiffs had been unable to arrange alternate financing, but did not indicate whether that inability was due to their impecuniosity. Kerwin
and Taschereau JI. doubted that the plaintiffs' inability was due to impecuniosity, but
also stated that "[a]ssuming it to be proved that in a business sense the respondent
required further capital in its undertaking, one of the main objects of the bargain between the parties was the supplying of that capital" [id. at 679 (S.C.R.), 647 (D.L.R.)].
Foreseability was not mentioned. Hudson J. noted that the defendants were aware of
the likely consequences of their breach, and of the plaintiffs' impecuniosity, and then
stated without more ado that "[t]he circumstances here ... justify a substantial verdict"
[id. at 680 (S.C.R.), 648 (D.L.R.)]. Five judges: 4 judgments: no ratio.
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breach of contract may be recovered if they were reasonably foreseeable at
the relevant time.20 3 The great respect always accorded the views of Chief
Justice Duff, however, makes the decision strong persuasive authority at the
very least.
The first decision to adopt the reasonable foresight test in what was
clearly an impecuniosity case was a decision of the Privy Council on appeal
from Palestine, Muhammad Issa el Sheikh Ahmad v. Ali.20 4 The plaintiffs
sold land to one Haski, and then sold the same land to the defendants.
Anticipating trouble, they obtained from the defendants a promise to indemnify them against any judgment recovered against them by Haski. Haski
obtained a judgment in the amount of £1,830 against the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs lacked the funds to satisfy the judgment, and the defendants refused to furnish them with the necessary monies. So Haski caused some
of the plaintiffs' other land to be sold at a court sale. It realized £2,883
less than its true value.
The plaintiffs sought to recover the £2,883 and the Privy Council
held that the loss resulting from the execution sale was not too remote:
The vendor's impecuniosity was not a separate and concurrent cause of the land
being sold in execution, and the trial judge held, as has been stated, that is [sic]
was common knowledge that on a forced sale full value was seldom realized.
Whether the contract be read as a contract to indemnify the vendors at all stages
or as a contract to indemnify the vendors against the amounts due to Haski with
a right in the vendors to fight Haski to such extent as they chose, the result is,
in their Lordships' opinion, the same.... On the first basis the damages claimed
fall within the terms of the contract on its true construction, and on the second
they are damages which, on the facts found by the trial judge, might reasonably
be expected to be in the contemplation of the parties.2 05

Although this could have been viewed as impecuniosity excusing a failure
to mitigate 206 the Privy Council was clearly treating it as impecuniosity
giving rise to a new head of damages and applying the test in Hadley v.
Baxendale.
Within two years Lord Wright himself took note of the decision in
Muhammad Issa. In Monarch Steamship Co. v. Karlshamns Oliefabriker

(A/B) 20 7 the rules of remoteness in contract were in issue. Lord Wright first
noted that The Liesbosch had held that losses due to a party's impecuniosity
were too remote.208 He did not elaborate on this. Then his Lordship noted
20 3
The decision of Duff C.J.C. was mentioned in a note in (1948), 64 L.Q. Rev.
2 at 3. The case was cited by Munro J. in Pelletier v. Pe Ben Ind. Co., [1976] 6 W.W.R.
640 (B.C.S.C.) as supporting the reasonable foreseeability test.
204[19471 A.C. 414, [1948] 117 L.J.K.B. 455.
2
05 Id. at 427 (A.C.), 461-62 (L.J.K.B.) per Lord Uthwatt. The Liesboch was not
mentioned in the speech, and is not shown as mentioned in argument.
206 Of course, if the plaintiffs had been able to satisfy the judgment, the loss should
not have arisen.
207 [1949] A.C. 196, [1949] 1 All E.R. 1, [1949] 118 L.J. Ch. 772 (H.L.Sc.).
208
1d. at 224 (A.C.), 14 (All E.R.), 785-86 (L.J. Ch.).
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that such losses had been held not to be too remote in Muhammad Issa because they met the "reasonable contemplation" test.2°9 He concluded his remarks by observing that "[tihe difference in result did not depend on the
differences (if any) between contract and tort in this connexion." 210
Two corollaries follow from this statement. First, damages flowing from
the combination of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the defendant's breach
of contact will be recoverable if, and only if, they meet the reasonable foresight test. Second, the same is true of damages flowing from the combination
of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the defendant's tort. These conclusions
are rather surprising, following as they do an earlier speech of Lord Wright,
who had stated in 1938 that such damages would be too remote even if the
defendant knew full well that they would be the inevitable consequences of
his breach.2 1' In any event they would be useful to a plaintiff seeking to
recover damages flowing from his own impecuniosity, even though they can
only be supported by a comment which was not necessary to the decision
and which is found in the speech of a Law Lord speaking only for himself 2'2 on an appeal from Scotland. It therefore seems strange that, although
the first corollary has been applied numerous times, the second corollary
appears to have passed generally unnoticed, and has been applied only
once. 213
In Charles v. Malherbe, Bosch & Co. (Pty.) Ltd.,21 4 the South Africa

Supreme Court was prepared to adopt the second corollary, and cited
Monarch Steamship Co. for the proposition that damages in both tort and
contract are based on "the doctrine of 'reasonable contemplation.' "215 On
the strength of the defendants' representation that they had purchasers ready
and willing to buy eighty percent of a certain farm, the plaintiff bought the
farm, paying £500 down and depending on the receipts of the resales to
pay off the balance. When the purchasers did not materialize, he was compelled to rescind the bargain and to forfeit half his deposit. His attempt
to recover the forfeited sum was defeated because "there is nothing to suggest that defendant knew what the financial position of the plaintiff was or
that he was relying on his ability to sell 4/5ths of the property.., in order

209ld.
2 0

1 Id. A "rather Delphic passage;" Sir Robin Cooke,, Remoteness of Damages and
Judicial Discretion (1978), 37 Camb. LJ. 288 at 289.
211 Wright, supra note 14, at 113-14 where Lord Wright stated "where payment of
a debt is withheld, the creditor may be in such a difficult financial situation that he may
be driven into bankruptcy, but all he can recover as damages is interest on the amount
during the period of delay. I have never heard it suggested that the position is any
different even if when the debt was contracted the debtor was informed of the creditor's
position."
212 Lord Porter, Lord Uthwatt, Lord du Parcq and Lord Morton of Henryton also
gave reasons. Only Lord Uthwatt made any mention of the speech of Lord Wright: he
agreed only with the conclusion.
213 Taupo Borough Council v. Birnie, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 397 (C.A.).
214 [1949] 3 S.A.L.R. 381.
215 Id. at 389, quoting from a note in (1949), 65 L.Q. Rev. 137.
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to finance the transaction. '216 The case is especially interesting because the
Court indicated that The Liesbosch would have been determinative of the
issue only if Monarch Steamship Co. were wrong and the test in Re Polemis,
not the test of reasonable foresight, applied to remoteness in tort;2 17 the
authority of The Liesbosch was seen as resting squarely on that of Re
Polemis.
The first corollary was affirmed by the English Court of Appeal in
0 2 18
All three members of a
Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co.
strong court adopted the view that remoteness in contract falls to be determined according to the test in Hadley v. Baxendale, and that there are
no special rules applicable to special types of contracts. Both Denning
L.J. 219 and Romer L.J. 20 went out of their way to state in dicta that damages which met the test in Hadley v. Baxendale could be recovered for
breach of an obligation to pay money. 221 All three Lords Justice 22 2 adopted
the principle that damages flowing from the combination of the plaintiff's
of contract are recoverable if they
impecuniosity and the defendant's breach
223
meet the test in Hadley v. Baxendale.
The Trans Trust case has been approved in Canada, New Zealand and
Australia. 224 In Canada it was first considered in Freedhoff v. Pomalift Ind.
2 16

ld.
Id.
21sSupra note 17. See also Ian Stach Ltd. v. Baker Bosley, Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B.
130, [1958] 2 W.L.R. 419, [1958] 1 All E.R. 542 (Q.B.) and Pilkington v. Wood, [19531
Ch. 770 at 779-80 (Ch.).
219 Trans Trust, id. at 306 (Q.B.), 977-78 (All E.R.), 1074 (T.L.R.).
22
01d. at 307 (Q.B.), 978-79 (All E.R.), 1075 (T.L.R.).
217

221 The imagined rule that only interest was recoverable for breach of an obligation
to pay money was probably due to a presumption of non-impecuniosity; such a presumption, if irrebutable, is equivalent to a rule that damages flowing from an injured
party's impecuniosity are not recoverable. Strangely enough, in America, where the
foresight test generally determines the recoverability of damages flowing from an injured party's impecuniosity, the rule survives that breach of a contract to pay a debt
does not sound in consequential damages: New Orleans Ins. Ass'n'. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S.
378, 21 L. Ed. 358 (1872).
222Supra note 17, at 306 (Q.B.), 977-78 (All E.R.), 1074 (T.L.R.) per Denning
LJ.; at 307 (Q.B). 978 (All E.R.), 1075 (T.I.R.) per Romer LJ.; and at 302 (Q.B.),
975 (All E.R.), 1071 (T.L.R.) where Somervell LJ. said: "We were referred to The

Liesbosch and Muhammad issa el Sheikh Ahmad v. All. The result is stated by Lord
Wright in the former case, namely, that damages due to impecuniosity may not be too
remote if the loss might reasonably be expected to be in the contemplation of the
parties." Quaere, if Lord Wright said this.
= Although this principle is now well-accepted in England (The "Elena D'Amico",
[1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep.'75 at 87), it has only recently been applied to allow the recovery
of interest on funds improperly withheld: compare Techno-Impex v. Gebr. van Weelde
ScheepvaartKantoorB.V., [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 484 (Q.B.), rev'd [1981] 2 W.L.R. 821
(C.A.) with The Borag, supra note 70. See also Wadsworth v. Lydall, [1981] 1 W.L.R.
598 (C.A.) which held that lost interest is recoverable whenever it meets the normal
criteria for the recoverability of special damages.
224
Kollman v. Watts, [1963] V.R. 396 at 400 (S.C.).
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Ltd.22 i The plaintiff had purchased a defective ski lift. As a result, he was
unable to attract patrons to his heavily-mortgaged ski facility. So he could
not earn the profits upon which his ability to make mortgage payments
depended. Ultimately the mortgagee caused the ski facility to be sold. It
realized only a fraction of its true value, and Stewart J. allowed the plaintiff
to recover the shortfall. He distinguished The Liesbosch on the ground of
foreseeability.
There must be a distinction made between impecuniosity extraneous of the
... breach of contract when damages caused by it must be regarded as being
too remote, and between impecuniosity traceable to the wrongful acts of the
defendant, foreseeable and a likely consequence of the defendant's default.226

It seems strange to require that the impecuniosity, and not the damages flowing from it, be foreseeable and traceable to the breach of contract. 2 7
Fortunately the Ontario Court of Appeal made it clear that the tests of

foreseeability and causation are applicable only to the damages, and not to
the plaintiff's impecuniosity. 228 Although he found that the alleged damages

had not been adequately proven, and should not have been awarded, Kelly
J.A. went on to say:
In the instant case, even if the plaintiff be entitled to be compensated for damages
in the amount of loss of revenue, the loss of property through the sale by the
Industrial Development Bank because of the plaintiff's failure to keep the mortgage in good standing, does not entitle him to damages measured by the loss he
alleges that he suffered in the sale of the property. It does not meet the test of
foreseeability.229

Since Stewart J. made no finding of special knowledge on the defendants'
part, the damages were unforeseeable; damages flowing in part from the
plaintifrs impecuniosity do not, it seems, meet the first branch of the test
in Hadley v. Baxendale.
In this context it is interesting that an American court had, fifty years
earlier,230 labelled damages in a personal injury action as "too remote" when
the plaintiff alleged that she had lost her equity in a lot that she had been
225 [1970] 3 O.R. 571, 13 D.L.R. (3d) 523 (H.C.). See Keinzle v. Stringer (1982),
21 R.P.R. 44 (Ont. C.A.), stating that the reasonable foresight test will not assist a
plaintiff wrongly deprived of the funds necessary to finance an intended purchase of
land, save in special circumstances [as to which, see Sinclair v. Tomic, unreported,
Feb. 25, 1982 (Alta. Q.B.)].
226 Id. at 581 (O.R.), 532 (D.L.R.), Stewart J. referred to Trans Trust, supra note
17, and then continued: "In Muhammad Issa el Sheikh Ahmad v. Ali [supra note 204]
and in Monarch S.S. Co. v. Karlshamns Oliefabriker (A/B) [supra note 207], loss due
to a party's impecuniosity was considered as not being too remote and was therefore
allowed" [id. at 580 (O.R.), 532 (D.L.R.)].
227 This was not a slip, for Stewart J. re-emphasized the point when he said that
"their act created that very impecuniosity" [id. at 581 (O.R.), 533 (D.L.R.)].
228 [1971] 2 O.R. 773, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 153 (C.A.). Of course the damages can
not be foreseeable unless the impecuniosity is foreseeable, but the damages can be
caused by the wrongdoer's acts without the impecuniosity being so caused.
229 Id. at 778 (O.R.), 158 (D.L.R.), speaking for the Court and citing no cases.
230
De Liere v. Goldberg, Bowen & Co., 30 Cal. App. 612, 159 P. 197 (1916).
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buying when "in consequence of her injuries she had been unable to keep up
her payments." 231 And in a case decided five years before Freedhoff, where a
plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident claimed similar damages, the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held "that plaintiff's alleged losses by
reason of the repossession of the tractor and two trailers, which were either
not damaged or not involved in the collision, were speculative, remote, and
not the natural and proximate result of any wrongful act on the part of dethe defendant."'' s The opposite result has, however, been reached when
fendant had special knowledge of the plaintiff's circumstances. 233
The trial decision in Freedhoff, rather than the decision of the Court
of Appeal, has been followed in British Columbia. It was approved in dictum in Bango v. Holt,234 and followed in Groves-Raffin Const. Ltd. v. Bank
of Nova Scotia.23 5 In the latter case, the defendant's breach of contract had
enabled one of the plaintiff's directors to defraud the plaintiff of $176,000.
As a consequence, the plaintiff lacked the funds to discharge its obligations
under various contracts with third parties. It was forced to default, and
suffered damages as a result. Andrews J.applied a hybrid of the test set out
by Stewart J. in Freedhoff and the test in Hadley v. Baxendale; he allowed
recovery on the basis that both the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the resulting
damages23were
foreseeable as well as traceable to the defendant's breach of
6
contract.
The Court of Appeal refused to allow the damages. 23 7 Not only were
they not quantified with sufficient precision, but the relationship between the
defendant's breach and the plaintiff's default on the third-party contracts did
not even meet the minimal "but for" test of causation: "Groves-Raffin's impecuniosity was not attributable to the payment out of the $176,000 because it could not, on any reasonable degree of probability, have survived
for long in any event ....,"238 This passage seems to support the thesis that
the plaintiff's impecuniosity, and not merely his damages, must meet the
causation test. It is not, however, clear if the Court of Appeal was directing

Id. at 615 (Cal. App.), 198 (P.).
Tullock v. Hoops, 206 Va. 665 at 670, 145 S.E. 2d 152 at 155 (1965). See also
Jerry Alderman Ford Sales Inc. v. Bailey, 291 N.E. 2d 92 (Ind. C.A. 1972).
233
In Horton v. Medicine Rock Land Co., 275 Or. 59, 549 P. 2d. 1122 (1976),
the defendant breached its obligation to log the plaintiff's timber and deliver it to a
purchaser. As a result, the plaintiff received no money from the purchaser and could
only satisfy its creditors by selling certain land in a hurry and for less than market
value. It recovered the deficiency because the defendant knew that it required the receipts from the timber sale to pay its outstanding notes. See also Markowiltz & Co. v.
Toledo Metropolitan Housing, 608 F. 2d 699 at 707 (6th Cir. 1979), where the Court
explicitly adopted the foresight test.
231

232

24

[1971] 5 W.W.R. 522, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 66 (S.C.).

235

[1975] 2 W.W.R. 97, 51 D.L.R. (3d) 380, citing only Freedhoff.

236

1d. at 132-33 (W.W.R.), 414 (D.L.R.).

237

[1976] 2 W.W.R. 673, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 78.

238 Id.

at 729 (W.W.R.), 130 (D.L.R.) per Robertson J.A. with whom the other

members of the Court agreed on this point.

19821

Losses Flowing from Impecuniosity

its mind to this distinction, for Groves-Raffin's damages, as well as its impecuniosity, were not attributable to the defendant's breach.
In the most recent reported British Columbia case to consider this matter, Pelletier v. Pe Ben Ind. Co.,)2 39 Munroe J. applied the tests of foresight
and causation to the plaintiff's damages, and not to the impecuniosity from
which, in part, they flowed. 240
There is thus authority in British Columbia for the proposition that
damages flowing from the combination of the plaintiff's impecuniosity and
the defendants' breach of contract are recoverable if, and only if, both the
impecuniosity and the damages meet the tests of causation and foresight.
There is also authority for the proposition that only the damages need meet
these two tests. Whether there is any difference between the two propositions will depend largely on the courts' willingness to describe impecuniosity
and
as traceable to the defendant's acts. The trial decisions in Groves-Raffin
24
Pelletier suggest that the courts will be quite willing to do so. '
The second proposition, that only the damages must meet the tests of
causation and foresight, is well accepted in New Zealand. 24 One case from
that country, Inder Lynch Devoy & Co. v. Subritzky,243 illustrates the difficulties in applying the proposition during periods of economic change. The
defendant was the plaintiff's solicitor, and was acting for her in the sale of
her house. He knew that she planned to use the proceeds to have a new
house built. The consequence of the defendant's negligence was that the
purchase monies were not available on the completion date. As a result the
plaintiff was unable to hire a builder. After a few months she did obtain the
greater part of the purchase monies, and could then afford to begin construction. But the cost of construction had risen several thousand dollars in the
interim, and she sought to recover that sum from the defendant.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's impecuniosity enabled the plaintiff to recover, not
only the usual damages that would have been suffered even by a non-impecunious plaintiff, but also the cost of accommodation during the period of
delay.2 44 But no other damages flowing from the delay in having the new
239

Supra note 203. The plaintiff, owner-operator of a truck that was being purchased under a conditional sales contract, was counting on his earnings under a contract
with the defendant to enable him to meet the payments. When the defendant repudiated
the contract, the plaintiff lost his truck. The resulting damages were held to have been
foreseeable. Freedhoff and General Securities were cited in the judgment.
240

Id. at 641.

In Dodd Properties,supra note 101, at 935 (All E.R.), 453 (W.L.R.), Megaw
L.J. referred to cases "where, as here, the plaintiff's 'financial stringency' so far as it was
relevant at all, arose, as a matter of common sense, if not as a matter of law, solely
as a consequence of the defendant's wrongdoing."
242 Popular Homes, supra note 191; Bevan Inv., supra note 186.
243 [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 87 (C.A.). Compare the only similar Australian case, Van
Amstel v. Country Roads Board, [1961] V.R. 780, at 789.
244 Id. at 94-95.
241
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house built were held to be foreseeable. For although "it may be taken to
have been within contemplation that during delay in payment to the respondent the cost of building a house might vary," still "[s]uch variations...
were those within the confines of what, on the evidence, must be assumed
to be settled economic conditions," and "[a]gainst the assumed market no
such loss as was asserted
by the respondent can be said to follow ordinarily
'2 45
from the breach.
This reluctance to recognize the foreseeability of inflation must be compared with the more robust attitude demonstrated in the astonishing case of
Taupo Borough Council v. Birnie.246 There the defendant council had negligently caused flooding which damaged the plaintiff's hotel and grounds. The
hotel's reputation suffered, and it attracted fewer patrons. When it could not
make its mortgage payments, the mortgagee had it sold. At this forced sale
the hotel realized only a fraction of its true value. Its owner sued to recover
the deficiency.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal held that foreseeability was the
touchstone of recovery. 247 Since it is always foreseeable that property sold
at a forced sale will not realize its full value, 248 the question was whether
the forced sale could have been foreseen. For this it was necessary, though
hardly sufficient, that the presence of debts secured by the property be foreseeable at the date of breach.
In considering this matter, the Court laid down a potentially farreaching rule. "As a matter of common sense," said Cooke J. for the Court,
"the existence of mortgage or debenture liability was probable."2 49 Whether
this will be extended to residential buildings is questionable, but it shows
that the existence of debts secured by property will sometimes meet the
first branch of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.
That did not end the matter. Encumbered property can only be lost if
the owner defaults on his payments and the charge-holder seeks to realize
on his security. The charge-holder's actions are never mentioned, and are
doubtless always foreseeable. A forced default normally would be foreseeable
only if the plaintiff's lack of funds is foreseeable.
In considering this point, the Court laid down another unexpected rule:
impecuniosity meets the first branch of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. It

245 Id. at 95. So the plaintiff recovered no damages at all in respect of the rise in
the cost of construction. In light of the finding that some increase was foreseeable, it
would seem that some portion of the loss should have been recoverable: Cory v.
Thames Ironworks Co. (1866), L.R. 3 Q.B. 181, [1861-73] All E.R. 597, 37 L.J.Q.B.
68.
24 6
Supra note 213.
247 Id. at 410 per Cooke J., for the Court, citing Monarch Steamship and Muhammad Issa el Sheikh.
248
Supra note 205 and accompanying text.
249

Supra note 213, at 411.
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is not up to the plaintiff in establishing foreseeability to show that the defendant had special knowledge which should have told him that the plaintiff
was impecunious. On the contrary, it is up to the defendant in establishing
unforeseeability to show that he had special knowledge that should have
suggested to him that the plaintiff was not impecunious. This is the thrust
of the following passage from the judgment of Cook J.:
As already indicated... it was no less foreseeable that serious flooding, especially
successive floods, would have a damaging effect on the hotel's reputation as an
attractive place in which to stay.... In these circumstances default to a secured
creditor, and ultimately a forced sale, were the very kind of things which were
likely to happen. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the defendant
Borough had any reason to suppose that independently of the hotel income the
would have enplaintiffs commanded financial resources of a magnitude which
250
abled them to keep the hotel in operation despite two floods.

No court has yet commented on these two points. Certainly if both
impecuniosity and the existence of debts secured by one's property are automatically foreseeable, then damages in respect of forced sales become routinely recoverable. It is unlikely, however, that a Canadian court will ever
go so far. Two decisions illustrate the prevailing view in Canada.
In Jones v. Fabbi,251 the defendants induced a breach of a contract
between the plaintiff and certain milk producers under which the plaintiff
was to haul milk. The plaintiff had bought a truck to haul the milk, but
because of the producers' breach he was unable to keep up the payments
on it; it was repossessed, and he lost his equity in it. Hinkson J. (as he then
was) denied recovery of such a loss both in contract 252 and in tort2 53 because the defendants were ignorant of, and could not have foreseen, both
the fact that the plaintiff's purchase had been financed and the fact that
breach of the contract might prevent him from making the payments. Neither
of these was considered automatically foreseeable.
In Len Pugh Real Estate Ltd. v. Ronvic Const. Ltd.254 the defendant's
breach deprived the plaintiff of $98,000 for four years. The trial judge
awarded the plaintiff a sum representing the profits which it would have
earned over those four years if it had received the $98,000 and invested it
in its business. The Court of Appeal disallowed that portion of the award.
Brooke J.A.-who evidently adopted the view that foreseeability determined
the issue-held that the defendant was not made aware of the plaintiff's

2501Id. at 411-12. In Bevan Inv., supra note 186, at 117, Richmond P. held that
the possibility of a plaintiff being unable to mitigate his losses because he was in a
position of difficulty "from a commercial and common sense point of view," met the
requirements of the first rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. (The President seems to have
assumed that only foreseeable impecuniosity would excuse a failure to mitigate.)
251 (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 27 (B.C.S.C.). The Liesbosch was not cited.
252 Id. at 33, applying Hadley v. Baxendale.
253 Id. at 36-37, applying The Wagon Mound (No. 1), supra note 122.
254 6 O.R. (2d) 454, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 71 (C.A.), citing no cases.
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financial position, or of the likelihood of such losses resulting from its
breach, and awarded only four years' lost interest on the $98,000.25
5.

Cases Distinguishing The Liesbosch: He Who Takes a
Benefit Must Take the Burden Too
It sometimes happens that the plaintiff's impecuniosity causes his damages under one head to be increased, and his damages under another head
to be decreased by an even greater amount. In this case the defendant, glad
to have his damages under the second head restricted to the decreased figure,
must by an elementary rule of equity be liable for the increased damages
under the first head.
Multi-Malls Inc. v. Tex-Mall PropertiesLtd.250 comes closest to illustrating this. M gave $180,000 to T who used the money to buy land. Both
parties were to use their best efforts to have the land rezoned. If they were
successful, M would give T a further $320,000, and T would convey the
land to M. If they were unsuccessful, T had an option: it could repay the
$180,000 to M and keep the land, or it could convey the land to M.
M, in breach of contract, acted so as to make rezoning almost impossible. Craig J. found that there was a 20% chance of rezoning if M had
honoured its obligations, and awarded $64,000 to T. He also ordered T,
unable to raise the $180,000 necessary to repay M and retain the land, to
convey the land to M.
M argued that T should have exercised its option to pay $180,000 and
retain the land and that the land was worth far more than $180,000. The
exercise of its option would accordingly have given T a benefit that would
have more than offset its loss of $64,000. M argued that T could not excuse
its failure to exercise the option by its lack of funds, since The Liesbosch
established "that impecuniosity not caused by the wrongdoer does not excuse a claimant from taking steps to mitigate. '257 But as T's impecuniosity
had enabled M to obtain the order for specific performance of the agreement to convey the land, so it enabled T to resist M's argument that it
should have mitigated; M's argument would result in a windfall profit and
was therefore rejected. A statement to the same effect is found in Clearlite
HoldingsLtd. v. Auckland City Corp.268 but the plaintiff's impecuniosity was
actually irrelevant 59 so the statement loses much of its force.
id. at 456 (O.R.), 73 (D.L.R.).
(1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 6, 108 D.L.R. (3d) 399, 9 B.L.R. 240 (H.C.).
257jd. at 17-18 (O.R.), 410 (D.L.R.), 255 (B.L.R.). It is not clear if Craig I.
accepted this contention.
2
- Supra note 170, at 743-44.
259
The plaintiff had sold the building in which it carried on its business. The
defendant damaged the building, and the plaintiff had to repair it before handing it
over to the purchaser. The repairs took slightly over three months, and the plaintiff
had to pay the purchaser in respect of the three months delay in giving possession. It
seems difficult to argue that the losses represented by that payment were attributable
to the plaintiff's impecuniosity.
255
256
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6.

Cases Distinguishing The Liesbosch: Impecuniosity Caused
by the Defendant's Act Generates Recoverable Damages
In at least three cases-Freedhoff,60 Groves-Raffin, 61 and Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. -62 the court has described the plaintiff's impecuniosity as
caused by the defendant's wrongful acts. But in none of those cases was the
nature or significance of such a causal connection discussed, for the first
two were decided on the ground that foreseeability determines the recoverability of losses flowing in part from the injured party's impecuniosity, and
the third was decided on the ground that impecuniosity excuses a failure to
mitigate. The principle suggested in The Liesbosch, that damages flowing in
part from the plaintiff's impecuniosity might be recoverable if that impecuniosity is in turn attributable to the defendant's wrongful acts, 26 3 has remained dormant. It may be, however, that the recent decision in K.R.M.
Const. Ltd. v. B.C.R. 6 4 will breathe new life into it.
In that case the defendant was held liable in deceit, having fraudulently
induced the plaintiff to enter into two disadvantageous contracts. Damages
were assessed as the difference between the plaintiff's financial position and
the position in which it would have found itself if the fraud had not been
perpetrated. This depended on how the plaintiff would have acted if it had
known the truth. The question was one of causation, remoteness having no
place in the assessment of damages for deceit.2"e
Counsel agreed that the plaintiff could recover the losses that it had
suffered by performing under the contract, but joined issue over the recoverability of damages in respect of lost opportunities, that is, compensation for
profits which the plaintiff would have earned under other contracts if it had
been able to enter into them. The judge found that the plaintiff was unable
to enter into other contracts because its contracts with the defendant were
2 67
tying up too much of its capital2 66 and too many of its experienced people.
With reference to the first factor, the defendant cited The Liesbosch and
argued that "the loss of potential profits on other contracts is too remote2 if
68
it is due to the plaintiff's financial inability to bid on other contracts.
26

Supra note 225.
Supranote 235.
262
Supranote 101.
2 63
Supra note 99 and accompanying text.
204 Unreported, Jan. 15, 1981 (B.C.S.C.). In Liska v. Bank of B.C. (1981), 27
A.R. 614 (Q.B.), the plaintiff sought the profits from a venture into which he would have
entered if the defendant's breach had not deprived him of the necessary funds. He failed
on the ground that the loss was unforeseeable. In Weber v. R.G. Sleeves Const. Co.
(1982), 20 R.P.R. 116 (B.C.S.C.), the plaintiff had earned profits from a venture into
which he was able to enter only because the defendant's breach had enabled him to
invest previously-committed funds. Those profits were deducted from the award of
damages.
265 Infra note 323.
266
Supra note 264, at 144.
26
7 Id. at 144-45.
268 Id. at 142.
0
261
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The proposition did not call for comment, since a shortage of manpower
would have prevented the plaintiff from entering into other contracts even if
it had not been experiencing a shortage of funds also, but Fawcus J. explicitly rejected it:
...I think, with respect, that if the plaintiff's inability to bid on other contracts
was, for example, due to not being able to raise another bid deposit or to securo
adequate financing or bonding because of their involvement in the subject contracts, then that could hardly be said to be '...not traceable to the [defendant's]
acts ....'269

The ramifications of this remain unclear. The plaintiff's financial inability
to enter into other contracts was attributable to two factors: first, the contracts with the defendant were tying up much of its capital and second, the
plaintiff's resources, even if it had not entered into those contracts, would
have been finite. The first factor would not have prevented it from entering
into other contracts if the second had not also been present. The second
factor can be paraphrased as "the limited nature of the injured party's funds
even if it had not been wronged," which is what is generally meant by "impecuniosity not traceable to the wrongdoer's acts." Indeed, by a similar
analysis an injured party's impecuniosity could always be attributed to its
"impecuniosity not traceable to the wrongdoer's acts." This would sterilize
the qualification "not traceable to the wrongdoer's acts." The judgment of
Mr. Justice Fawcus indicates, however, that the qualification may yet bear
fruit.
Its potency will depend on the test used to characterize impecuniosity
as "traceable to the defendant's acts." The "but for" test of causation seems
at first glance to be the appropriate test: impecuniosity is "traceable to
the defendant's acts" whenever it would not have existed if the defendant
had not wronged the plaintiff. But this test is phrased in terms that might be
misleading. The cases show that "impecuniosity," when used in connection
with the rule in The Liesbosch, does not have its ordinary meaning: it refers,
not to poverty, but simply to an inability to make some particular expenditure. Thus the nature of the expenditure in question determines whether a
person is to be labelled "impecunious," and the word "impecuniosity" is
meaningless unless that expenditure is specified. The test should therefore be
rephrased: an inability to make a particular expenditure is "traceable to the
defendant's acts" and The Liesbosch is distinguishable, whenever that inability
would not have existed if the defendant had not wronged the plaintiff.
Unfortunately this test is irreconcilable with the foreclosure cases applying The Liesbosch. Nor is it a satisfactory test if the expenditure in question was only made necessary by the defendant's acts: the question "would
a driver whose taxi was not damaged have earned enough fares to have the
damage to his taxi repaired" seems, if not meaningless, at least too artificial
for anything of importance to hinge upon its answer. Yet if the "but for"
269 Id. Notice, however, that in Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801
at 828-29, [1976] 2 All E.R. 5 at 22-23 (C.A.), the plaintiff sought damages in respect
of lost income, which "continued after the closure of the business because [he] no longer
had the capital to reinvest in another business," but all he recovered was interest on
thp money which he had negligently been induced to disburse.
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test is rejected, what can take its place? This must be settled before this sixth
exception to The Liesbosch can be freely invoked.
Conclusion
The Courts of Appeal of England and New Zealand have decided both
that impecuniosity excuses a failure to mitigate and that damages of a type
which only an impecunious person would have suffered are recoverable if
they meet the remoteness tests applicable to heads of damage generally.
New Zealand has adopted the second proposition both in tort and in contract; England has yet to adopt it in tort, but that adoption seems inevitable.
As a result, in those two countries The Liesbosch has been rendered irrelevant. There is no longer anything special about damages attributable in
whole or in part to the plaintiff's impecuniosity.2 70
But such is not the case in Canada. Significant appellate support is
lacking for both propositions. It is true that sometimes the courts award
damages in respect of losses attributable to the plaintiff's impecuniosity
without comment. For example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has decided that an impecunious plaintiff who was forced to borrow the money
to repair the effects of the defendant's wrongdoing can recover interest paid
on the loan.2 71 A non-impecunious person in the same position would, however, have to pay for the repairs from his own pocket and would not be
able to recover damages in respect of lost interest on the money which was
no longer his to invest.272 No one has yet remarked upon the interaction
between this principle and whatever principle The Liesbosch established,
although The Liesbosch has elsewhere been taken to prohibit the recovery
of interest in such circumstances 27 3 But such cases are anomalous. No appellate decision detracts significantly from The Liesbosch, or states that it is
to be read in the light of Clippens Oil, The Wagon Mound or even Hadley
v. Baxendale. On the contrary, there are many Canadian cases denying re7.

270For a case where damages attributable to impecuniosity were awarded without
comment, see Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd., [1969] 2 Q.B. 158, [1969] 2 All E.R.
119, (1969] 2 W.L.R. 693 (C.A.). The action was brought in deceit, where damages
may depend on causation but not on foreseeability: Jacks v. Davis, [1980] 6 W.W.R.
11, 12 C.C.L.T. 298, further proceedings at (1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 223 (B.C.S.C.).
271Leslie R. Fairn & Associates v. Colchester Dev. Ltd. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d)
389, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 681, 5 A.P.R. 389; appl'd in Atlantic Salvage Ltd. v. City of
Halifax (1978), 30 N.S.R. (2d) 512, 94 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 49 A.P.R. 512 (C.A.) and
Municipal Spraying & ContractingLtd. v. J. Harris & Sons Ltd. (1980), 35 N.S.R. (2d)
237, 62 A.P.R. 237 (S.C., Tr. Div.).
272Municipal Spraying, id. at 248-49 (N.S.R.), 248-49 (A.P.R.), noting that such
damages could not be recovered; D. Latimer Engineering Ltd. v. Cassidy (1980), 39
N.S.R. (2d) 663 at 674, 71 A.P.R. 663 at 674 (S.C., Tr. Div.), denying such damages
because the plaintiff could not show that it had been forced to borrow the money.
There is no justification for such diversity of treatment, for there is no valid distinction
between interest charged on an increased overdraft and interest lost on money withdrawn from a deposit account. The situation has now been rectified by the introduction
of section 38(9) to the Judicature Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 2 (see C.S.N.S. 1979, c. J-3), but
a plaintiff forced to borrow money can still choose between pre-judgment interest and
the interest which he was forced to pay: Young v. Burgoyne (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d)
330 at 339-40 (N.S.S.C., Tr. Div.).
273See text accompanying notes 306-10, infra.
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covery even in circumstances where recovery would be almost automatic in
New Zealand or England. It remains to discuss these cases in the next section.
B.

Cases Denying Recovery for Losses Attributable to the
Plaintiff's Impecuniosity
1. Cases Rejecting Clippens Oil: Impecuniosity Does Not Excuse a
Failure to Mitigate
Most of the cases applying the doctrine of The Liesbosch have involved
a plaintiff pointing to his impecuniosity to explain his failure to take steps
which would have reduced, though not eliminated, the quantum of his losses
under a particular head. This might be seen as impecuniosity explaining,
though not excusing, a failure to mitigate; such cases might be seen as implicitly denying the validity of Lord Collins' dictum in Clippens Oil.
But that denial is implict only if the court characterized the issue before
it as one of mitigation. Consider Coffey v. Dickson.2 14 The plaintiff purchased a defective juke box. It could have been repaired in a few months,
but the plaintiff's inability to pay for the repairs extended the period during
which the juke box was inoperative. At trial the magistrate allowed recovery
of profits lost during the entire period, but on appeal the New Zealand
Supreme Court allowed only the profits lost during the time necessary to
repair the juke box. This would seem to represent a rejection of Clippens
Oil. But the judge stated clearly that the case was not one involving "the
duty of
a plaintiff to mitigate loss," and implied that Clippens Oil was good
27 5
law.
For this reason, the only cases that can be said to represent a rejection
of Clippens Oil are those in which the court explictly described the issue as
one of mitigation. There are three such cases, all from Canada.2 76
The first is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dawson v.
Helicopter Exploration Co. 277 The plaintiff had been engaged to carry out
certain work for which he was to receive 75,000 shares in a new company.
The defendant breached the contract by hiring another, and it was found
that the plaintiff was entitled to the entire 75,000 shares. The question was
whether that value should be determined as of the breach-date, as of the
judgment date, or at the highest intermediate value. In opting for the breachdate, Rand J. said for the Court:
Dawson could have purchased the number of shares promised and had he done
so his damages would have been made certain. From the point of view of a purchaser, that is really in the nature of mitigation, and it would be no answer that
at the time he was not financially able to buy: "Liesbosch Dredger" v. S.S.
"Edison" ... .278

Whether or not this rule will stand is now questionable in light of the
27

4 Supra note 170. The decision has never been the subject of adverse comment,
although it seems out of line with recent decisions from New Zealand.
275

Id. at 1146.

276

See also the ambiguous case of Abbeyview Ent. Ltd. v. Dist. of Matsqui (1980),

22 B.C.L.R. 113 (S.C.).
277

(1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.).

278 Id. at 11. The Liesbosch was the only case cited.
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decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Asamera Oil case.279 The
case involved the breach of a contract to return shares. The breach-date
rule was applied, but Estey J. indicated for the Court that the result might
be otherwise if the plaintiff were financially unable to purchase replacement
shares at that time. 280 In this context, it is useful to compare Theis v. duPont,
Glore, Forgars Inc.,281 in which the Supreme Court of Kansas held that impecuniosity excuses a failure to purchase shares in order to mitigate one's
losses. But until Dawson is overruled, the doctrines in Clippens Oil must be
regarded as rejected in Canada.
That doctrine was next rejected by the Manitoba Court of Queen's
282
Bench in Western Processing& Cold Storage Ltd. v. Hamilton Const. Co.
The defendant used unsuitable material in constructing a cold storage plant

for the plaintiff. The plant deteriorated progressively. The plaintiff sought
damages in respect of the deterioration up to the time of trial. The deterioration could have been stopped had certain remedial work been undertaken in
1961, but the plaintiff could not afford the repairs. The judge allowed damages in respect of the deterioration up to 1961 and no further: "the duty of
a person who has suffered damage to minimize his loss is not affected by his

impecuniosity." 2sa

Most recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly rejected Clippens
Oil in R.G. McLean Ltd. v. Canadian Vickers Ltd.284 The defendant had
supplied a defective printing press to the plaintiff. The defendant offered to
refund2 the purchase monies paid but the plaintiff had already sustained such
losses ss that even the return of its money would not have enabled it to
purchase a replacement press.&2 86 The Court allowed recovery only of the

losses suffered until another press could have been bought by a non-impecunious plaintiff. Arnup J.A. said:
If the plaintiff had a good cause of action for damages by March, 1966 (and I
have already found that it had), any delay in actually collecting such damages
would not in law be the fault of the defendant nor a valid2 87excuse for the plaintiff's failure to mitigate its damages by accepting the offer.
279

Supra note 5.
657 (S.C.R.), 17-18 (D.L.R.), 319-20 (W.W.R.).
281 212 Kan. 301, 510 P. 2d 1212 (1973).
282 (1964), 47 W.W.R. 150, citing only The Liesbosch, varied without reference
to this point (1965), 51 W.W.R. 354, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 245 (C.A.).
283 Id. at 171.
281 [1971] 1 O.R. 207, 15 D.L.R. (3d) 15, varying [1969] 2 O.R. 249, 5 D.L.R.
(3d) 100. See the comment by Baer, The Assessment of Damages for Breach of Contract-Loss of Profit (1973), Can. B. Rev. 490 at 500-504.
2
86 Id. at 215-16 (O.R.), 23-24 (D.L.R.). The money spent must have been money
wasted in fruitless attempts to get the press working. The losses sustained were losses
on printing contracts that had gone unfilled.
286 This was not because the price of the machines had risen, but because the
machines were being bought under a conditional sales agreement, and it was unlikely
that the plaintiff, whose financial position had deteriorated, would have been able to
arrange financing of a replacement machine.
28 7
Supra note 284, at 216 (O.R.), 24 (D.L.R.), citing no cases. The "delay" was
not a delay in instituting proceedings, and by "any delay in actually collecting such
damages," Arnup J.A. seems to have meant only "any impecuniosity of the plaintiff."
28

0id. at
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It is disheartening to realize that the rejection of Clippens Oil has been
based on the mistaken view that it was rejected by Lord Wright in The
Liesbosch, and not on any firmer ground. Surely at the Supreme Court level,
at least, an authority that is merely persuasive should only be followed
after a rather more detailed analysis than is suggested by Dawson. But the
rejection of Clippens Oil is, until the Supreme Court speaks again, the law
of Canada; indeed, its rejection may be implicit in many of the cases considered in the next section that have purported to follow The Liesbosch
without indicating what that case was thought to have decided.
2.

Cases Applying The Liesbosch Without Analysis
There are many such cases, but they represent only a few typical fact
patterns.
(a) Delayed Repairs: It often happens that the plaintiff's lack of funds prevents him from repairing damages for which the defendant is liable. In such
a case he may not recover losses attributable to the continuation of the state
of disrepair beyond the date by which a non-impecunious person would have
had the repairs completed. In Clements v. Bawns Shipping Co.,288 for example, an action in fraud, lost profits were awarded only in respect of the
time necessary to repair a decrepit fishing vessel sold to the plaintiff by the
defendant, even though the plaintiff's impecuniosity had, for over two years,
prevented him from repairing the vessel. In Newman v. Cook,28 D an action
in contract, damages were refused in respect of the plaintiff's purchase of
equipment for an unusable fishing vessel sold to it by the defendant when
the equipment remained idle because the plaintiff lacked the funds to repair
the vessel.2 90 In Smith v. McConnell Bros. and Elkin,29 1 an action in negligence, the plaintiff was only allowed the cost of renting a replacement for
his damaged car until repairs could have been made, even though he may
not have had the funds to commission them.2 2 In Alberta Caterers Ltd. v.
288 (1948), 81 Lloyd's Rep. 232 at 235 (K.B.), citing only The Liesbosch.
289 [1963] V.R. 659 (S.C.), citing only The Liesbosch.
2
90 Id. at 666. It is not clear what damages the plaintiff was seeking: only the in-

terest on the purchase price of the idle equipment seems recoverable.
29
1 Supra note 138, citing only The Liesbosch. In Hollett and Hollett v. Coca-Cola
Ltd. and Fougere (1980), 7 N.S.R. (2d) 695 at 710, 11 C.C.L.T. 281 at 298, 67 A.P.R.
695 at 710, Cowan CJ.T.D. stated that the plaintiff "is entitled to the actual expense
to which he has been put by the loss of the use of his vehicle, but only for such reasonable period as might be expected to elapse before he had an opportunity to replace it,
and, for this purpose, it is assumed that he can finance the purchase of a new vehicle."
He cited no cases. Quaere, if the learned judge was referring to a rebuttable or an irrebuttable
assumption.
292
The plaintiff was also held not entitled to delay repairs by reason of a "dispute
between the insurance companies or their adjusters" [id. at 607 (W.W.R.), 80 (Man.
R.)]. In the similar case of Green v. White (1975), 10 N.B.R. (2d) 299 (S.C.), damages were not allowed for the increase in the cost of repairs to the plaintiff's vehicle
during the time he refrained from commissioning them "being short of money and
having no promise of settlement" (at 300). The decision cites only The Liesbosch and
Nason v. Aubin (1959), 41 M.P.R. 314, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 309 (N.B.C.A.), in which

such damages were disallowed on the authority of The Liesbosch, the delay being attributable entirely to the plaintiff's impecuniosity. Cf. Martindale v. Duncan, supra note 136
and accompanying text.
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R. Vollan (Alta.) Ltd.,2 93 an action in negligence, the plaintiff, whose building was damaged and who had not been able to raise the funds to commis-

sion the repair work in the three and one-half years leading up to the trial,
sought the profits lost during the entire period as well as the cost as of trial
date 9 4 of repairing the building. Cavanagh J. denied his claim and gave the
only analysis of the problem of impecuniosity found in the reports of the
last five decades:
The plaintiff says that inability to repair because of the plaintiff's impecuniosity
is a sufficient reason. On the other hand a deliberate choice not to repair because
the plaintiff did not wish to disturb its investments and preferred to await the
outcome of the litigation before undertaking repairs would not be a sufficient
reason.
That impecuniosity was not created by the defendants. That condition was
created by the plaintiff itself. It risked its all on this venture. It did not have a
reserve fund for contingencies. It gambled that nothing would happen before it
could earn some money to meet contingencies. It lost that gamble.
The plaintiff acknowledges that it had a duty to mitigate its loss. It offers as
excuse that it could not due to its own impecuniosity, but I think before one gets
to the question of mitigation one must go back to the question of causation. Did
the defendants cause the additional loss suffered by the plaintiff? It is not a physical loss that flowed naturally from the tort of the defendants. In popular language
it flowed from the impecuniosity of the plaintiff so that in that respect one might
say that it was not caused by the defendants at all. In the "Liesbosch" case, however, it is clear that the House of Lords held that the results of impecuniosity
were too remote to attach to the defendants in law. I consider that case to be
binding on me and the facts do not show the plaintiff's impecuniosity to be traceable to the defendants' acts. I therefore reject the plaintiff's claim.... 2 95

There is a suggestion here that the plaintiff is being punished for its failure
to retain sufficient reserves to meet contingencies. If this is truly at the root
of the principle in The Liesbosch, intriguing ways of evading that principle
suggest themselves.
(b) Delayed Replacement: What holds true for repairs delayed by reason
of the plaintiff's impecuniosity should hold equally true for delayed replacement. The Liesbosch itself was such a case. Impecuniosity has thus been
held not to excuse a delay in replacing a useless truck sold by the defen293 (1978), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 672 (Alta. S.C., Tr. Div.). The judge found that the
defendant was ignorant of the plaintiff's impecuniosity.
294 Cf. Burton v. Pacific Aircraft Salvage Inc. and Beulieu, unreported, Sept. 12,
1980 (B.C.S.C.). The defendants in that case had improperly repaired the plaintiff's
airplane, which he then kept in storage for almost three years until he obtained funds
to have it repaired properly. Wallace J. stated, "the inflated cost of repairs due to the
plaintiff keeping the plane in storage for 2 years was not a foreseeable consequence
of the defendants' breach of the contract to repair, but rather was the result of the
independent decision of the plaintiff who, because of the nature of the repairs he insisted on being carried out, and of his financial status, decided to forego having the
repairs effected until late 1978 ... ," and refused to allow recovery. See, similarly, Wozny
v. Pankhurst,unreported, Oct. 6, 1981 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
295
Supra note 293, at 682-84. The view that a plaintiff with available funds cannot sit back and await the outcome at trial seems now to be rejected in some jurisdictions: supranote 186.
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dant,2 a yarder converted by the defendant, " 7 an oven sold by the defendant,298 a well polluted by the defendant,2 9 9 cattle poisoned by the defendant, 3 o ahd a building destroyed by the defendant.3 0'
(c) Foreclosure: Several of the cases already discussed have involved a
plaintiff whose earning capacity was destroyed by the defendant's acts and
whose property was seized when he found himself unable to discharge a debt
which it secured, or to continue the payments under which he was buying it.
In such cases he has seldom been allowed to recover his lost equity from
the wrongdoer. Thus in Burton v. Dominion Steel & Coal Corp.30 2 a plaintiff
whose injuries prevented him from working found his schooner seized for
debt, and in Clements v. Wyatt 30 3 property belonging to a developer was
foreclosed when the houses in whose construction the developer had invested
all his disposable funds turned out to be unsaleable as a result of a defect
in title which the defendant solicitors should have discovered. Neither plaintiff recovered damages in respect of the losses occasioned by the foreclosure.
And just as damages stemming from foreclosure are not recoverable, neither
are the costs of employing a 0solicitor
to negotiate with the mortgagee in an
4
effort to prevent foreclosure.
The most recent foreclosure case seems to be Muller N.D. v. Government of the Republic of South Africa.30 5 Synman purchased property subject to a mortgage which was not revealed on the title deed. When the mortgagee revealed himself and sought to enforce the mortgage, Snyman, who
did not have the funds to discharge the debt, was forced into insolvency.
His trustee sued the Deeds Registry for negligence in not recording the mortgage on the title deed, but his attempt to recover the administration costs
was dismissed. The Court cited The Liesbosch and stated that "it is true that
Snyman's financial embarassment was a consequence of the negligence, but
Bird Chevrolet, supra note 23.
297 Stewart v. J.A.C. Ltd., [1949] 3 D.L.R. 42 at 51, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 1154 at 1166
296

(B.C.S.C.).
298

Extrufix Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of Canada,unreported, June 5, 1980 (Ont.

S.C.).
299 Chiasson,supranote 177.
300

Copeland v. Stanthorpe Shire Council, [1941] Q.S.R. 86, 35 Q.J.P.R. 17 (S. Ct.).
OBischoff v. Sams (1965), 51 W.W.R. 49 (Alta. S.C.). The dispute concerned
only the loss of use of a suite in the destroyed building, which had been replaced by a
smaller building similar to it but lacking a suite. The report does not reveal the reason
for holding the defendant liable for anything at all, and presents problems of interpretation.
302 [1940] 1 D.L.R. 476 at 481 (N.S.S.C.), citing no cases.
303 9 R.P.R. I at 34 (Ont. H.C.). Rutherford J. noted that the losses in question
were unforeseeable. He cited no cases.
304
Isaak v. Brisbane City Council, [1971] Q.W.N. 101 (S.C.), citing only The
Liesbosch. This reflects the rule that expenses incurred in forestalling a loss are not
recoverable if the loss itself would have been too remote if it had occurred: Foster v.
Public Trustee, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 26 at 29.
305 [1980] 3 S.A.L.R. 970 (T.P.D.). For another recent example see Mardon, supra
note 269 per Lord Denning M.R.
3
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the negligence can be regarded as a cause of the exI do not think 'that
'3 6
penses claimed. 0

(d) Interest: An impecunious plaintiff forced to borrow money to counter
the effects of the defendant's wrongful acts cannot recover the interest that

he paid on it; at least not if a non-impecunious plaintiff in similar circumstances would be denied pre-judgment interest. Although this principle could
be attributed to the common law's horror of usury, it has been attributed to
The Liesbosch in cases where a plaintiff has been denied interest on money
he borrowed to go abroad in order to seek treatment for the injuries the defendant had caused him, 307 to furnish an apartment so that he could live
near the hospital in which his wife was being treated for injuries the defendant had caused her, 308 and to purchase a car to replace one demolished by
the defendant.20 9 Recent cases, however, suggest that it may be due for re-

appraisal. 310

3
061d. at 975. The decision is totally at odds with The Liesbosch: see note 116,
supraand accompanying text.
307 Johnson v. Browne (1975-76), 19 W.I.R. 382 at 390 (Barbados H.C.).
308 Hunter v. Scott, [1963] Qd. R. 77 at 88 (S.C.).
309 Clancy v. Menchenton (1979), 21 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 305 at 310 (Nfld. Dist. Ct.).
See also Parlby Const. Ltd. v. Stewart Equip. Co., [1972] 1 W.W.R. 503 at 572

(B.C.S.C.).
310 In Burton, supra note 294, Wallace J. remarked obiter that he agreed with the
proposition "that an innocent plaintiff is required to borrow funds, if necessary, in order
to mitigate his loss if, in all the circumstances, to do so is a reasonable business decision," and that if "such an obligation is imposed upon the plaintiff he is entitled to
recover any interest paid to obtain such funds." See also S & N Timber Ltd. v.
Greenwood Forest Products (1969) Ltd., unreported, Dec. 21, 1977 (B.C.C.A.). Damages for delay in payment, calculated as interest, were awarded in E & B Mortgages
Ltd. v. Skrivanos (1980), 118 D.L.R. (3d) 139 (B.C.S.C.), Lozcal Holdings Ltd. v.
Brassos Dev. Ltd. (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 598 at 609, 22 A.R. 131 at 147-48 (C.A.),
and Len Pugh, supra note 254.
Difficulties arise in reconciling the recovery of interest "as" damages with the
mandatory provisions for the recovery of pre-judgment interest "on" damages [for example, the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 76, s. 1(1)]. In Heer v. Kamali,
unreported, April 15, 1980 (B.C.S.C.), Lander J. overcame this problem by awarding
interest on the judgment simultaneously as damages and as pre-judgment interest. There
are, however, conceptual problems with this approach. It seems more sound simply to
award pre-judgment interest at the plaintiff's borrowing rate. See, for instance, Prince
Albert Pulp Co. v. Foundation Co. of Canada, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 200, 1 C.P.C. 74, 8
N.R. 181; Heeney v. Best (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 71, 108 D.L.R. (3d) 366, 11 C.C.L.T.
66, rev'g. in part, 94 D.L.R. (3d) 451; Lepin v. Uniguard Mutual Ins. Co., [1976]
I.L.R. 1-788 (B.C.S.C.); Glanfield v. Madison, unreported, July 18, 1977 (B.C.S.C.).
Unfortunately this will generate inadequate compensation, since pre-judgment interest
cannot be compounded.
Other courts have refused to assess the rate of pre-judgment interest as the plaintiff's rate of borrowing: N. American Car (Canada) v. Fort Nelson Forest Inc., unreported, April 7, 1977 (B.C.S.C.); Alpulka Inv. Ltd. v. Uniguard Mutual Ins. Co., [1978]
I.L.R. 1-1023 (B.C.S.C.); Tate & Lyle Food and Dist. Ltd. v. Greater London Council,
[1981] 3 All E.R. 716 at 722 (Q.B.).
Claims for interest as damages have been dismissed on the authority of The
Liesbosch: Seigo v. Crompton and Leslie, unreported, Aug. 28, 1978 (B.C.S.C.); Kam
Collision Repairs (1970) Ltd. v. Alpine Sales Ltd., unreported, Jan. 12, 1976 (B.C.S.C.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, NO. I

(e) Conversion: Only one Canadian case remains to be considered. In Stilling v. Clarke Simpkins Ltd.311 the plaintiff gave his old truck plus a $1,025
cheque to the defendants in return for a new truck. The deal was cancelled
and the trucks re-exchanged, but the defendants cashed his cheque anyway.
He had insufficient remaining money to buy a truck3m from another firm,
and was unable to undertake various jobs that required one. His claim for
lost profits was rejected on the ground that "the plaintiff cannot recover
damages-real though they may be-which arose out of his own impecuniosity."3 13
The decision could perhaps be supported on the grounds of remoteness, but The Liesbosch was inapplicable: if ever there was a plaintiff whose
impecuniosity could be traced to the defendant's wrongful acts, Stilling was
that plaintiff. Unfortunately the judge did not consider this point: he cited
The Liesbosch but did not comment upon it.
3.

Conclusion
Although The Liesbosch has been cited many times to explain a court's
refusal to allow the recovery of losses which a non-impecunious person
would not have suffered, it has seldom been analysed. As a result, the decisions have not established any general principles to guide the courts in future
cases.
At the appellate level the status of The Liesbosch remains unclear. At
the House of Lords, The Liesbosch stands alone; the issue it raised has not
been considered since 1933. 314 In England and in New Zealand the decision
has been relegated to the limbo of legal history by the courts of appeal,
which have held that the test of reasonable foresight applies to damages
flowing in part from the plaintiff's impecuniosity. Outside Canada, The
Liesbosch has been followed in recent years only in a series of Australian
trial decisions devoid alike of reasoning and of authority 31 and in a few
isolated decisions from South Africa and Barbados.
This leaves appellate decisions in Canada and The Liesbosch itself. But
the latter affords no guidance. The basis of the rule laid down by Lord
Wright, which alone can determine if the rule survives The Wagon Mound,
remains unclear. In addition, a fundamental problem lies in the widespread
The Liesbosch should not be applied in such circumstances, for the plaintiff is not
impecunious in the usual sense, i.e., lacking both cash and credit. The question here is
not the amount of money to which the injured party has access, but the manner in
which he must gain access to it: the questions, though easily confused, are distinct.
311 (1951), 2 W.W.R. 302 (B.C.S.C.).
3 12
The defendants offered to return the $1,025, and it would seem that the plaintiffs inability to purchase another truck would be attributable to his refusal to accept
this offer. But truck prices had risen in the interim, and the offer came too late.
313 Supra note 311, at 303, citing only The Liesbosch.
314 See the rather disparaging remark by Viscount Simonds in The Wagon Mound,
supra note 122, at 423-24 (A.C.), 139-40 (W.L.R.), 414 (All E.R.).
315 In addition to the cases cited elsewhere, see Antonatos v. Dunlop Ins. Co.,
[1968] Qd. R. 114 (S.C.).
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disagreement over what the rule says. Some courts have taken it to say that
impecuniosity excuses a failure to mitigate. Other courts have taken it to say
the opposite. It has even been taken to say that a party may not recover lost
profits when his impecuniosity would have prevented his earning those profits in any event, 316 a rule which need not look to The Liesbosch for support.A17 All this confusion has rendered The Liesbosch irrelevant; a decision
that may be interpreted in any of several conflicting ways, each of which
finds case support, can aptly be described as devoid of authority.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada afford little guidance. The
Court may or may not have approved the foresight test in General Securities
Ltd. v. Don Ingram Ltd.318 The case is ambiguous. Kerwin J. referred to The
Liesbosch in his judgment in R. v. C.P.R.,319 but again in ambiguous terms.m2
Rand J. clearly assumed in Dawson321 that unforeseeable impecuniosity
does not excuse a failure to mitigate; this is the only principle which finds
explicit Supreme Court approval. Some guidance can be found in decisions
of provincial courts of appeal but these decisions are restricted to three or
four provinces.
In light of this relative silence, Canadian trial courts, and all Canadian
appellate courts, are free to answer at least the first of the following questions as they choose:
(1) Should losses flowing wholly or in part from the plaintiff's impecuniosity
be recoverable, and if so, under what circumstances?
(2) Is it meaningful to draw a distinction between the concepts of mitigation
and of heads of damages, and if so, should impecuniosity excuse a failure to
mitigate even though the circumstances outlined in response to the first question
are absent?

The discussion of these questions will occupy the remainder of this paper.
V. THE PLAINTIFF'S IMPECUNIOSITY: HOW IT SHOULD
BE TREATED
A. Impecuniosity in Relation to Heads of Damage
Reserving for the next section the difficult task of trying to separate
problems of mitigation from problems of heads of damage, it is possible at
311 Trans Canada Forest Products Ltd. v. Heap, Waterous Ltd., [1952] 1 D.L.R.
827 at 843 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd on appeal, [1953] 3 D.L.R. 672 (C.A.), trial decision
restored, [1954] S.C.R. 240.
317 The rule is a consequetnce of the "but for" test of causation: McCain Produce
Co. v. C.P. Ltd. (1980), 30 N.B.R. (2d) 476 at 519-20 (C.A.).
3 8
l Supra note 126.
319 [19471 S.C.R. 185 at 189-90.
320 After quoting a portion of Lord Wright's judgment, he quoted from Hay (or
Bourhill) v. Young, supra note 123, to the effect that damages in tort are restricted to
"direct consequences" of the tort. This suggests that the rule in The Liesbosch was
viewed by Kerwin J. as exemplifying that rule, in which case the two rules perished
together, but later courts have sometimes taken this decision as approving the denial
of damages flowing from the plaintiff's impecuniosity.
321
Supra note 277.
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this stage to consider those problems which seem clearly to have nothing to
do with mitigation. Such a problem would arise, for example, in a foreclosure case. If A injures B so that B is deprived of his earning power and
consequently finds himself unable to meet the mortgage payments due on
his house, which is ultimately sold at a forced sale for a price substantially
below its true value, can B recover the deficiency from A?
To this there are only two defensible answers. One is that such a loss,
attributable as it is not only to A's wrong but also B's impecuniosity, can
never be recovered. The other is that this loss, being of a unique type,32 2 is
recoverable if it meets the usual criteria for recoverability: causation alone
in some intentional torts, 323 or both causation and foreseeability in contract
and in the unintentional torts. Either of these answers could be given without logical inconsistencies entering the law, and it is only possible to set out
their competing merits, leaving the reader to choose between them.
Adoption of the second answer, that foreseeability and causation should
together determine recoverability, has the disadvantage of complexity: it
would require the courts to answer questions which they have never yet had
to answer, and which may indeed be unanswerable. An example will suffice
to demonstrate this. Suppose, to make the argument as strong as possible,
that X is totally conversant with even the most intimate details of Y's life:
he knows that Y has $900 in the bank and no other assets, that Y requires
$600 per month to live, that Y's only source of income is his job, which
pays $950 each month, and that Y is buying a car under a conditional sales
agreement which requires him to pay $250 per month. Suppose that X, who
is Y's employer, wrongfully dismisses Y without the requisite two months
notice. Could X have foreseen that Y's car might be repossessed?
At the very least, X could only foresee repossession if he could foresee
default. So could he have foreseen that Y might be forced to default on his
car payments? X knows that Y can weather one month's unemployment, but
that before two months have passed he must somehow obtain another $800
in addition to his savings, or he will be forced to default. Since Y would
have earned $1,900 if he had ben given appropriate notice, this is equivalent to saying that his wage loss flowing from the wrongful dismissal will be
no more than $1,100. X's ability to foresee a default thus depends in part on
his ability to foresee the pecuniary loss which his wrong will cause Y to
suffer, and even better foresight would be demanded of one not so conversant with his opponent's affairs.
322 It seems likely that the courts will treat the "type" in question as "damages
attributable to impecuniosity."
3
Davis, supra note 270 (breach of fiduiciary duty); Siametis v. Trojan Horse
(Burlington) Inc. (1980), 25 O.R. (2d) 120, afl'd, (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 782 (C.A.)

(fraud);

Allan v. New Mt. Sinai Hospital (1980),

109

D.L.R.

(3d)

634,

11

C.C.L.T. 299 (Ont. H.C.), new trial ordered (1982), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 276 (C.A.)
(battery); Olby, supra note 270 (deceit); Bettell v. Yim (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 617, 88
D.L.R. (3d) 543, 5 C.C.L.T. 66 (Co. Ct.) (assault); but compare Fabbi, supra note
251, where the foresight test of remoteness was applied, without discussion, to damages
in the intentional tort of inducing breach of contract, and C.R.F. Holdings, supra note*
190.
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This illustrates a general rule. In deciding if it was foreseeable that a
plaintiff would have suffered losses which only an impecunious person would
have suffered, a court must first decide if it was foreseeable that he would
be impecunious-that is, required to make an expenditure beyond his
means-after being injured; this requires some estimate of the quantum of
pecuniary loss which it was foreseeable the injury would cause him.
The question of the foreseeability of quantum presents, however, various difficult conceptual problems. Indeed, the rule making the recoverability
of losses of a particular type independent of the foreseeability of their quantum was probably adopted largely in order to circumvent them. 324 But if the
recovery of losses attributable to an injured party's impecuniosity is to depend on the foreseeability of such losses, these problems will eventually have
to be confronted.
A test, the adoption of which would ultimately force the courts to
answer a question that they have resolutely avoided in the past, may be
criticized on the ground that it is unworkable. Only experience will show if
such criticism is well-founded.
Leaving practical problems behind, the problems of principle which
adoption of the foresight test might present should be considered. The concept of "remoteness" is a device to restrict both the number of claimants
and the quantum of their awards, and the foresight test must prove that it
will extend neither beyond acceptable bounds.
One fear is easily allayed. Adoption of the foresight test would not result in the proliferation of claims, for claims in negligence and in contract
are limited by the twin concepts of duty and privity respectively. The foresight test would affect neither of these; its adoption would affect only the
measure of damages recoverable by one to whom the defendant had already
been found to have owed a duty of care, or with whom the defendant had
already been found to have contracted.The foresight test will, however, certainly increase the size of some
awards, and so the question is whether it will increase them unduly. It has
the potential to do so, because of the nature of economic "leverage." A precarious financial empire might be tipped into insolvency for want of a relatively small sum, and it might seem harsh to hold a wrongdoer responsible
for all the resulting losses. It is unlikely that such losses will often meet the
foresight test, but what if certain minor losses flowing from the combination
of injured company's cash-flow problems and the wrongdoer's acts could
have been foreseen? Must the wrongdoer pay for the immense losses that
actually resulted?
24

1n Wroth v. Tyler, supra note 142, at 61 (Ch.), 450 (W.L.R.), 922-23 (All
E.R.), Megarry J. accepted this as the rationale of the rule.
325
In J.R.S. Holdings Ltd. v. Dist. of Maple Ridge (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 398,
27 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C.), the plaintiff sought to recover levies he had allegedly paid
under "practical compulsion" when his impecuniosity prevented him from resisting the
defendant's unlawful demands. Berger J. rejected his claim: "Impecuniosity ought not
to be considered a factor in recovery. To hold otherwise would be to put a premium
on poor business judgment." [at 407 (D.L.R.), 46 (B.C.L.R.)].
Z

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, NO. 1

Although at first glance it might seem that he must, this need not be so.
If the wrongdoer's acts caused the injured company only minor losses (other
than those attributable to its impecuniosity), then the recoverable damages
may be reduced on causal grounds. A company so close to the brink of
insolvency might well have stumbled over unaided, and the losses it suffers0
when pushed over that brink must be discounted to reflect that probability.8
Ofi the other hand, if the wrongdoer's acts caused the injured company
enormous losses (other than those attributable to its impecuniosity), then
it does not seem overly harsh to hold him responsible for the additional
losses flowing from the combination of his acts and the injured company's
impecuniosity. In either case, the wrongdoer need not be held liable for an
unwarranted sum. The foresight test would not increase quantum unduly.
There is another problem of principle that the foresight test might present. Following the suggestion in Alberta Caterers,327 it might be argued that
an impecunious plaintiff is unworthy of relief; like a cyclist who insists on
riding without a helmet, one who goes through life without financial reserves
sufficient to cushion him from the impact of another's negligence should be
able to recover only the losses which he would have suffered if he had taken
precautions to protect himself.
There is no merit to this argument. 328 For many persons the lack of
financial reserves is a matter of necessity, not choice, and it seems hard to
fault a man for not retaining money that he never had. Even in the commercial context, where the decision to establish a business usually represents
a choice made freely and with knowledge of the reserves that the embryonic
business will possess upon birth, the argument is fallacious. Not only is it
impossible to maintain "sufficient" reserves-for there is no reserve that
might not be exhausted if a wrongdoer's acts were to place a sufficient strain
on it-but the argument runs counter to basic economic principles. The vitality of our economy depends to a great extent on the small businessman
who is willing to take a risk. By penalizing those persons who establish a
32

6 The discounted award is equal to the product of the lost profits and the probability of their having been earned if the plaintiff had not been wronged [Multi-Malls,
supra note 256; Talbot v. Gen. T.Y. Corp. Ply., [1980] V.R. 224 at 253 (S.C.)]. The
propriety of this arithmetic approach was treated as open to question in M.J.BL Ent.
Ltd. v. People's Food Mkt. Ltd. (1979), 11 B.C.L.R. 130 at 141 (C.A.). The probability must be established by the defendant: Kohler v. Thorold Natural Gas Co.
(1916), 52 S.C.R. 514, 27 D.L.R. 319.
The plaintiff's award should be discounted whenever the probability exceeds some
de minimus level, which need not be as high as 50%. The appropriate level should be
the level which the probability of future losses must exceed before it can be used to
increase his award: see Kovats v. Ogilvie (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 343 (B.C.C.A.);
Mallett v. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166 at 176, [1969] 2 All E.R. 178 at 190, [1969]
2 W.L.R. 767 at 772 (H.L.); Davies v. Taylor, [1974] A.C. 207, [1972] 3 All E.R. 836,
[1972] 3 W.L.R. 801 (H.L.); Schrump v. Koot (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 337, 82 D.L.R.
(3d) 553, 4 C.C.L.T. 74 (C.A.).
27
Supra note 293 and accompanying text.
32
8 It may be negligent to put oneself in a precarious financial position: Rowe v.
Turner Hopkins & Partners,[1980] 2 N.Z.L.R. 550 at 566 (H.C.).
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business when they are not in a position to protect themselves against the
risk of another's negligence or breach of contract, the courts would in effect
be declaring that such small businessmen have no place in society. This
would be wrong both philosophically and economically.
In summary, the only disadvantage of the foresight test lies in its potential to confront the court with problems of extreme complexity. The only
disadvantage of the "no recovery" rule lies in its denial of recovery to those
who might be seen as deserving of compensation. The choice between the
two is ultimately a policy choice which the courts must make.
B.

Impecuniosity in Relation to Mitigation

However one answers the first question, it remains to consider the significance of an injured party's financial inability to mitigate his losses. Before
the issues can be formulated in a meaningful manner, the term "mitigation"
must be defined. Properly understood, it refers to the principle that an injured party cannot recover losses 32 9 which he could have avoided by "reasonably" acting, or ceasing to act, 330 in a certain way. In other words, an
injured party whose losses will continue to increase as long as a certain state
of affairs exists must take all reasonable steps to terminate that state of
affairs. If he fails to take adequate steps, then he will not be able to recover
the increased losses, even if they meet the tests of causation and foreseeability, unless his inactivity was reasonable. The courts have often found
inactivity to have been reasonable when no reasonable steps would have terminated the state of affairs under which the injured party's losses were increasing. In principle, inactivity should also be reasonable whenever the injured party has no reason to believe that his losses will continue to increase.
If the vendor fails to deliver an item destined solely for the purchaser's personal use, and not intended to be used in any profit-earning capacity, only
the difference between the market price of a substitute and the contract price
is generally recoverable. The purchaser, normally unable to predict market
fluctuations, will have no reason to believe that the market will rise and his
losses increase; he should therefore be able to excuse his failure to purchase
a replacement. The law has, however, developed a "breach-date" rule to the
effect that damages will be assessed as of the date of breach. 33 ' the rule against
the recovery of avoidable loss can be phrased as follows: an injured party
cannot recover losses which increased during the continuance of a certain
329Feldman and Libling argue in Inflation and the Duty to Mitigate (1979), 95
L.Q. Rev. 270 that one need not act to avoid losses consisting only of inflationary
increases in the cost of replacement goods. This was approved in Anchorage Asphalt
Paving Co. v. Lewis, 629 P. 2d 65, at 68-69 (Alaska S.C. 1981), but see Leitch Trans-

port Ltd. v. Neonex Int'l Ltd. (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 363, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 315, 8
B.L.R. 357 (C.A.).
330 The rule that a party need not accept the other's repudiation, but may continue
to perform under the contract, set down in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor,
[19621 A.C. 413, [1961] 3 All E.R. 1178, [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17 (H.L.), rests on shaky
ground in Canada: Finelli v. Dee, [1968] 1 O.R. 676, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 393 (C.A.);
Asamera Oil, supra note 5, at 668-69 (S.C.R.), 26-27 (D.L.R.), 328-30 (W.W.R.).
331 Supranote 277.
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state of affairs, providing he could reasonably have predicted such an increase and taken steps to terminate the state of affairs that brought it about.
The question dealt with in this section is this: in applying the rule
against the recovery of avoidable losses, when should the injured party's
impecuniosity be taken into account in characterizing steps as reasonable or
unreasonable? It is not necessarily possible to consider this question independently of the question posed in the preceding section. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff's profit-earning chattel could have been repaired in
thirty days, but that owing to his impecuniosity it remains unrepaired at the
date of trial. The profits lost after the initial thirty-day period can be viewed
as damages of a special type, flowing as they do from the injured party's
impecuniosity. The test of their recoverability then depends on the answer
given to the question posed in the preceding section. Conversely, the entirety
of the lost profits can be viewed as damages of one type, where the profits
lost after the intial thirty-day period would usually be avoided, so that the
test of their recoverability depends on the answer to the question posed in
this section.3 32 Questions of mitigation always have this dual nature. Yet in
deciding if a plaintiffs psychological inabilities excuse his failure to mitigate
his losses, the courts have always considered the question to be one of mitigation.3 33 They could have phrased the question as one of heads of damage
with equal validity. The losses that a psychologically-normal plaintiff would
reasonably have mitigated could be described as damages of a special type.
The court could then ask whether damages of that type met the test of remoteness. The question of whether a plaintiff's psychological inabilities excuse his failure to mitigate his losses, and the question of whether a plaintiff's financial inabilities excuse his failure to mitigate his losses, may have
different answers, but they should have the same characterization. The latter,
like the former, should be seen as a question of mitigation and not of heads
of damage.
Whether or not a plaintiff's impecuniosity should excuse his failure to
mitigate his losses must depend on the reasons underlying the rule against
the recovery of avoidable losses. The plaintiff would not have suffered the
losses if the wrongdoer had not acted as he did. They are losses of foreseeable type. The wrongdoer may not have anticipated, or even have been
able to foresee, that the extent of those losses would increase while the injured party sat idly by, but the unforeseeability of quantum has never been
held to justify the denial of recovery. Prima facie, then, avoidable losses
should be recoverable.
It is insufficient to state in opposition to this that the injured party owes
the wrongdoer a duty to mitigate his losses, for this leaves unanswered the
logically anterior question: why do the courts impose such a duty on him?
Nor is it enough to describe the issue as one of causation. For example,
332 The choice of one of these two seems to underlie almost every Canadian decision mentioned in this paper, but no decision has yet mentioned the existence of two
alternatives.
333 Supra note 113 et seq.
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postulate an employer who wrongfully dismisses an employee who could
obtain alternate employment after sixty days, but who decides to remain idle
for one hundred and twenty days. The first sixty days' lost wages are attributable to the refusal of potential employers to enter into a contract of
employment with the ex-employee. In the same way, the second sixty days'
lost wages are attributable to the refusal of the ex-employee to enter into
, contract of employment with potential employers. As a matter of causation, there is no difference between the two. To state that losses caused by
one innocent party's refusal to act are recoverable whereas those caused by
another innocent party's refusal to act are not, and to describe the difference
between the two as a difference in causation, is to conceal under the guise
of causation the fundamental value judgment that the victim, and only the
victim, must act to minimize the losses flowing from a wrongdoer's acts.
That judgment must still be supported.
The rule against the recovery of avoidable losses can be explained on
economic and moral grounds. The economic argument is based on "the desirability ot avoiding economic waste. ' 33 4 Avoidable losses represent economic
waste, and so the injured party who incurs them is penalized as an example
to those who might be tempted to follow his lead. Seen in this way, the
rule against the recovery of avoidable losses is designed to deter economically undesirable behaviour.
The moral argument is based on an intuitive feeling that, for reasons
that cannot be logically explained, an injured party who fails to mitigate his
losses is at fault, and should be punished accordingly. On this basis ignorance of one's ability to mitigate should excuse a failure to do so, 3 as
should a psychological inability to mitigate, 336 because neither of them reflects any fault on the injured party's part. Seen in this way, the rule against
the recovery of avoidable losses is designed to punish morally undesirable
behaviour.
Under either view, an injured party's financial inability to mitigate his
losses should excuse his failure to mitigate. His punishment could not deter
others, for those others still have no alternative but to remain idle while
their losses increase. Nor can he be faulted for his failure to do the impossible. The purpose of the rule, be it to deter the wasteful or to punish
the blameworthy, would not be furthered by penalizing an impecunious
plaintiff for his failure to mitigate. Yet if the rule against the recovery of
avoidable loss is inapplicable, there is no reason to deny him recovery. Impecuniosity should excuse a failure to mitigate.
Certainly this leaves many questions unanswered. Many cases have held
that losses suffered in counterproductive attempts to mitigate one's fore3 34
Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1977) at 460.
See also Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1973) at
188-91.
335 Eley v. Bedford, L1972] 1 Q.B. 155, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 563, [1971] 3 All E.R.
285 (Q.B.).
336 Elloway, supranote 113.
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seeable losses are recoverable providing those attempts were reasonable. 83 7
The resulting damages need not have been foreseeable. 338 Does this mean
that losses flowing from counter-productive attempts to mitigate foreseeable
losses should be recoverable by an unforeseeably impecunious plaintiff, if
the attempts are only reasonable insight of his poverty? The question of
whether a plaintiff's impecuniosity excuses his failure to avoid losses that
even a non-impecunious plaintiff would have suffered, albeit to a lesser extent should be characterized as a question of mitigation. Even unforeseeable
impecuniosity should excuse such a failure. How should the law characterize
the question of whether an unforeseeably impecunious plaintiff can recover
foreseeable damages that should have been avoided in their entirety by any
non-impecunious person in his position? 39 Is this a question of mitigation
or of heads of damage? The answers to these and many other questions must
await further development in the law concerning mitigation generally.
VI. SUMMARY
An injured party's impecuniosity can affect the measure of his losses in
many ways. Two of those ways in particular have come under examination
in recent years: his impecuniosity might cause him to suffer losses of a kind
that only an impecunious person would have suffered, or it might render
him powerless to mitigate certain of his losses that even a non-impecunious
person would have suffered, though for a shorter time and accordingly to a
lesser extent. In each case the question whether the resulting losses can be
recovered at law arises. The two questions thus generated are traditionally
expressed in terms of heads of damage and of mitigation: can impecuniosity
give rise to new heads of damage, and can it excuse a failure to mitigate?
The two questions overlap to some extent, but can be separated if the concept of mitigation is closely analysed; most of the inconsistencies in the reported cases stem from a failure to do so.
The first question had not been explicitly addressed in 1933. Various
cases involving a failure to deliver goods, to replace stock, or to loan money,
suggested that impecuniosity could in some circumstances give rise to new
337 Cases which either refer only to the necessity of the plaintiff's steps having been
reasonable and make no mention of their foreseeability, or state explicitly that the steps
need only have been reasonable, include Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Modern
Cars and Caravans (Kingston) Ltd., [1966] 1 Q.B. 764, [1964] 2 All E.R. 732, [1964]
3 W.L.R. 859 (Q.B.); N.Z. Forest Products Ltd. v. O'Sullivan, [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 80
at 83 (S.C.); Hoffberger v. Ascot Int'l Bloodstock Bureau Ltd. (1976), 120 Sol. J. 130
(C.A.); PopularHomes, supra note 191, at 654; Hawboldt Ind. Ltd. v. Sanborn's Motor
Express Ltd. (1979), 36 N.S.R. (2d) 1 at 14, 64 A.P.R. 1 at 14 (S.C., Tr. Div.); . &
J.C. Abrams Ltd. v. Ancliffe, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 420 at 432 (S.C.), aff'd [1981] 1
N.Z.L.R. 244 (C.A.) and Simonius Vischer & Co. v. Holt, [1979] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 322
at 355-56 (C.A.).
338
McMorran's Cordova Bay Ltd. v. Harman & Co., [1980] 2 W.W.R. 499, 106
D.L.R. (3d) 495, 17 B.C.L.R. 173 (C.A.). Other cases fail to distinguish between
"reasonable" and "foreseeable": Farish v. National Trust Co., [1975] 3 W.W.R. 499, 54
D.L.R. (3d) 426 (B.C.S.C.); Monias v. Antoskio, unreported, June 5, 1978 (Man.

C.A.).
339 Walton, supra note 75, involved such a question.
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heads of damage. A handful of cases involving lost profits suggested that
this applied to contract but not to tort, and still other cases involving involuntary bankruptcy suggested that impecuniosity could never give rise to
new heads of damage. The cases generally supported only one principle, that
impecuniosity could in some circumstances give rise to new heads of damage
in contract. The second question, though it had arisen less often, had been
addressed more explicitly and with less ambiguity, and the cases indicated
that impecuniosity would indeed excuse a failure to mitigate.
In The Liesbosch, Lord Wright denied the recovery of losses attributable to the injured party's impecuniosity. His decision can be, and has been,
interpreted to support numerous theories, but is best understood as saying
only that losses resulting from an injured party's impecuniosity are not
"direct" consequences of the wrongdoer's acts. On this basis, his speech lost
all relevance with the demise of the rule in Re Polemis.
The current view in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom is that
impecuniosity does excuse a failure to mitigate. The courts of both nations
agree also that impecuniosity can give rise to new heads of damage, provided
those damages meet the usual remoteness tests. The two countries differ as
to whether such damages can fall under the first branch of the rule in Hadley
v. Baxendale, and can be foreseen in the absence of special knowledge.
Neither question has received much consideration outside those two
countries and Canada. In Canada, however, the questions have arisen in
numerous cases. The decisions seldom contain any analysis of the issues involved, seldom recognize the existence of earlier cases dealing with the same
points, and are often irreconcilable. It is therefore possible for almost any
court to give any answer to either question.
As a matter of principle, it seems that the second question should be
answered 'in the affirmative; impecuniosity, even unforeseeable impecuniosity, should excuse a failure to mitigate. The first question cannot be resolved
on logical grounds, however, and its answer must represent a fundamental
value choice by the courts. Whatever the choice that will ultimately be made,
a strong decision squarely facing up to some of the problems presented by
these two questions must eventually come down, for in the present state of
the law it is impossible to predict how any court will resolve any issue that
involves an impecunious plaintiff seeking to recover damages in respect of
losses that a person of greater means would have suffered to a lesser extent
if at all.

